Estate of Neill v. Earls
| Decision Date | 28 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-CA-00177-COA |
| Parties | IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA HINES NEILL, DECEASED: JOHN H. HINES APPELLANT v. JERRY GLEN EARLS APPELLEE |
| Court | Mississippi Court of Appeals |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 01/15/2021.
HINDS COUNTY CHANCERY COURT, SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT, HON. TIFFANY PIAZZA GROVE, TRIAL JUDGE.
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: J. PEYTON RANDOLPH II, RICK D. PATT.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: H. BYRON CARTER III.
EN BANC
¶1. John Hines, as the executor for the estate of his sister Patricia Hines Neill, appeals from the Hinds County Chancery Court's order instructing him to revise an "Executor's Deed" which provided for the transfer of Neill's property. Specifically, the order required Hines to incorporate additional parcels of land to reflect the conveyance of a larger allocation of Neill's property to Jerry Glen Earls based upon Neill's will. Hines claims that the chancery court erred (1) by applying an erroneous legal standard when it interpreted the terms of the will as used by the testator; (2) by concluding that the testator intended to specifically devise all four pieces of property described in a "Corrected Warranty Deed" to Earls; and (3) by disregarding the explicit language of the will that included specific bequests to Hines and a residuary clause naming Hines as the beneficiary. Upon finding that the chancery court erred in its application of the law when it construed the distribution of property at issue, we reverse and remand this case for further determination and to allow the parties to provide extrinsic evidence to support their arguments.
¶2. Patricia Hines Neill died on September 15, 2018, leaving a last will and testament naming her brother, John Hines, as executor of her estate, and devising certain real property to Hines and certain real property to her friend Jerry Glen Earls. Hines petitioned to probate Neill's will, and estate proceedings commenced. On October 31, 2019, the chancery court entered its final order closing Neill's estate and distributing her assets. Relevant to this appeal, the court's order instructed Hines, as executor, to distribute Neill's property and specifically stated:
¶3. Pursuant to the court's order, Hines had a deed prepared (the Executor's Deed) conveying certain real property from Neill's estate to Earls as follows:
Beginning 432 feet fro[m] the North East corner of S.B. Huchins lot, formerly known as Mrs. Carrie Moore lot, on the Carpenter Road opposite the Public school house, running thence South 200 feet, thence West 312 feet, thence North 200 feet, thence East 312 feet to place of beginning commonly known as the Breeden House. It is intended to convey only that house and house lot known as the "Breeden House[.]"
The Executor's Deed was filed on December 10, 2019, and was subsequently provided to Earls's attorney on January 9, 2020. After reviewing the contents of the Executor's Deed, Earls's attorney contacted Hines's attorneys and alleged that there was an issue with the real property description contained in the Executor's Deed.
¶4. On February 14, 2020, Earls filed a motion to correct the error in the Executor's Deed, claiming Hines had misconstrued the terms in Neill's will and had failed to include all the property that was devised to him. Earls argued that he was entitled to receive the entirety of the "Breeden property" that had been conveyed from the Breedens to the Neills on July 14, 1987, by a deed that was titled "Corrected Warranty Deed" and consisted of four separately described parcels of property.[1] Hines then filed his response to Earls's motion and contended that the Executor's Deed appropriately conveyed the property in accordance with the language of the will and the court's final order. Hines argued that the devise to Earls at issue in the will provided a definite description of the property as 216 Carpenter Street. He claimed that this address was an accurate description that corresponded with one of the lots listed in the Corrected Warranty Deed. Thus, Hines contended that because the devise provided an accurate description matching one lot, Earls was only entitled to that singular lot, regardless of whether the lot was a part of a bigger piece of property. Hines further alleged that Earls's claim of error was flawed based upon other specific devises Neill had made in the will. Hines stated that the will specifically devised property at 226 Carpenter Street and 227 Carpenter Street to him and that those two property descriptions corresponded with the lots outlined in the Corrected Warranty Deed. Similarly, he noted that Earls was specifically devised property at 225 Carpenter Street, which Hines alleged was one of the lots described in the Corrected Warranty Deed as well.[2] Lastly, Hines claimed that he was entitled to the remaining property that was not otherwise specifically devised since he was the beneficiary of the residuary clause in Neill's will.
¶5. Upon the chancery court's request to further brief the issues presented, Hines filed his supplemental response to Earls's motion. Hines asserted that the Corrected Warranty Deed from the Breedens conveying the property at issue to the Neills described the boundaries of distinctly separate lots. He then elaborated that the Executor's Deed conveyed only one of the lots because the location of the house at the stated address of 216 Carpenter Street corresponded to the property described as Parcel 1 exclusively. Therefore, Hines urged that the Executor's Deed satisfactorily conveyed to Earls the real property devised to him in the will. Earls subsequently filed his reply, stating that the will had identified each piece of property Neill had owned and distributed it particularly, indicating that Neill did not intend for any real property to pass through the will's residuary clause. Earls also insisted that distributing the entirety of the property in the Corrected Warranty Deed to him would not overlap other bequests to Hines in the will, as Hines had claimed.
¶6. On January 15, 2021, the chancery court entered an order ruling on Earls's motion to correct the alleged error in the Executor's Deed. The court began by focusing its analysis on the testator's intent, noting that the court first must look to the four corners of the will to ascertain Neill's intent. The court stated that the will was detailed and specific and found Based on this finding, the court concluded that the language of the will was unambiguous. Thus, the court initially determined that "the Will deeded to Earls the entirety of the 'Breeden House' property, as originally conveyed by Corrected Warranty Deed from the Breedens to the Neills."
¶7. Following its initial conclusion, the chancery court proceeded to discuss the issue in the alternative under the premise that the will's language was ambiguous. The court immediately turned to the rules of construction from the outset of this discussion and attempted to glean the construction of the ambiguous language that was most consistent with Neill's intent. Without a hearing or receiving additional parol evidence, the court surmised that the Neills had used the lots as one whole piece of property from the date of purchase. The court also stated that the Hinds County Tax Assessor had combined the four parcels described in the Corrected Warranty Deed into one tax parcel when the Neills recorded the Corrected Warranty Deed from the Breedens. These findings led the court to conclude that "the construction most consistent with the intention of the testator [Neill] would be to treat the language 'the lot upon which the residence is situated' to include the entirety of the property deeded from the Breedens to the Neills" in the Corrected Warranty Deed. The court further stated, "The same is the only way to ensure the fulfillment of the clear and obvious intentions of the testator." Based on this conclusion, the court granted Earls's motion to correct the Executor's Deed and ordered Hines to prepare a deed conveying the entirety of the property described in the Corrected Warranty Deed to Earls.[3] Aggrieved by the chancery court's order, Hines appeals.
¶8. "A chancellor's factual findings will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence, but if an erroneous legal standard is applied, appellate review is de novo." In re Est. of Smith v. Flowers, 201 So.3d 1099, 1102 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016). Further, "[w]hen reviewing a chancellor's legal findings, particularly involving the interpretation or construction of a will, this Court will apply a de novo standard of review." Id.
¶9. We find that the chancery court erroneously applied the pertinent legal standard in reaching its conclusion and that the court's factual findings are not supported by substantial evidence based on the existing record.
¶10. To properly construe the distributions provided for in a will, "we must first determine if an ambiguity exi[st]s" in the testator's devise. Id. at (¶14). A will is unambiguous "[i]f the terms of [the] will are plain . . ., taking the whole instrument into consideration," and "the language of [the] will is clear." Carlisle v. Carlisle's Est., 252 So.2d...
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