Estate of Roosa, Matter of, 87-152
| Citation | 753 P.2d 1028 |
| Decision Date | 14 April 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 87-152,87-152 |
| Parties | 46 Ed. Law Rep. 815 In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Gordon C. ROOSA, Deceased. Neola WHIPPLE, Marjorie M. Costa, Howard A. Roosa, and the Estate of the Reverend Ray Roosa, Appellants (Petitioners/Contestants), v. NORTHERN WYOMING COMMUNITY COLLEGE FOUNDATION OF SHERIDAN, Wyoming, Appellee (Respondent/Intervenor), First Interstate Bank of Sheridan, formerly Bank of Commerce of Sheridan, Appellee (Respondent/Executor). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Jeffrey J. Gonda, Lonabaugh & Riggs, Sheridan, for appellants.
Robert E. Holstedt, Holstedt & Holstedt and Bruce P. Badley and Clay B. Jenkins, Badley & Rasmussen, P.C., Sheridan, for appellees.
Before THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ., and GUTHRIE, J., Retired.
This case presents two questions relating to testamentary capacity. The first involves a motion for summary judgment, by proponents of a will in response to a contest which raised the issue of testamentary capacity, and is concerned with the nature of the information which must be presented to support a motion for summary judgment and, conversely, by the party opposing the motion to structure a genuine issue of material fact. The second question relates to whether a presumption of lack of testamentary capacity attaches to a guardianship created under the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119, W.S.1977 (May 1985 Replacement). The district court held that the will contestants failed to demonstrate appropriately a genuine issue of material fact as to testamentary capacity and afforded no efficacy to the veteran's guardianship. Summary judgment was ordered in favor of the proponents of the will. We agree with the ruling of the district court in this instance and affirm the summary judgment which was entered.
In attacking the summary judgment in this appeal, the will contestants, who are nieces and nephews of the testator, set forth the following issues:
The appellees, Northern Wyoming Community College Foundation of Sheridan, Wyoming (the beneficiary under the will), and First Interstate Bank of Sheridan (the executor of the will), urged that the issues to be resolved are:
After the death of Gordon C. Roosa (Roosa), this proceeding was initiated to probate his Last Will and Testament. The will was contested by the appellants who asserted lack of testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed. Subsequent to the initiation of the will contest, Northern Wyoming Community College Foundation of Sheridan, Wyoming was allowed to intervene in order to defend the will. Following additional pleading by the parties and the pursuit of discovery, a Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by the executor and the beneficiary, supported by affidavits of two attorneys (one who had prepared the Last Will and Testament of Gordon C. Roosa and served as a witness, and the other who only witnessed the will); a certified copy of the will; and depositions of a bank employee who had worked with the administration of the guardianship of Roosa, one of the attorneys who witnessed the will, and two of the contestants. The contestants resisted the Motion for Summary Judgment and supported their resistance with the affidavits of two people who had known Roosa for some 13 years prior to his death, which period of time encompassed the date of execution of his Last Will and Testament. The probate court granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, and this appeal is taken from that order.
Roosa was a veteran of the Armed Forces of the United States of America, apparently of World War I, although the record is not clear on this point. It would appear that he would have been in his late twenties or early thirties at the time of World War I because he was ninety-eight or ninety-nine when he died in 1985. He was separated from his brothers and sisters at an orphanage early in life. Roosa and his siblings were raised in separate families and, over the years, he maintained only minimal contact with any brothers and sisters. Probably he had not seen any of them since the 1940's, and all predeceased him. None of the appellants ever had met Roosa.
From approximately 1963 until March of 1983 (about a year and 9 months prior to his death), Roosa had lived in a trailer on property belonging to a firm known as Barker Brothers, Inc. In 1974, he became a ward under a guardianship created pursuant to the Uniform Veterans' Guardianship Act, §§ 3-6-101 through 3-6-119, W.S.1977 (May 1985 Replacement). He executed his Last Will and Testament at Sheridan, Wyoming on March 2, 1977. The Northern Wyoming Community College Foundation of Sheridan, Wyoming was the sole beneficiary under that Last Will and Testament. Roosa's estate was composed essentially of accumulated Veterans' Administration benefits which had been subject to the guardianship. If the appellants' challenge to the will on the basis of lack of testamentary capacity should succeed, then they, as his statutory heirs, would receive the estate.
In order to properly enter a summary judgment, the district court must find that there exists no genuine issue of material fact and that the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. E.g., Schepps v. Howe, Wyo., 665 P.2d 504 (1983); Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, Wyo., 609 P.2d 984 (1980); Johnson v. Soulis, Wyo., 542 P.2d 867 (1975), and the cases cited in these authorities. Materiality of a fact depends upon it having some legal significance so that it establishes or refutes some essential element of a cause of action or defense asserted by one of the parties. Schepps v. Howe, supra; Johnson v. Soulis, supra. The burden is assigned to the moving party to demonstrate clearly the absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Weaver v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Wyoming, supra. If the motion for summary judgment is supported properly by affidavits, as supplemented by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits, the party opposing the motion cannot rely upon allegations or denials in his pleading, but he must, by affidavit or otherwise, demonstrate facts which pose a genuine issue for trial. Rule 56(e), W.R.C.P.; Schepps v. Howe, supra. In reviewing a summary judgment, we examine the entire record in the light most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and all favorable inferences which may be drawn from the material either supporting or opposing the motion must be afforded to the party against whom judgment was entered. O'Donnell v. City of Casper, Wyo., 696 P.2d 1278 (1985); Schepps v. Howe, supra.
In this case, the materiality of any facts is limited by the pertinent legal standard. The standard of testamentary capacity articulated in 1 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, § 12.21 at 606-608 (1960) has been adopted for Wyoming:
" " In re Estate of Morton, Wyo., 428 P.2d 725, 729 (1967).
There are three factors which must be considered in applying this standard. The testator must be able to comprehend:
" * * * (1) [T]he extent and nature of the estate, (2) the identity of the beneficiaries and their relationship, whether by blood or circumstances, to the testator, and (3) the nature of the testamentary act, that it is a disposition of property to take effect at death." 1 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, supra, § 12.21 at 608.
These elements of testamentary capacity must be present at the time the will is made. 1 Bowe-Parker, Page on Wills, supra, § 12.21 at 571.
We also recognize a presumption of sanity and the possession of testamentary capacity. Wyoming embraced that general rule in Matter of Faragher's Estate, Wyo., 367 P.2d 972 (1962). This presumption of testamentary capacity arises upon proof of the due execution and attestation of the will. 79 Am.Jur.2d Wills §§ 106 and 107 (1975), and cases cited therein. The effect of this presumption in a will contest is that the burden is assigned to the contestants to show by a preponderance of the evidence the claimed testamentary incapacity, and the only exception is if the prior incompetency of the testator has been established by proof or admission. In re Estate of Morton, supra.
We examine then the factual information in this record in the light of the standard and the burden of proof. In support of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the appellees offered:
(1) the affidavit and deposition of Harlan Rasmussen, an attorney who...
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