Estate of Sims ex rel. Sims v. County of Bureau

Decision Date19 October 2007
Docket NumberNo. 01-2884.,01-2884.
PartiesESTATE OF Thetis M. SIMS, by and through its personal representative, Melissa K. SIMS, William C. Sims, surviving spouse and next of kin, and Melissa K. Sims, individually, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. COUNTY OF BUREAU, as a necessary party in interest, Greg Johnson, John E. Thompson, in his official capacity as Sheriff of the County of Bureau and Bureau County Sheriff's Department, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Richard L. Steagall (argued), Nicoara & Steagall, Peoria, IL, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

George J. Casson, Jr. (argued), Clifford G. Kosoff, O'Halloran, Kosoff, Geitner & Cook, Northbrook, IL, William W. Kurnik (argued), Knight, Hoppe, Kurnik & Knight, Des Plaines, IL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

In 1999 Thetis M. Sims suffered a fatal heart attack in her home in Tiskilwa, Illinois. The only person present at the time was Bureau County Sheriff Greg Johnson, whose alleged campaign fraud was the subject of a story Ms. Sims was investigating for the local newspaper. Her estate, her husband, and her daughter brought a federal civil rights suit against Johnson in his individual and official capacities,2 Bureau County, and the Bureau County Sheriff's Department, alleging that Johnson's actions led to Sims's death. The district court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and the plaintiffs appeal. Following oral argument in the appeal, the plaintiffs informed us that they had settled their claims against Johnson, but that the remaining defendants were challenging the settlement agreement in Illinois state court. We suspended our proceedings until the Illinois courts could resolve the dispute. In accordance with the state court decisions, we dismiss Johnson in his individual capacity. The plaintiffs have failed to establish their claims against the remaining defendants. Accordingly, we affirm the dismissal of the complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

Because the district court dismissed the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), we assume all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint are true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiffs' favor. Christensen v. County of Boone, Illinois, 483 F.3d 454, 457 (7th Cir.2007) (per curiam); Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 402 (7th Cir.2000). See also Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). Prior to her death, Sims, a part-time newspaper reporter for the Kewanee Star Courier, was conducting an investigation into allegations that Sheriff Johnson engaged in campaign fraud in his election campaign and misused county funds. She had expressed concern to others that Johnson might retaliate against her for writing the story. On the day of her death, in an effort to intimidate Sims from writing the newspaper article about Johnson's misconduct, Johnson deposited for bulk mailing to the residents of the Simses' hometown a letter falsely accusing Sims's husband, William, of past and current felonious criminal conduct. Johnson then telephoned Sims, asked to speak with her, and drove to her home in Tiskilwa. Upon arrival, he showed the defamatory letter to Sims and questioned her regarding the accusations of criminal conduct by her husband. According to the allegations of the complaint, Johnson knew of Sims's heart condition, and knew or had reason to believe that reading a letter containing such extreme, outrageous accusations about her husband would cause her great emotional distress and would increase the likelihood that she would suffer a fatal heart attack.

At approximately 12:30 p.m., Sims did suffer a fatal heart attack. Johnson radioed for an ambulance at 12:47 p.m., but by the time the paramedics arrived at 12:54 p.m., Sims was not breathing and did not have a pulse. One of the paramedics described her as "cold" when he arrived. The plaintiffs' expert in emergency medicine averred that Sims died of cardiac arrhythmia provoked by extreme anger or fear and that she could have survived if she had been given CPR immediately. Johnson told the paramedics that he did not complete CPR because his rubber gloves kept breaking. Before calling the ambulance, Johnson used Sims's telephone to call the Princeton Post Office and ask a postal worker about the criminal penalties for sending defamatory letters and whether the bulk-rate mailing of the defamatory letter could be traced. Sims's daughter found the telephone off the hook and out of her mother's reach. Following her death, Johnson dropped his own investigation regarding the defamatory letter. He also failed to investigate Sims's death and refused to cooperate with the police officers seeking to investigate her death.

Both Johnson, in his individual capacity, and the County defendantsBureau County, the Bureau County Sheriff's Department and the Sheriff in his official capacity — filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Magistrate Judge Evans recommended, in part, that the district court dismiss the following parties and claims: (1) the County of Bureau as a real party in interest; (2) the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth Amendment claims in Counts IX and X; (3) the prayer for punitive damages in Counts IX, X, and XI, and (4) Counts XIV, XV, XVI, and XVII against the Sheriff in his official capacity. Neither side filed objections as to these recommendations; therefore, the district court adopted these portions of the Report and Recommendation. The district court, however, rejected the portions of the Report and Recommendation that the Bureau County Sheriff's Department be retained as a party, that the substantive due process violation claims in Counts IX and X be allowed, that the conspiracy claims in Count XI be allowed, and that the supplemental state law claims be allowed. The district court accordingly granted the defendants' motions to dismiss pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) in their entirety, and dismissed the federal claims with prejudice and the state claims without prejudice.

II. DISCUSSION

The plaintiffs appealed from the disposition of the motion to dismiss the individual capacity claims against Johnson and the motion to dismiss the claims against Bureau County, the Bureau County Sheriff's Department and the Sheriff in his official capacity. However, after oral argument was heard in this appeal, the plaintiffs entered into a settlement agreement with Johnson. Although the plaintiffs and Johnson settled only the claims against Johnson, the plaintiffs further agreed to dismiss their appeal and to limit their right to collect the settlement solely from Bureau County and its insurers. When they notified this court of the settlement agreement, the plaintiffs informed the court that Bureau County understandably was already challenging the settlement agreement in the state court case and asked the court to stay its proceedings pending resolution of the enforceability of the action in state court, which we did. The Illinois Appellate Court held that the settlement agreement was enforceable with respect to Johnson in his individual capacity, but not enforceable with respect to the Sheriff's Office or the County. Sims v. Johnson, No. 3-05-0416 (Ill.App. 3 Dist. July 27, 2006). State law governs a suit to enforce a settlement of a federal suit. Dillard v. Starcon Int'l, Inc., 483 F.3d 502, 506-07 (7th Cir.2007); Lynch, Inc. v. SamataMason Inc., 279 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.2002). At the time he entered into the settlement agreement, Johnson had resigned as Sheriff of Bureau County and was not empowered to act on behalf of the Sheriff's Office. Cf. Carver v. Sheriff of LaSalle County, 203 Ill.2d 497, 272 Ill. Dec. 312, 787 N.E.2d 127 (2003) (holding that an acting sheriff is authorized under the Illinois Tort Immunity Act to enter into settlement agreements that bind the county for the acts of the sheriff in his official capacity). Accordingly, we grant the plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Johnson only in his individual capacity. We reject Johnson's argument that the current Sheriff in his official capacity also be dismissed based on the settlement agreement.

We review de novo whether the complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted. Christensen, 483 F.3d at 458. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The statement need only "`give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Bell Atlantic, 127 S.Ct. at 1964 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). See also Erickson v. Pardus, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007). In order to state a claim pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiffs must allege that a government official, acting under color of state law, deprived them of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Christensen, 483 F.3d at 459. In a civil rights case alleging municipal liability, a federal court may not apply a heightened pleading standard more stringent than the usual Rule 8(a) pleading requirements. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 165, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993).

Now that the individual capacity claims against Johnson have been settled, only three defendants remain — John E. Thompson, in his official capacity as Sheriff, the Sheriff's Department, and Bureau County. The liability of the Sheriff's Department and of the County is derivative of Thompson's official-capacity liability, and the official-capacity liability is subject to holding in ...

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