Estates of Hibbard, Matter of
| Decision Date | 26 March 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 57966-1,57966-1 |
| Citation | 118 Wn.2d 737,826 P.2d 690 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of the ESTATES OF Robert G. HIBBARD and Maxine Hibbard, Deceased. Heidi L. HIBBARD, Individually, and as Personal Representative of the Estates of Robert G. Hibbard and Maxine Hibbard, Plaintiff, v. GORDON, THOMAS, HONEYWELL, MALANCA, PETERSON and O'HERN, a law firm; E. M. Murray, a public service corporation; E. M. Murray and "Jane Doe" Murray, husband and wife, and their marital community; and Puget Sound National Bank, Respondents, The State of Washington, Petitioner. |
Kenneth O. Eikenberry, Atty. Gen., Glen A. Anderson, Asst. Atty. Gen., Olympia, for petitioner.
Lane, Powell, Spears & Lubersky, Anne McDonald, Linda E. Blohm, Seattle, for respondent Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson & O'Hern.
Eisenhower, Carlson, Newlands, Reha, Henriot & Quinn, Ronald A. Roberts, Tacoma, for respondent Puget Sound Nat. Bank.
The State of Washington (State) petitioned for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, Division Two, which reversed a dismissal on summary judgment in the State's favor by the Pierce County Superior Court. 60 Wash.App. 252, 803 P.2d 1312. We granted review. The State contends that respondents are not aggrieved by the trial court's order and that they therefore had no standing to appeal to the Court of Appeals. It further contends that the statute of limitations has run on plaintiff's original complaint and that the "discovery rule" does not apply to extend the applicable 3-year statute of limitations. We reverse the Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff in the trial court was Ms. Heidi L. Hibbard (Hibbard), appearing on her own behalf and as personal representative of the estate of her parents, Robert G. and Maxine Hibbard, Deceased. 1 Defendants in the trial court were Puget Sound National Bank (Bank), the original personal representative of the Hibbards' estate; and E.M. Murray and the law firm of Gordon, Thomas, Honeywell, Malanca, Peterson and O'Hern (Gordon Thomas), attorneys for the personal representative. The defendants were served with the original summons and complaint on December 2, 1983. A second amended complaint adding the State as a defendant was filed by Ms. Hibbard on February 10, 1986.
The primary question in this case is whether the "discovery rule" applies and whether the 3-year statute of limitations barred Ms. Heidi L. Hibbard's claims against the State of Washington. Because we answer "no" to the first prong of that question and "yes" to the second prong, it is not necessary for us to address the further question whether Respondents Bank and Gordon Thomas had standing to appeal to the Court of Appeals the trial court's summary judgment order dismissing the State from the lawsuit filed by Ms. Hibbard.
On December 6, 1977, Larry W. Knox murdered Robert G. and Maxine Hibbard and allegedly raped their daughter, Ms. Heidi L. Hibbard. 2 Knox was on probation for burglary and had been treated at Western State Hospital and released 7 months prior to the December incident. On December 12, 1977, the Bank was appointed personal representative of the Hibbard estate and Gordon Thomas was retained as attorneys for the estate. Probate was closed on March 4, 1980.
In the fall of 1983, Ms. Hibbard read a newspaper account of this court's decision in Petersen v. State. 3 She consulted an attorney in October 1983. The estate of her parents was then reopened and Ms. Hibbard was appointed as personal representative. 4
On November 23, 1983, Ms. Hibbard filed a claim with the State for personal injuries arising out of her rape by Larry W. Knox on December 6, 1977. The State denied her claim for the reason that it exceeded the statute of limitations, "pursuant to RCW 26.28.015." 5 On December 2, 1983, Ms. Hibbard served the Bank with a summons and complaint and filed her lawsuit in the Pierce County Superior Court on February 3, 1984. 6 Gordon Thomas was made a defendant prior to consolidation of these actions on February 3, 1986. Ms. Hibbard claimed that the Bank and Gordon Thomas acted negligently in failing to bring suit against the State and Larry W. Knox. 7
The Bank moved for summary judgment, asking dismissal of the action based upon the statute of limitations. On January 17, 1986, visiting judge Karen B. Conoley, Kitsap County Superior Court, in an oral decision denied the Bank's motion because there remained an issue concerning the date Ms. Hibbard knew all the elements of her cause of action against the Bank. 8 At this point, the Bank and Gordon Thomas asked that the State be joined as a party.
On January 17, 1986, Ms. Hibbard filed a claim with the State for the wrongful death of her parents. On February 10, 1986, she filed a second amended complaint for damages in the Pierce County Superior Court, adding the State as a party. 9 The complaint acknowledged that the 3-year statute of limitations had expired on December 6, 1980, but asked for judgment against the State in the event the court determined that the statute of limitations had not run against it for its "tortious and outrageous conduct."
On July 27, 1987, the State filed a summary judgment motion for dismissal based on the statute of limitations. 10 Gordon Thomas filed a memorandum opposing the State's motion. 11 On August 4, 1987, the Bank filed a motion for summary judgment, adopting the State's arguments and contending that the claims against the Bank were also barred if the claims against the State were barred by the statute of limitations. 12
On September 11, 1987, visiting judge David E. Foscue, Grays Harbor County Superior Court, granted the State's motion, but denied the Bank's motion. In his memorandum decision dated September 11, 1987, Judge Foscue ruled that the statute of limitations expired on December 6, 1980, on the claims against the State and that the "discovery rule" did not apply. However, Judge Foscue concluded that a genuine issue of material fact remained concerning the date the cause of action accrued against the Bank. 13 The Bank and Gordon Thomas filed notices of appeal. However, Ms. Hibbard did not appeal.
On December 30, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Division Two, certified the appeal to this court. This court declined certification on January 31, 1989, and returned the case to the Court of Appeals. An order confirming appealability was signed on March 9, 1989.
On August 22, 1989, in reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals determined that the "discovery rule" applied and that there was an issue of fact whether Ms. Hibbard should have known of her cause of action against the State within the allowable statute of limitations period. The State filed a motion for reconsideration. 14 Following this court's decision in Gevaart v. Metco Constr., Inc., 15 the Court of Appeals issued an order calling for an answer, withdrew its opinion and set the case for reargument.
On January 14, 1991, after reargument, the Court of Appeals again reversed the trial court. 16 The majority (Alexander, J.) held that the discovery rule applied and that there remained a question of fact whether Ms. Hibbard knew or should have known of the State's alleged negligence within the allowable statute of limitations period. The dissent (Reed, J.) concluded that the Bank and Gordon Thomas had no standing to appeal the State's dismissal 17 and that the "discovery rule" did not apply in the case.
On February 13, 1991, the State petitioned this court for review, which we granted on May 8, 1991.
Two orders were entered in this case by the trial court: an order granting the State's motion for summary judgment of dismissal, which determined the issues between Plaintiff Hibbard and the State, and an order denying the Bank's motion for summary judgment of dismissal, which determined the issue between Plaintiff Hibbard and the Bank. Plaintiff, Ms. Heidi L. Hibbard, was not a party to any appeal in this case.
In ruling on the summary judgment motions, the trial court followed our established rule that:
A summary judgment motion can be granted only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... The court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and the motion should be granted only if, from all the evidence, reasonable persons could reach but one conclusion.... 18
Additionally, we follow the rule that "[w]hen reviewing an order of summary judgment, this court engages in the same inquiry as the trial court." 19
Inasmuch as Plaintiff Hibbard did not appeal any of the rulings in this case, there is actually not before this court any basis for reviewing the decision of the trial court on summary judgment between her and the State. However, the Court of Appeals having spoken on the rulings by the trial court, we must necessarily direct our attention to the principal question whether the "discovery rule" applies in this case between Ms. Hibbard and the State.
The general rule in ordinary personal injury actions is that a cause of action accrues at the time the act or omission occurs. 20 "In certain torts, ... injured parties do not, or cannot, know they have been injured; in [those] cases, a cause of action accrues at the time the plaintiff knew or should have known all of the essential elements of the cause of action." This is an exception to the general rule and is known as the "discovery rule." 21
This court first adopted the discovery rule in Ruth v. Dight. 22 That was a medical malpractice case in which a plaintiff, alleging that her doctor had negligently left a surgical sponge in her abdomen, brought an action against the doctor 23 years after he had performed surgery on her. During those 23 years, plaintiff had sought the help of various physicians who treated her for recurrent pain. However, the sponge was not discovered until she...
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