Estep v. Combs
| Citation | 467 F.Supp.3d 476 |
| Decision Date | 17 June 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. 6:18-CV-23-REW,6:18-CV-23-REW |
| Parties | Jack ESTEP, Plaintiff, v. Steve COMBS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
Edward L. Cooley, Michael Ryan Robey, Rhonda Nicole Iuliano, Cooley Iuliano Robey, LLP, Lexington, KY, for Plaintiff.
Christian Matthew Feltner, Caldwell & Feltner, PLLC, London, KY, Derrick T. Wright, Lyndol Scott Miller, Sturgill, Turner, Barker & Moloney PLLC, Lexington, KY, for Defendant.
"My wife's going to kill me," thought Jack Estep as he was booked at the Harlan County Jail near midnight on the eve of his wedding anniversary. The charges: menacing, resisting arrest, and obstruction. Estep believed he would be "dead meat" when his wife learned of his untimely arrest. An investigation of his son's unlicensed taxidermy, and Estep's abrupt intervention, had landed him in the clink.
This case concerns the legitimacy of state game warden Steve Combs's arrest of Estep. From a county that is no stranger to strife,1 the tension between the Esteps and Combs is an unlikely candidate for the history books. It is, nonetheless, a saga all its own and its apex (or, perhaps, nadir) ultimately put the parties on this Court's docket.
After two rounds of dispositive motion practice, four of Estep's claims survive: false arrest and excessive force theories under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Kentucky law malicious prosecution and false imprisonment allegations.2 Combs now seeks summary judgment on each. See DE 55 (Motion). The motion—fully briefed, see DE 61 (Response), DE 62 (Reply)—stands ripe for review. For the following reasons, and under the applicable standards, the Court finds only partial summary judgment warranted. The Court will permit Estep to proceed with his Fourth Amendment unduly tight handcuffing claim and state malicious prosecution claim. Combs is entitled to summary judgment on Estep's two other claims.
Plaintiff seeks recovery based on the following factual scenario:3 shortly after 10:20 p.m. on December 21, 2016, Defendant Steve Combs4 arrived at the residence of Tim Estep (Plaintiff's son). Combs proceeded up a ramp to the residence and, from the porch, began questioning Tim about taxidermy licensure. Reports of Tim advertising "European Mounts" for "50 bucks" each, motivated Combs's investigation.5 Tim told Combs that he had not commercially profited from the nascent business plan, that he, to date, had completed mounts only for family members, and—having recently learned of the regulatory requirement—intended to secure a license in short order. Nonetheless, as the video makes clear, Combs had persisting doubts.
Roughly 5 minutes after Combs's arrival, Plaintiff Jack Estep received a call from his daughter-in-law, Victoria Estep. Mrs. Estep advised that Defendant Combs was harassing Tim at their home. She requested Plaintiff's assistance. Plaintiff arrived at his son's residence shortly thereafter (around 10:30 p.m.) and found Combs standing on the front porch.
Upon the elder Estep's arrival, the parties had the following exchange as Estep approached, climbed the ramp, and came face-to-face with Combs:
DE 59 at 23:31:10 to: 19.6 Then, on the residence threshold:
Id. at 23:31:20 to: 30. From here, Combs grabs Estep by the arm and repeats "you're goin’ to jail." Estep pulls his arm away saying, "I'm not goin’ nowhere." Combs questions: "You gonna resist?" Estep fends off another Combs collar attempt and, again, inquires about a warrant. Combs advises he does not need one; Estep insists he does. Finally, Estep withdraws into his son's residence, pulling away from Combs's final attempt to take hold of his jacket, while Combs instructs him to "get out here" and, again, advises "you're going to jail." Id. at 23:31:31 to:40. The parties’ verbal exchange, with Estep in his son's home and Combs on the threshold, continues for another minute before Combs radios for backup. Id. at 23:33:00.7 In the eight minutes of jawing that preceded arrival of State Police troopers, Combs twice reiterates that he was there investigating taxidermy issues (and the parties continue to discuss the topic). See id. at 23:36:25, 23:39:30.
Eventually, the Esteps permitted State Police to enter the residence and, after some discussion, convinced Jack Estep to exit. And, roughly 12 minutes after the confrontation began, Combs cuffed Plaintiff, walked him to his vehicle, and placed him in the back seat. The video records approximately 4.5 minutes of cuffed time and ends shortly before the pair's departure. Per Estep, Combs then drove directly to the Harlan County Jail, a 12-or-so minute drive. Estep Dep. at 102. At the Jail, Combs stopped in the parking lot and began writing a citation. Sometime after (the record is not clear how long, exactly), Estep first complained about the tightness of the handcuffs and asked Combs to loosen them because "they're killing me." Fifteen minutes later, with no response from Combs, Estep repeated his complaint and his request. As Estep tells it, Combs "acted like he didn't hear" either protest and removed the cuffs only after entering the Jail. Estep claims his wrist was bleeding from the cuffs. A photograph taken after Estep's release the next morning shows significant bruising and a scabbed-over wound
on Estep's wrist. See DE 58-1.
On February 13, 2017, the Harlan District Court, following a hearing during which Combs testified, granted Estep's motion to suppress evidence relating to the resisting, menacing, and interference charges and, the same day, entered an Order dismissing all charges for lack of evidence. See DE 61-2 (Harlan District Court Orders). This suit, first filed in Harlan Circuit Court and then removed, followed. See DE 1-1 at 4 (Jan. 2, 2018, Compl.).
A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A reviewing court must construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences from the underlying facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986) ; Lindsay v. Yates , 578 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2009). Additionally, the court may not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter" at the summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact initially rests with the moving party. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (); Lindsay , 578 F.3d at 414 (). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to produce "specific facts" showing a "genuine issue" for trial. Celotex Corp. , 106. S. Ct. at 2553 ; Bass v. Robinson , 167 F.3d 1041, 1044 (6th Cir. 1999). However, " Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. , 106 S. Ct. at 2552 ; see also id. at 2557 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ( .
A fact is "material" if the underlying substantive law identifies the fact as critical. Anderson , 106 S. Ct. at 2510. Thus, Id. A "genuine" issue exists if "there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party." Id. at 2511 ; Matsushita Elec. , 106 S. Ct. at 1356 () (citation omitted). Such evidence must be suitable for admission into evidence at trial. Salt Lick Bancorp v. FDIC , 187 F. App'x 428, 444-45 (6th Cir. 2006).
Defendant primarily argues the existence of probable cause and, alternatively, that immunity doctrines shield him from Estep's claims. See DE 55-1 at 9–22. The Court analyzes the federal and state issues distinctly.
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