Estavien v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Co., FBTCV176068795S
| Decision Date | 08 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | FBTCV176068795S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Ruby Estavien v. Progressive Casualty Insurance Company et al. |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Stewart, Elizabeth J., J.
The plaintiff, Ruby Estavien, sued the defendant, Sacoto Agency LLC (Sacoto), in negligence for its alleged failure to procure underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage at the same level as liability coverage when it asked the co-defendant, Progressive Casualty Insurance Company ("Progressive"), to increase the liability coverage limits to $1.5 million. Amended Complaint, count two (no 108.00). The plaintiff is the granddaughter of the named insured, Paul Noel, who was Sacoto’s client. Id. Although the plaintiff had no interactions with Sacoto, she is a beneficiary of the policy’s UIM coverage section because she is a blood relative of Noel and lives with him. Id.
After the plaintiff was seriously injured in an automobile accident and only recovered $120, 000.00 from her driver and the tortfeasor, she attempted to recover under the Progressive policy, but Progressive declined to pay, citing UIM limits of only $50, 000.00. The plaintiff then brought this action, suing Progressive for breach of contract and Sacoto for negligence. Sacoto moved for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) its negligence, if any, was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and (2) the requirements of General Statutes § 38a-336(a)(2) do not apply to the plaintiff’s grandfather’s policy. Motion for Summary Judgment (No. 130.00). The court denied the motion on those grounds. Memorandum of Decision (No. 130.10). However, because this defendant had made a one-sentence reference questioning whether it owed a duty to the plaintiff, this court asked for supplemental briefing on that issue. Id. at 1, 9 n.1.; Order (No. 130.20). In addition, the court asked for supplemental briefing on the issue of standing, which implicates subject matter jurisdiction. Id. Thereafter, this defendant filed a motion to dismiss asserting lack of standing. (No. 155.00). The court held oral argument on both issues on March 25, 2019.
"The issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction ..." Wilcox v. Webster Ins., Inc., 294 Conn. 206, 213, 982 A.2d 1053, 1060 (2009) ("Wilcox"). "Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of the court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Tolly v. Department of Human Resources, 225 Conn. 13, 29, 621 A.2d 719, 727 (1993). Once subject matter jurisdiction has been raised, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction "before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction." Schaghticoke Tribal Nation v. Harrison, 264 Conn. 829, 839 n.6, 826 A.2d 1102, 1109 (2003). Therefore, the court will analyze the issue of standing first.
Wilcox, supra, 214, 982 A.2d 1053, 1060-61.
(Citations omitted; Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox, supra, 214-15, 982 A.2d 1053, 1061; see also Handsome, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 317 Conn. 515, 526, 119 A.3d 541, 548-49 (2015).
"[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute ... It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Wilcox, supra, 294 Conn. 213-14, 982 A.2d 1060.
Research revealed one Superior Court case that ruled on the issue of standing to sue an insurance broker for negligence. Grossenbacher v. Ericson Agency, Superior Court, Docket No. CV- 97-0073518-S (April 10, 2000, DiPentima, J.). The plaintiff husband in Grossenberger alleged that the insurance broker had failed to advise him of appropriate coverage and caused him to lose assets he jointly owned with his wife when she injured a third party in an automobile accident and their liability coverage was inadequate. The court in that case found that this allegation was sufficient for a direct injury, and held that the husband had standing.[1] Id.
The plaintiff husband in Grossenberger was an actual client of the insurance broker, albeit for homeowner’s insurance, not the automobile insurance at issue. By contrast, this plaintiff is a resident relative insured who was not the direct client of the insurance broker. Research revealed no Connecticut state case law on the standing of third parties to sue insurance brokers. The plaintiff urges the court to follow Wilcox, supra, and hold that she has standing on the basis of that case. While the court agrees that Wilcox sets forth the classical aggrievement test for standing, there are significant factual differences between Wilcox and the present case. Specifically, the plaintiffs in Wilcox were not third parties for purposes of the Supreme Court’s decision that they had standing. Additionally, the defendant at issue in the Wilcox standing analysis was an insurance company, whereas in the present case the defendant is an insurance broker.[2] Therefore, Wilcox is not factually on point.
In Wilcox, the two individual plaintiffs were members of a limited liability company. 294 Conn. 209, 982 A.2d 1058. The automobile policy at issue listed the limited liability company and one of the individuals as a named insured. Id., 215, 982 A.2d 1061. The other individual was an insured under the terms of the policy, but was not a named insured. Id., 216, 982 A.2d 1062. The Supreme Court held that each of them had a specific, personal and legal interest in those policies and that the defendant insurance company had injuriously affected those interests when it denied coverage. Id., 216-18, 982 A.2d 1061-62. Based on these findings, the Supreme Court concluded that they had standing to sue the defendant insurance company for breach of contract and various other claims (not including negligence). Id., 211, 219, 982 A.2d 1064.
In the present case, the plaintiff alleges that she was injured in a car accident, that the $120, 000 she recovered from her driver and the tortfeasor were not enough to pay for her care, that she is a resident relative of Noel and therefore an insured for purposes of the Progressive policy UIM coverage, that Progressive has not paid her claim, that the defendant was the insurance broker for Noel, and that the defendant negligently failed to advise Noel regarding UIM coverage. Amended Complaint, count two (no. 108.00). The court holds that the Supreme Court’s holding that an insured (who is not a named insured) has a specific, personal and legal interest in an insurance policy applies here such that the plaintiff satisfies the first prong of the classical aggrievement test. Nevertheless, Wilcox does not answer the question raised by the second prong of classical aggrievement, i.e., did the defendant, an insurance broker for the plaintiff’s grandfather, injuriously affect that specific, personal and legal interest?
Research reveals one federal case, applying Connecticut case law, that held that third parties had standing to sue an insurance broker. O&G Industries, Inc. v. Aon Risk Services Northeast, Inc., 922 F.Supp.2d 257, 265-66 (D.Conn. 2013). The third parties were participants in a Contractor Controlled Insurance Program ("CCIP") who wanted to sue the contractor’s insurance broker for failure to procure coverage in excess of the CCIP. Id., 261. The United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that they were third-party beneficiaries of a service agreement to procure insurance between the client and the insurance broker and that therefore, they had standing to bring contract claims against the broker. Id., 265-66. Additionally, the court held that they also had standing to sue the broker in...
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