Estate of Mears
| Decision Date | 13 December 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 4-82-0230,4-82-0230 |
| Citation | 443 N.E.2d 289,110 Ill.App.3d 1133 |
| Parties | , 66 Ill.Dec. 606 ESTATE OF Frances A. MEARS, deceased. Ruth Koontz CORDIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Gordon BRADY, et al., Respondents-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jack C. Vieley, Atty. at Law, Peoria, for petitioner-appellant.
Dunn, Brady, Goebel, Ulbrich, Morel, Kombrink & Hundman, Attys. at Law, Bloomington, for Illinois Wesleyan Univ.; William Goebel, Bloomington, of counsel.
James C. Wollrab, Costigan & Wollrab, Attys. at Law, Bloomington, for Hubert Ellis heirs.
Robert M. Travers, Fellheimer, Fellheimer, O'Dell & Travers, Ltd., Attys. at Law, Pontiac, for Mary Arthur heirs.
Frances A. Mears died testate and her will was admitted to probate in the circuit court of Livingston County. The principal beneficiary of that will is Illinois Wesleyan University of Bloomington, which receives all of the residue of the substantial estate after the payment of a number of specific monetary legacies. The testator was widowed and childless and her heirs were 53 known nieces and nephews of the whole and half blood and descendants of other such nieces and nephews as predeceased her. Other heirs, if any, were unknown.
Within the time limited by law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110 1/2, par. 8-1(a)) the petitioner, an heir and legatee of the testator, filed a petition to contest the validity of the will and named therein as respondents all of the heirs and legatees, but did not name as a respondent the executor to whom letters had issued. In the body of the petition it was alleged that the executor had been nominated in the will and that letters had issued to him.
The executor filed a special and limited appearance for the purpose of contesting the jurisdiction of the circuit court. It alleged the failure to name him as a party respondent and that the time for filing a proper petition had expired. Illinois Wesleyan University, joined by several of the heirs, filed a motion to dismiss on the same grounds.
The circuit court of Livingston County held a hearing on the appearance and the motion and dismissed the petition with prejudice, holding that the failure to join the executor deprived it of jurisdiction. The petitioner appeals and we reverse.
The trial court placed great emphasis on a portion of section 8-1(a) of the Probate Act. That section, after limiting the period for filing a petition to contest the validity of a will, provides: "The representative, if any, and all the heirs and legatees of the testator must be made parties to the proceeding * * *." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110 1/2, par. 8-1(a).) The court stressed the word "must" and held that its jurisdiction derived from the statute. Undoubtedly the statute mandates the joinder of the representative, but the court was in error in determining that its jurisdiction flowed from the statute.
Jurisdiction is the life-spirit of the judiciary and is just as difficult of description as is the life-force of homo sapiens. However, while the origin of the life-force of humans remains a divine mystery, the origin of jurisdiction is secular and may be traced. A brief sketch of its origin and subsequent career in this State may be helpful in illuminating the question presented in the case at bar.
Let us accept for purposes of discussion a simplistic definition of jurisdiction as being the power to adjudicate. In the history of this State that power has found itself engaged in a tug-and-pull imbroglio between the courts and the legislature.
The Illinois Constitution of 1818 represented a legislative dominance of the matter. Article IV, section 4, of that document provided in part: "[T]he said justices [of the supreme court], respectively, shall hold circuit court in the several counties, in such manner and at such times, and shall have and exercise such jurisdiction as the general assembly shall by law prescribe."
The legislature moved at an early date to implement this provision. Section 26 of "An Act regulating and defining the duties of the justices of the supreme court," approved March 31, 1819, provided:
"And be it further enacted, That the said circuit courts shall be holden at the respective court-houses of said counties; and the said justices respectively, in their respective circuits, shall have jurisdiction over all causes, matters, and things at common law and in chancery, arising in each of the counties in their respective circuits, where the debt or demand shall exceed the sum of $20." Laws of Illinois 1819, page 380.
Article IV, section 4, of the Constitution of 1818 provided for the appointment of the justices of the supreme court and judges of the inferior courts by the legislature. After the appointment of circuit judges, the same strictures on jurisdiction were placed on them by the legislature. Section 18 of "An Act regulating the Supreme and Circuit Courts, in force July 1, 1829" provided:
"The said circuit courts shall be holden at the respective court houses of said counties, and the said judges respectively, in their respective circuits shall have jurisdiction over all matters and suits at common law and in chancery, arising in each of the counties in their respective circuits, where the debt or demand shall exceed twenty dollars." Revised Laws of Illinois, 1833, 151-52.
The supreme court took an exceedingly expansive view of this grant of jurisdiction and stated:
Beaubien v. Brinckerhoff (1840), 3 Ill. 269, 273.
Here was the nativity of the concept that jurisdiction flowed from the legislature through its statutory enactments. This was preserved in the Constitution of 1848 which to a large extent curbed Judge Lockwood's "original and unlimited" idea of jurisdiction set forth in Beaubien. Article V, section 5, of the Constitution of 1848 granted the supreme court original jurisdiction in a limited number of cases and appellate jurisdiction in all others. Section 8 was restrictive as to the circuit courts and incorporated the "law and equity" concept found in the early statutes:
"[S]aid courts shall have jurisdiction in all cases at law and equity, and in all cases of appeals from all inferior courts." Ill. Const.1848, art. V, sec. 8.
So matters stood until the Constitution of 1870. That document took a cautious step forward by conferring "original" jurisdiction in law and equity on the circuit courts, but declined Beaubien's "unlimited." It stated:
"The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction of all causes in law and equity, and such appellate jurisdiction as is or may be provided by law, * * *." Ill. Const.1870, art. VI, sec. 12.
As happened in 1840 with Beaubien, the supreme court took an equally expansive view of "original" jurisdiction and asserted in Myers v. People (1873), 67 Ill. 503, 509, "The legislature, therefore, has no power to abridge the original jurisdiction of the circuit court."
The appellate court stated the concept more poetically in Ide v. Sayer (1888), 30 Ill.App. 210, 216-17:
"The jurisdiction of the County Court does not resemble that of the Circuit Court, which is original 'of all cases in law and equity' (Sec. 12, Art. 6, Const.), undefined, general, like space, ending nowhere, and embracing all that is."
The law became well-settled that the legislature could not infringe on the "law and equity" jurisdiction of the circuit courts. However, power was retained in the legislature to regulate proceedings which did not have their ancestry in the traditional forms. A concise statement is found in People v. Graw (1936), 363 Ill. 205, 208, 2 N.E.2d 71, 72-73:
After the adoption of the Constitution of 1870, the legislature exercised its retained power in a variety of ways. It provided jurisdiction over matters which had no roots in traditional law and equity, e.g., probate, and even at times legislated without objection on matters which were traditionally part of inherent chancery jurisdiction; e.g., section 1 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to injunction" (Revised Statutes 1874, page 579) which conferred on the circuit courts and the circuit judges the power to grant writs of injunction. The bench and bar fell into the habit of looking to the statutes as a source of jurisdiction and largely ignoring the other sources.
A revolution was wrought, almost without a murmur, by the Judicial Article of 1962, effective January 1, 1964. That provided:
"The Circuit Court shall have unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, and such powers of review of administrative action as may be provided by law." (Ill. Const.1870, art. VI (amended), sec. 9.)
It is noteworthy that this is the exact language employed by the supreme court in Beaubien 122 years before. Now for the first time in the history of the State jurisdiction was out of the hands of the legislature except for administrative review and instead of looking for a statutory fiat, the bench and bar were required to determine the nature of a "justiciable matter." Grappling with this problem is still going on and its very...
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