Estate of Pate, Matter of

• Decision Date: 05 July 1995
• Docket Number: No. COA94-724,COA94-724
• Citation: 459 S.E.2d 1,119 N.C.App. 400
• Parties: In the Matter of ESTATE OF Ralph E. PATE, Deceased.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

Page 1

459 S.E.2d 1

119 N.C.App. 400

In the Matter of ESTATE OF Ralph E. PATE, Deceased.

No. COA94-724.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

July 5, 1995.

Rose, Rand, Orcutt, Cauley & Blake, P.A. by William R. Rand and Susan K. Ellis, Wilson, for appellant.

Connor, Bunn, Rogerson & Woodard, P.A. by David M. Connor and C. Timothy Williford, Wilson, for appellees.

JOHN C. MARTIN, Judge.

Margaret Clark Pate appeals from an order of the Superior Court affirming a determination by the Clerk of Superior Court that she has no right to dissent to the will of Ralph E. Pate or to inherit from his estate. We affirm.

The events leading to this appeal are: Ralph E. Pate, a resident of Wilson County, died testate on 26 April 1993, survived by his wife, Margaret Clark Pate, and three daughters by a previous marriage. His will was admitted to probate and letters testamentary were issued by the Clerk of Superior Court to Connie P. Holloman and Frankie P. Letchworth, who are Ralph Pate's daughters. The will made no provision for Margaret Clark Pate, and she filed a dissent from the will. In response, the co-executrixes asserted the provisions of a premarital agreement between Ralph Pate and Margaret Clark Pate as a bar to her right to dissent.

The issue of Margaret Clark Pate's right to dissent was heard by the Clerk of Superior Court. It was stipulated that Ralph E. Pate and Margaret Clark Pate executed a premarital agreement on 29 April 1992, were married 2 December 1992, and had no children of the marriage. Pursuant to the premarital agreement, each party waived and released any right to inherit from the other or to dissent from the other's will. It was further stipulated that there has been no written revocation of the premarital agreement.

In addition to the stipulated facts, the Clerk heard evidence tending to show that the premarital agreement recited that the parties "contemplate that they will become married sometime in the near future," but did not specify any particular date. At the time they executed the agreement, Ralph Pate and Margaret Clark Pate planned to be married on 17 May 1992. However, on or about 4 May 1992, Ralph Pate called off the wedding. The parties terminated their relationship for a time, but reconciled in late November 1992, and were married 2 December 1992. After the premarital agreement was signed on 29 April 1992, neither of the parties ever mentioned it to the other again. However, at Ralph Pate's request after their marriage, Margaret Clark Pate placed the premarital agreement, along with other personal papers belonging to her, in a safe deposit box, where it was found when the box was inventoried under the supervision of the Clerk of Superior Court following Ralph Pate's death.

The Clerk found facts essentially as stated above and that the couple had entered into the premarital agreement voluntarily in contemplation of their prospective marriage whenever that might occur. The Clerk found that the parties intended to be bound by the premarital agreement at the time of their marriage on 2 December 1992, and concluded, therefore, that the premarital agreement was in full force and effect at the time of the parties' marriage and Ralph Pate's death and that Margaret Clark Pate had "waived, relinquished and released all of her right, title and interest accruing to or vesting in her as the widow of Ralph E. Pate to inherit from the said Ralph E. Pate or to dissent from his Will or to receive any property from his estate."

The substance of appellant's argument in this Court is that the evidence before the Clerk of Superior Court did not support the Clerk's findings with respect to the intentions of the parties or the Clerk's legal conclusion that the 29 April 1992 premarital agreement was in full force and effect at the time of the parties' marriage on 2 December 1992. Thus, appellant contends the Superior Court judge erred when he affirmed the Clerk's order denying her right to dissent from Ralph Pate's will.

In her appeal of the Clerk's order to the Superior Court, appellant set forth specific exceptions to the Clerk's findings of fact. On appeal to the Superior Court of an order of the Clerk in matters of probate, the trial court judge sits as an appellate court. In re Estate of Swinson, 62 N.C.App. 412, 303 S.E.2d 361 (1983). "When the order or judgment appealed from does contain specific findings of fact or conclusions to which an appropriate exception has been taken, the role of the trial judge on appeal is to apply the whole record test." Id. at 415, 303 S.E.2d at 363. In doing so, the trial judge reviews the Clerk's findings and may either affirm, reverse, or modify them. In re Estate of Lowther, 271 N.C. 345, 156 S.E.2d 693 (1967). "If there is evidence to support the findings of the Clerk, the judge must affirm." Swinson at 415, 303 S.E.2d at 363. Moreover, even though the Clerk may have made an erroneous finding which is not supported by the evidence, the Clerk's order will not be disturbed if the legal conclusions upon which it is based are supported by other proper findings. See Black Horse Run Ppty. Owners Assoc. v. Kaleel, 88 N.C.App. 83, 86, 362 S.E.2d 619, 622 (1987), cert denied, 321 N.C. 742, 366 S.E.2d 856 (1988). (In a non-jury trial, "[w]here there are sufficient findings of fact based on competent evidence to support the trial court's conclusions of law, the judgment will not be disturbed because of other erroneous findings which do not affect the conclusions.") The standard of review in this Court is the same as in the Superior Court. In re Estate of Outen, 77 N.C.App. 818, 336 S.E.2d 436 (1985), disc. review denied, 316 N.C. 377, 342 S.E.2d 896 (1986).

The Clerk found specifically that there was no evidence tending to show that either party intended that the premarital agreement not apply to their 2 December 1992 marriage. On appeal to the Superior Court, appellant excepted to the foregoing findings, requiring the judge to review the record to determine if there was evidence to support them. Appellant argues to this Court that the finding is incorrect to the extent the Clerk determined there was no evidence to show that appellant did not intend the premarital agreement to apply, because she testified that she had considered the parties' reconciliation as a whole new relationship and had considered the...