Estate of Witzke, Matter of
| Decision Date | 19 December 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 83-1057,83-1057 |
| Citation | 359 N.W.2d 183 |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATE OF Anne Rose WITZKE, Deceased. Edward J. WYKOFF and Mary E. Wykoff, Appellants, v. William A. WITZKE and Jack Steven Witzke, Appellees. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Lyle A. Rodenburg and Robert Rodenburg, Council Bluffs, for appellants.
Richard A. Heininger of Smith, Peterson, Beckman & Willson, Council Bluffs, for appellees.
Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, LARSON, SCHULTZ, and WOLLE, JJ.
Petitioners Edward J. and Mary E. Wykoff appeal from the denial of their petition to reopen the estate of Anne Rose Witzke, deceased, so that a sale of realty to them by the estate's administrator may be rescinded. We affirm.
I. Background and proceedings. On August 12, 1980, petitioners entered into a purchase agreement for certain real estate in Council Bluffs with William A. Witzke, administrator of the estate of Anne Rose Witzke. Petitioners were issued a Court Officer's Deed for the land on September 16. The estate had only two distributees, the aforementioned William A. Witzke and Jack Steven Witzke. The estate was closed, the estate funds distributed, and the administrator discharged by court order on November 21, 1980.
On October 12, 1982, petitioners filed a petition to reopen administration of the Witzke estate. They alleged that the administrator willfully and fraudulently misrepresented the boundaries of the real estate he sold to them and that they did not discover the true boundaries of the realty until January 1981 after the estate had been closed. They sought reopening of the estate, rescission of the sale to them by the administrator, restitution of their purchase money, and payment of consequential damages from the estate. William and Jack Witzke resisted the petition, denying that any fraudulent misrepresentation had occurred and also maintaining that petitioners had no right to reopen the estate.
After hearing, on January 31, 1983, the petition was denied. The district court found that because the probation and administration of estates is strictly a statutory entity, it could only order or direct that which is specifically provided for by the statutes applicable thereto. The court noted that Division VII, Part 9 of the Iowa Code chapter 633 treats the reopening of closed estates. This Part consists of sections 633.487, .488 and .489. The court held that sections 633.487 and 633.488 were not applicable to the issues raised by the petition. It then proceeded to consider whether the petition could be granted pursuant to section 633.489, the first sentence of which reads, "Upon the petition of any interested person, the court may, with such notice as it may prescribe, order an estate reopened if other property be discovered, if any necessary act remains unperformed, or for any other proper cause appearing to the court."
Relying on the Iowa State Bar Association Committee Comment to section 633.489, the court found that the purpose of that section was to permit the reopening of an estate to allow administration of newly discovered property or performance of required but omitted acts of the administrator. Because the petitioners' purpose in reopening the estate was to remedy an alleged breach of contract by the administrator, the court concluded that the petition to reopen could not be granted pursuant to section 633.489. Petitioners appealed.
Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss the appeal under Iowa R.App.P. 23(a), claiming the appeal was untimely. After consideration, we hereby overrule the motion and proceed to the merits of the appeal.
II. Interpretation of section 633.489. Section 633.489 provides that upon the petition of an "interested person," the court "may" reopen an estate "if other property be discovered, if any necessary act remains unperformed, or for any other proper cause appearing to the court." In resisting the petition to reopen the Witzke estate, William and Jack Witzke contended (1) that petitioners are not "interested persons" within the meaning of the statute; and (2) that petitioners did not allege "proper cause," within the meaning of the statute, for reopening the estate. We do not decide the correctness of the Witzkes' first contention, because we believe the trial court acted permissibly in ruling that no proper cause for reopening the estate was alleged.
Petitioners do not allege that any property of the Witzke estate has been newly discovered. They do, however, contend that the satisfaction of their claims against the estate based on the allegedly fraudulent conduct of the administrator is a "necessary act" within the meaning of section 633.489. We disagree. We conclude that the district court was correct in holding that the phrase "necessary act" in section 633.489 refers to an act that is required by law of the administrator in order to properly close the estate. See Iowa Code § 633.489 Bar Committee Comment.
Finally, section 633.489 permits reopening of an estate "for any other proper cause appearing to the court." The meaning of this language is not...
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