Estate of Tokes v. Dep't of Rehab. & Corr.
| Decision Date | 09 May 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 18AP-723,18AP-723 |
| Citation | 135 N.E.3d 1200,2019 Ohio 1794 |
| Parties | ESTATE OF Reagan TOKES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
On brief: Robert B. Newman ; Cincinnati, O'Hara, Taylor, Sloan & Cassidy, and Michael J. O'Hara, for appellant. Argued: Robert B. Newman.
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, Anne Berry Strait, Peter E. DeMarco, Columbus, and Jeanna V. Jacobus, for appellee. Argued: Anne Berry Strait.
DECISION
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} In this wrongful death and survivorship action, plaintiff-appellant, Estate of Reagan Tokes ("Estate"), appeals the decision of the Court of Claims dismissing the Estate's complaint against defendant-appellee, Department of Rehabilitation and Correction ("DRC"), under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Because we find that the public duty immunity statutes are both constitutional and applicable to the Estate's claims, we affirm.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} At the outset, we are compelled to note the senseless, unquantifiable suffering any violent crime imposes on victims, their families and their loved ones. We note our role in such cases, like the one presently before us, requires us to examine the requisite issues presented with judicial, not emotional, awareness.
{¶ 3} According to the complaint, Brian Golsby was convicted of robbery and attempted rape in 2010. (Compl. at ¶ 11.) That conviction yielded him, inter alia, a six-year prison term and a five-year mandatory post-release control period. (Compl. at ¶ 11, 12.) His incarceration for those crimes ended in November 2016, and his post-release control period then began. (Compl. at ¶ 11.) DRC labeled him a high risk offender and placed him in the EXIT Program, a half-way house operated by former defendant NISRE, Inc.1 (Compl. at ¶ 14, 23.)
{¶ 4} DRC outfitted Golsby with an ankle monitor to comport with a condition of his post-release control. (Compl. at ¶ 15, 16.) The monitor could provide DRC with Golsby's exact location contemporaneously with his movements. (Compl. at ¶ 17-18.) DRC also instituted a curfew for Golsby. DRC did not program the monitor to allow for automatic notification of curfew violations. (Compl. at ¶ 21.)
{¶ 5} Between December 2016 and January 2017, Golsby was sanctioned for violating the terms of his probation three times. (Compl. at ¶ 25-28.) DRC did not arrest him or impose more restrictive conditions on him for any of those violations. (Compl. at ¶ 28.) Then, between late January and early February 2017, he engaged in a violent "crime wave" that culminated in him raping and murdering Reagan Tokes ("Ms. Tokes") on February 8, 2017. (Compl. at ¶ 29-48).
{¶ 6} Police officers arrested him two days later. (Compl. at ¶ 48.) The state charged him with aggravated murder, aggravated robbery and rape. Id. A jury subsequently found him guilty on all counts, and the trial court sentenced him to life in prison without parole. (Compl. at ¶ 48-49.)
{¶ 7} The Estate's May 2018 complaint in the Court of Claims asserts a wrongful death claim under R.C. 2125.01 et seq. and a "survivor's action" under R.C. 2305.21 against DRC.2 (Compl. at ¶ 53-56, 61-63.) The Estate declares DRC's negligent monitoring and supervision of Golsby led to Ms. Tokes' death such that DRC is liable for Golsby's actions. In particular, the Estate claims DRC was negligent in failing to: (1) violate and arrest Golsby after his December 2016-January 2017 post-release control violations; (2) utilize GPS data from Golsby's monitor until after Ms. Tokes' death; (3) establish monitored exclusion zones for Golsby; and (4) place him in a more secure facility than the EXIT Program. (Compl. at ¶ 54.) The Estate seeks compensatory damages and other just and proper relief. (Compl. at ¶ 64-65.)
{¶ 8} In response, DRC moved to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). Therein, DRC maintained public duty immunity, found in R.C. 2743.01 and 2743.02, blocked the suit because its supervising and monitoring of Golsby equated to the performance or non-performance of a public duty. DRC also argued it was not liable under general tort law principles.
{¶ 9} The Estate first countered that DRC, through its monitoring of Golsby, knew or should have known of Golsby's violent propensities such that DRC had a duty to protect Ms. Tokes. The Estate next retorted that Golsby was on furlough under R.C. 2967.26, rather than on post-release control under R.C. 2967.28, at the time he raped and murdered Ms. Tokes such that DRC's claimed immunity was inapplicable. In addition, the Estate responded by asserting that DRC's cited immunity statutes, R.C. 2743.01 and 2743.02, were unconstitutional.
{¶ 10} DRC replied that there was no statutory duty to confine Golsby after he served his prison sentence. As such, DRC reasoned, it did not owe Ms. Tokes a duty. Next, DRC posited that the public duty rule is constitutional under the specific words of the Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 16 ("Section 16").
{¶ 11} The Court of Claims granted DRC's motion to dismiss on September 4, 2018. The Court of Claims initially declined to engage in the constitutional analysis. Instead, the Court of Claims reasoned that because the Estate failed to plead sufficient facts to show that a special relationship existed between DRC and Ms. Tokes, public duty immunity applied to bar the Estate's claims. The Court of Claims also found DRC's counterargument that Golsby was a releasee and not a furloughee on the day he raped and murdered Ms. Tokes persuasive. Consequently, the Court of Claims concluded that the Estate could prove no set of facts entitling it to relief such that Civ.R. 12(B)(6) mandated dismissal. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 12} We employ a de novo standard of review when reviewing a judgment on a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Ettayem v. Land of Ararat Invest. Group, Inc. , 10th Dist., 2017-Ohio-8835, 100 N.E.3d, ¶ 19-20, citing Perrysburg Twp. v. Rossford , 103 Ohio St.3d 79, 2004-Ohio-4362, 814 N.E.2d 44, ¶ 5. Such a motion is procedural and tests the sufficiency of the complaint. State ex rel. Hanson v. Guernsey Cty. Bd. of Commrs. , 65 Ohio St.3d 545, 548, 605 N.E.2d 378 (1992), citing Assn. for the Defense of the Washington Local School Dist. v. Kiger , 42 Ohio St.3d 116, 117, 537 N.E.2d 1292 (1989). When addressing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion, the trial court must presume all factual allegations contained in the complaint are true and must make all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Jones v. Greyhound Lines, Inc. , 10th Dist., 2012-Ohio-4409, 981 N.E.2d 294, ¶ 31, citing Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co. , 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 192, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1988). The court need not, however, accept as true any unsupported and conclusory legal propositions advanced in the complaint. Morrow v. Reminger & Reminger Co., L.P.A. , 183 Ohio App.3d 40, 2009-Ohio-2665, 915 N.E.2d 696, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). Additionally, a trial court may not rely on allegations or evidence outside the complaint when reviewing a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion. State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander , 79 Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 680 N.E.2d 985 (1997). But, "as long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a defendant's motion to dismiss." York v. Ohio State Hwy. Patrol , 60 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 573 N.E.2d 1063 (1991).
III. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 13} The Estate's single assignment asserts:
The Court Of Claims Erred In Granting [DRC's] Motion To Dismiss Under Rule 12 Where Plaintiff Met Its Pleading Burden To Articulate A Claim Of Negligence That Was Not Subject To State Sovereign Immunity Under Applicable Statutes And Constitutional Provisions.
We address the issues the assignment presents out of order to yield a cohesive analysis.
IV. R.C. 2743.01(E)(1) and 2743.02(A)(3) DO NOT VIOLATE SECTION 16
A. Constitutional and Statutory Framework
{¶ 14} Section 16, R.C. 2743.01(E)(1) and 2743.02(A)(3) are all of material import to our analysis. Accordingly, we begin with a review of the language each provides.
{¶ 15} Section 16 states:
{¶ 16} R.C. 2743.02(A) is best addressed in parts. R.C. 2743.02(A)(1) provides:
The state hereby waives its immunity from liability * * *, and consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, in the court of claims created in this chapter in accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits between private parties, except that the determination of liability is subject to the limitations set forth in this chapter * * *.
Simply put, this section serves to waive governmental immunity under certain conditions. In turn, R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a) establishes that the state's performance or non-performance of a public duty relative to individuals in prison is not one of those circumstances.
{¶ 17} So, the question thus becomes what constitutes a public duty within the confines of the statute. R.C. 2743.01(E)(1)(a) provides the answer:
Hence, R.C. 2743.02(A)(3)(a) and 2743.01(E)(1) combine to immunize the state for the performance or nonperformance of public duties. This is known as the "public duty doctrine." Vos v. Ohio EPA , 10th Dist. No. 17AP-749, 2018-Ohio-2956, 2018 WL 3599450, ¶ 12.
{¶ 18}...
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