Estate of Ralston, In re
| Decision Date | 13 October 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 83CA0288,83CA0288 |
| Parties | In re the ESTATE OF Daniel RALSTON, Deceased. Jean PHILLIPS, James Robert Anderson, Sheril Jean Talman, Bruce Wayne Anderson, and William Thomas Anderson, Petitioners-Appellants, v. Ruth Rebbecca LIECHTY, Arthur Lopkoff, Ida Ruth Woods, and Alexander Lopkoff, Respondents-Appellees. . III |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
Law Offices of Theodore P. Koeberle, Theodore P. Koeberle, Ira E. Greschler, Boulder, for petitioners-appellants.
Quigley & Goss, R. Neil Quigley, Denver, for respondents-appellees.
Petitioners appeal the order of the trial court which denied their motion to set aside an order appointing a personal representative in intestate administration. We affirm.
In February 1963, Daniel Ralston executed a will naming Naomi Jean Anderson, a/k/a Jean Phillips, as residuary beneficiary, with the remainder to her children by her previous marriage. Phillips and her children are petitioners in this case. No specific bequest or devise was made in the will. The will specifically provided that Ralston's mother, brothers, and sisters take nothing by the will. The will stated that Ralston was unmarried and made no reference to future or contemplated marriage.
In October 1963, Ralston and Phillips were married. The marriage was dissolved in July 1968. Ralston died in June 1982, neither having remarried nor having executed a subsequent will.
Shortly after Ralston's death, his mother, Ruth Rebecca Liechty, respondent, was appointed personal representative of his estate and letters of administration in informal intestate administration were issued. Thereafter, Phillips moved to set aside the order with respect to the intestate estate proceeding. She alleged that Ralston died testate and presented in support of this allegation the will executed in February 1963. The trial court concluded that this will had been revoked under C.R.S.1963, 153-5-3.
C.R.S.1963, 153-5-3, provides in pertinent part:
Section 15-11-508, C.R.S.1973, provides in pertinent part:
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in ruling that Ralston's marriage to petitioner in October 1963 caused a revocation of the February 1963 will by operation of law under C.R.S.1963, 153-5-3, then in effect. Petitioners contend that § 15-11-508, C.R.S.1973, in effect at the time of Ralston's death, applies to the will. Petitioners argue that the revocation by divorce provision of § 15-11-508, C.R.S.1973, applies only to testators who are married at the time of the execution of the will and since Ralston was not married when he executed the will in February 1963, Phillips' subsequent divorce from him was ineffective to cause a revocation as to her. In the alternative the petitioners argue that if § 15-11-508, C.R.S.1973, is construed to revoke Ralston's disposition as to Phillips, the estate would pass to her children.
Although a will does not become operable until the testator's death, Heinneman v. Colorado College, 150 Colo. 515, 374 P.2d 695 (19...
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PART 5 WILLS AND WILL CONTRACTS AND CUSTODY AND DEPOSIT OF WILLS
...time of decedent's marriage, the new probate code did not apply to will of decedent even though he died after 1974. Phillips v. Liechty, 674 P.2d 1001 (Colo. App. 1983). Applied in Wimbush v. Wimbush, 41 Colo. App. 289, 587 P.2d 796 (1978). ■ 15-11-509. Revival of revoked will. (1) If a sub......
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WILLS AND WILL CONTRACTS AND CUSTODY AND DEPOSIT OF WILLS
...time of decedent's marriage, the new probate code did not apply to will of decedent even though he died after 1974. Phillips v. Liechty, 674 P.2d 1001 (Colo. App. 1983). Applied in Wimbush v. Wimbush, 41 Colo. App. 289, 587 P.2d 796 (1978). ■ 15-11-509. Revival of revoked will. (1) If a sub......
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PART 5 WILLS AND WILL CONTRACTS AND CUSTODY AND DEPOSIT OF WILLS
...time of decedent's marriage, the new probate code did not apply to will of decedent even though he died after 1974. Phillips v. Liechty, 674 P.2d 1001 (Colo. App. 1983). Applied in Wimbush v. Wimbush, 41 Colo. App. 289, 587 P.2d 796 (1978). ■ 15-11-509. Revival of revoked will. (1) If a sub......
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ARTICLE 17 EFFECTIVE DATE - TRANSITION
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