Estate of Wilson, 20832

• Decision Date: 21 January 1997
• Docket Number: No. 20832,20832
• Citation: 938 S.W.2d 607
• Parties: In the ESTATE OF Gary L. WILSON, Deceased. Chancey WILSON and Chase Wilson, Minors, by their Guardian ad Litem, Thomas W. Cline, Appellants, v. William H. SEEBOLD and Lynne G. Seebold, Respondents.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 607

938 S.W.2d 607

In the ESTATE OF Gary L. WILSON, Deceased Chancey WILSON and Chase Wilson, Minors, by their Guardian ad Litem, Thomas W. Cline, Appellants, v. William H. SEEBOLD and Lynne G. Seebold, Respondents.

No. 20832.

Missouri Court of Appeals,

Southern District,

Division Two.

Jan. 21, 1997.

Motion for Rehearing and Transfer to

Supreme Court Feb. 3, 1997.

Application to Transfer Denied

Feb. 25, 1997.

Thomas W. Cline, Gainesville, for appellants.

Andrea L. Weiss, Summers, Compton, Wells & Hamburg, St. Louis, for respondents.

CROW, Presiding Judge.

Chancey Wilson and Chase Wilson, minors and sole heirs at law of Gary L. Wilson, deceased, appeal ¹ from an order of the Probate Division of the Circuit Court of Ozark County ("the trial court") approving a stipulation for settlement of a claim by Respondents, William H. Seebold and Lynne G. Seebold, against the deceased's estate. ² The stipulation was signed by Respondents and Pattie Ayers, the deceased's personal representative. ³

Appellants maintain the trial court (a) lacked jurisdiction because the claim did not satisfy certain requirements of § 473.380.1, RSMo 1994, ⁴ or, alternatively (b) erred in approving the stipulation because it provides Respondents value in excess of the amount claimed.

The standard of review governing this appeal is set forth in Estate of Asay v. Asay, 902 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Mo.App.W.D.1995):

"In court-tried cases, such as the compromise of a claim, the appellate court will follow the dictate of Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976), affirming the decision unless there is no substantial evidence to support the judgment, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the law. Smith v. Snodgrass, 747 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Mo.App.1988). An order is set aside as being against the weight of the evidence with caution and only upon the firm belief that it is incorrect. Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32. In assessing the trial court's decision, the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the judgment. Smith, 747 S.W.2d at 745."

The order appealed from here was entered after an evidentiary hearing at which Respondent William H. Seebold ("William") ⁵ was the lone witness. The facts recounted in this opinion are gleaned from his testimony, considered in the light most favorable to the trial court's order, and from the legal file.

William is in the "boat manufacturing business," having started around 1970. In 1983 he began manufacturing a line of family pleasure boats. However, because "the 10 percent luxury tax brought the marine industry into a slump" in 1992, he ceased producing those models and confined his manufacturing operation to high performance racing boats. Because the "molds" used in producing the decks and hulls of the discontinued models were no longer needed, William and his wife, Respondent Lynne G. Seebold, offered the molds for sale.

In November, 1994, Gary L. Wilson ("Wilson"), a boat manufacturer himself, phoned William about buying the molds. Wilson came to Respondents' place of business, examined the molds, and commenced negotiations with William.

By telephone at a later date, Wilson and William agreed Wilson would buy the molds for $100,000. Wilson would pay $10,000 at the time he began moving the molds from Respondents' place of business to his. Wilson would pay another $10,000 within sixty days and the balance within twenty-four months. Additionally, Wilson would produce one hull and deck, without engines, for a 32-foot boat and give it to Respondents.

William had his lawyer prepare a written contract on those terms.

On December 15, 1994, Wilson, accompanied by a driver, arrived at Respondents' place of business in a "boat transporter, which is a semi-tractor trailer truck, flatbed," and picked up some of the molds. Wilson and Respondents signed the contract, and Wilson paid the required $10,000. Wilson also orally agreed that date to buy a Hyster "forktruck" ⁶ from Respondents for $11,000.

A few weeks later, Wilson arranged by phone to pick up some more molds.

The same tractor trailer unit and driver, accompanied by Wilson's shop foreman, arrived at Respondents' place of business on January 10, 1995, and picked up some more molds. The foreman gave William a $10,000 check representing the second payment required by the contract, and also gave William an $11,000 check for the forktruck. Both checks were honored by the drawee.

The forktruck was left at Respondents' place of business because there were more molds to be picked up in the future and the forktruck was needed to load them.

On March 1, 1995, Wilson was killed in an accident. ⁷

After Wilson's death, William told John Bruffett ("Bruffett"), the lawyer for Wilson's personal representative, Pattie Ayers ("Ayers"), that he--William--still had some items Wilson had bought. William offered "to turn those over to the estate."

On July 10, 1995, Respondents filed a claim against Wilson's estate in the trial court. The claim was not signed by either Respondent. The claim alleged, inter alia, that $100,000 was due Respondents from the estate "on account of the contract that is attached hereto." Attached to the claim was a copy of the contract signed by Wilson and Respondents on December 15, 1994.

Appellants, by their guardian ad litem, filed a motion asking the trial court to "dismiss" Respondents' claim because it was "unsigned and bears no verification ... as required by ... Section 473.380.1." ⁸ Consequently, reasoned Appellants, the trial court "lacks jurisdiction to proceed on said claim."

The trial court denied Appellants' motion to dismiss.

Thereafter, Respondents and Ayers entered into the stipulation referred to in the first paragraph of this opinion. We henceforth refer to the stipulation as "the compromise." Provisions of it relevant to this appeal are set forth marginally. ⁹

With matters in that posture, the trial court heard evidence on February 21, 1996. Appellants appeared by their guardian ad litem ¹⁰; Respondents appeared in person with counsel; Ayers appeared in person with her lawyer, Bruffett. As noted earlier, William was the lone witness. He was questioned by only his lawyer and Appellants' guardian ad litem. Bruffett asked William nothing, presented no evidence for Ayers, and made no argument.

The trial court thereafter entered an order approving the compromise. This appeal followed.

Appellants' first point relied on:

"The Court erred in approving the Seebold claim against the Estate, because the claim presented was unsigned; was not verified; and did not allow credits or offsets due the Estate, in that the signature of the claimant or some person for him with knowledge of the facts is a statutory prerequisite for validity, thus the Court was deprived of jurisdiction to proceed."

Appellants begin their argument by citing State ex rel. Nollmann v. Gunn, 513 S.W.2d 710 (Mo.App.1974). That case, like this one, involved a claim against a deceased's estate. The version of § 473.380.1 in effect when the claim was filed in Nollmann was the version in RSMo 1969. It is set forth thus in the opinion:

"No claim shall be allowed against an estate unless it is in writing, stating the nature and amount thereof, if ascertainable, and is accompanied by an affidavit of the claimant, or of some person for him who has knowledge of the facts, stating ... to the best of his knowledge ... he has given credit to the estate for all payments and offsets to which it is entitled and ... the balance claimed is justly due." (Emphasis supplied.)

Id. at 712.

Nollmann held:

"[I]f the claim is not accompanied by the required statutory affidavit, the probate court does not have jurisdiction to hear evidence thereon or to allow or to classify the claim."

Id. at .

Appellants concede that § 473.380.1 was amended in 1980 ¹¹ and that the present version ¹² contains no requirement that a claim be verified. Appellants also concede that since the 1980 amendment, no case has addressed the issue of whether a court has jurisdiction of a claim that is not signed by the claimant or by someone for him who has knowledge of the facts.

However, Appellants direct us to the following segment of § 575.060, RSMo 1994, which has been in effect since January 1, 1979:

"1. A person commits the crime of making a false declaration if, with the purpose to mislead a public servant in the performance of his duty, he:

(1) Submits any written false statement, which he does not believe to be true

....

(b) On a form bearing notice, authorized by law, that false statements made therein are punishable...."

Appellants point out that the claim filed by Respondents was on a form stating, inter alia:

"Claimant states that to the best of claimant's knowledge and belief, credit has been given to such estate for all payments and offsets to which it is entitled and that the balance claimed as stated above is justly due.

The foregoing is made under oath or affirmation and its representations are true and correct to the best knowledge and belief of the undersigned, subject to the penalties of making a false affidavit or declaration."

Consequently, argue Appellants:

"The combination of RSMo 575.060; the requirement that the claim must be signed to constitute a claim against an estate as per RSMo 473.380.1; and the affirmation contained on the claim form have the exact same effect as the pre-1980 requirement of an affidavit. Accordingly, the rationale that claims presented that do not meet the basic statutory requirements convey no jurisdiction on the Court should continue to apply."

While there may be some measure of logic in Appellants' argument, it fails to acknowledge subsection 2 of § 472.080, RSMo 1994, a part of the probate code. ¹³ Section 472.080 reads:

"1. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this code or by supreme court rule, every document filed with the court under this code, including but not limited to...