Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati

• Decision Date: 25 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 1:01 CV 00769.,1:01 CV 00769.
• Citation: 385 F.Supp.2d 619
• Parties: Estate of Roger OWENSBY, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

385 F.Supp.2d 619

Estate of Roger OWENSBY, Jr., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CINCINNATI, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:01 CV 00769.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division.

March 25, 2004.

Mark Theodore Tillar, John J. Helbling, Cincinnati, OH, for Plaintiff.

Gloria J. Sigman, City Solicitors Office, Geri H. Geiler, Donald Edson Hardin, Hardin Lefton Lazarus & Marks, Cincinnati, OH, Neil Frank Freund, Freund Freeze & Arnold, Dayton, OH, Wilson G. Weisenfelder, Jr., Rendigs Fry Kiely & Dennis LLP, Dale Anthony Stalf, Buckley King & Bluso, Cincinnati, OH, for Defendants.

ORDER

SPIEGEL, Senior District Judge.

On November 6, 2001, Roger Owensby, Jr.'s Estate (the "Estate") filed a Complaint against the City of Cincinnati ("Cincinnati" or the "City"), the City of Golf Manor, and Huntington Meadows, as well as numerous police and security officers these Defendants either employed or currently employ (doc. 1). The Complaint raises federal civil rights violations and associated state law claims arising from the death of Roger Owensby, Jr. ("Owensby"), allegedly occurring as a result of unconstitutional and tortious treatment at the hands of the named police and security officers (doc. 1). On August 12, 2003, the City of Cincinnati moved for summary judgment on three categories or aspects of the Estate's claims (doc. 49). The Estate responded on September 4, 2003 (doc. 52), and Cincinnati replied on September 11, 2003 (doc. 53), rendering the matter fully briefed and ripe for decision. For the following reasons, the City's motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I. APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD

The narrow question that this Court must decide on a motion for summary judgment is whether there exists a "genuine issue as to any material fact and [whether] the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The Supreme Court elaborated upon the appropriate standard in deciding a motion for summary judgment as follows:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact as to an essential element of the non-movant's case. See id. at 321, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Guarino v. Brookfield Township Trustees, 980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir.1992); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1479 (6th Cir.1989). If the moving party meets this burden, then the non-moving party "must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); see Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405.

As the Supreme Court stated in Celotex, the non-moving party must "designate" specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405. Although the burden might not require the non-moving party to "designate" facts by citing page numbers, "`the designated portions of the record must be presented with enough specificity that the district court can readily identify the facts upon which the non-moving party relies.'" Guarino, 980 F.2d at 405, quoting InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989).

Summary judgment is not appropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Conclusory allegations, however, are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. See McDonald v. Union Camp Corp., 898 F.2d 1155, 1162 (6th Cir.1990). Furthermore, the fact that the non-moving party fails to respond does not lessen the burden on the moving party or the court to demonstrate that summary judgment is appropriate. See Guarino, 980 F.2d at 410; Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir.1991).

II. RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND

In general, summary judgment motions filed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 involve substantial evidentiary submissions and fact-intensive analyses. To be sure, the parties dispute a number of facts surrounding the instant case. However, the issues raised in the instant motion and the basis for this Court's disposition thereof makes a detailed review of the facts of this case unnecessary. A survey of the general facts forming the basis of the instant suit, as drawn from the Complaint's allegations and the instant motion and subsequent briefing, may be fairly summarized as follows.

On November 7, 2000, Cincinnati Police Officers Patrick Caton ("Caton"), David Hunter ("Hunter"), and Robert Jorg ("Jorg") observed Owensby as he left a Sunoco gas station convenience store. Apparently, the officers believed Owensby to be a man who had evaded police in the same area some weeks earlier. After frisking and questioning him, the officers began to effect his arrest. Owensby attempted to flee, and the officers wrestled him to the ground in response. In the ensuing struggle, during which time additional law enforcement officers named in the suit arrived on the scene, the officers struck and maced Owensby; the Estate alleges that Caton continued to strike Owensby even after he had stopped resisting and been handcuffed.

When the struggle ended, officers transferred Owensby, now motionless, to the back of a nearby Golf Manor police car. The Estate alleges that several minutes elapsed while Owensby lay in the back of the car without receiving any sort of first aid or medical care. It was not until Cincinnati Police Sergeant William ("Pete") Watts arrived on the scene, found Owensby unresponsive, and called for medical assistance that officers began to attend to Owensby's injuries and physical condition. Cincinnati police officers attempted to revive Owensby using CPR; however, they were unsuccessful. He was taken to the University of Cincinnati Hospital where he was pronounced dead at 8:47 p.m. The Estate alleges that Owensby's death certificate lists "mechanical asphyxia" as the official cause of his death (doc. 52).

III. LAW AND DISCUSSION

As noted, Cincinnati advances three general grounds for summary judgment with respect to specific claims advanced by the Estate and/or the damages sought as a remedy therefor. In the first two, Cincinnati avers that it and the individual officers enjoy statutory immunity from some or all of the state law claims advanced in the instant suit; accordingly, these contentions are appropriately addressed together. Finally, the City of Cincinnati also contends that the Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Estate's demand for punitive damages on its wrongful death claim, averring that punitive damages are simply available under Ohio's wrongful death statute.

A. Ohio's Statutory Immunity Provisions

The City invokes two sections of the Ohio Revised Code in support of its contention that it enjoys immunity from the Estate's state law tort claims. Both clearly purport, on their face, to vest both the City and the individual police officer Defendants with some degree of immunity from the Estate's claims. The first, Ohio Rev.Code § 2744.02, vests political subdivisions, such as the City of Cincinnati, with broad statutory immunity from suit. It provides, in relevant part:

(A)(1) For the purposes of this chapter, the functions of political subdivisions are hereby classified as governmental functions and proprietary functions. Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a political subdivision is not liable in damages in a civil action for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision in connection with a governmental or proprietary function.

Ohio Rev.Code § 2744.02(A)(1). The second statutory provision, Ohio Rev.Code § 2744.03, extends a comparable immunity to employees of political subdivisions, such as the individual police officer Defendants, regarding certain claims of negligence arising from acts performed while on duty. It provides that

(A) In a civil action brought against a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision to recover damages for injury, death, or loss to person or property allegedly caused by any act or omission in connection with a governmental or proprietary function, the following defenses or immunities may be asserted to establish nonliability:

. . . . .

(6) In addition to any immunity or defense referred to in division (A)(7) of this section and in circumstances not covered by that division or sections 3314.07 and 3746.24 of the Revised Code, the employee is immune from liability unless one of the following applies:

(a) The employee's acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities;

(b) The employee's acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner; [or]

(c) Civil liability is expressly imposed upon the employee by a section of the Revised Code. Civil liability shall not be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely because that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon an employee, because that section provides for a criminal penalty, because of a general authorization in that section that an employee may sue and be sued, or because the section uses the term "shall" in a provision pertaining to an employee.

Ohio Rev.Code. § 2744.03(A).¹

Reading these sections together, the City contends that it is absolutely immune from all of the Estate's "pendant and ancillary state tort claims" and that the individual officers are immune from the Estate's negligence claims ...