Estrada v. Alemañy-Noriega
| Decision Date | 30 August 2011 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 10–1065 (FAB). |
| Citation | 806 F.Supp.2d 510 |
| Parties | Edwin Alvarez ESTRADA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Wilfredo ALEMAÑY–NORIEGA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Johanna M. Emmanuelli–Huertas, M.L. & R.E. Law Firm, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiffs.
Yadhira Ramirez–Toro, Department Of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.
Before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 36), and the report and recommendation (Docket No. 49), regarding that motion. After making an independent examination of the record in this case and considering the arguments raised in the only remaining defendant's objection to the report and recommendation, the Court ADOPTS the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations as the opinion of the Court and DENIES the motion for summary judgment (Docket No. 36).
I. BACKGROUNDA. Procedural Background
On January 28, 2010, plaintiffs Edwin Alvarez–Estrada (“Alvarez”), Luis Ayala–Quintana (“Ayala”), Gisel Betances-de Jesus (“Betances”), Luis Ramos–Rodriguez (“Ramos”), Jose Rodriguez–Ronda (“Rodriguez–Ronda”), Rey Torres–Echevarria (“Torres”), Zulma Vazquez–Toro (“Vazquez”), and Antonia Rodriguez–Rivera (“Rodriguez–Rivera”) filed a complaint alleging claims of political discrimination pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“section 1983”). (Docket No. 1.) The complaint names several Puerto Rico government officials as defendants, including Wilfredo Alemañy–Noriega (“Alemañy”), Mayra Lopez–Carrero (“Lopez”), Yanitsia Irizarry–Mendez (“Irizarry”), Esteban Perez–Ubieta (“Perez”), and Wilfredo Maldonado (“Maldonado”). Id.
On April 8, 2011, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the complaint lacks sufficient factual allegations to “state a prima facie case of political discrimination under the First Amendment.” (Docket No. 28.) Plaintiffs filed no opposition to that motion. Pursuant to a referral order issued by the Court, Magistrate Judge Camille Velez–Rive filed a report and recommendation with regard to the motion for judgment on the pleadings on May 25, 2011, 2011 WL 2293223. ( See Docket Nos. 16 & 35.) Magistrate Judge Velez–Rive recommended that the motion be granted in part and denied in part, finding dismissal appropriate only with regard to the claims brought by Alvarez, Ayala, Vazquez, Torres, and Ramos. (Docket No. 35.) With regard to the remaining plaintiffs,1 Magistrate Judge Velez–Rive found that the complaint contained specific factual allegations which would allow their political discrimination claims to survive defendants' motion. Id. at 9–10. On June 8, 2011, 2011 WL 2263391, the Court adopted in part and rejected in part the magistrate judge's conclusions. (Docket No. 42.) Specifically, the Court rejected only the magistrate judge's conclusions that the remaining plaintiffs had properly alleged claims against all defendants. Id. Given the factual allegations in the complaint, the Court further narrowed the remaining plaintiffs' claims, dismissing all but the remaining plaintiffs' political discrimination claims against Alemañy. Id.
Prior to the Court's ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that even if plaintiffs could establish a prima facie case of political discrimination, those claims would be defeated by the application of the affirmative defense outlined in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). Pursuant to the referral order in this case, the magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding that, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, defendants had failed to establish the Mt. Healthy defense and, consequently, their dispositive motion should be denied. (Docket No. 49.) On August 16, 2011, Alemañy, the only remaining defendant in the wake of the Court's ruling on the motion for judgment on the pleadings, filed an objection to the report and recommendation, arguing that the magistrate judge had not properly applied the relevant legal standard. ( See Docket No. 50.)
B. Factual Background
Given plaintiff's lack of opposition to the motion for summary judgment, the magistrate judge accepted the factual assertions contained in defendants' statement of uncontested facts as admitted. ( See Docket No. 49.) Despite certain defects present in the factual background developed by defendants, which are discussed in further detail below, the Court will repeat the factual findings of the magistrate judge for the purposes of establishing context.
On July 31, 2008, Rodriguez–Ronda was appointed in a probationary position as Office Clerk I, to the Department of the Family's “Administracion de Desarrollo Socio-economico de la Familia” (“ADSEF”). (Docket No. 49 at 5.) On April 23, 2009, Rodriguez–Ronda was notified that his total seniority in employment as Office Clerk I was seven months and six days. Id. Although the letter also notified Rodriguez–Ronda of his right to contest that seniority determination, he did not seek to do so. Id. On May 29, 2009, a letter notified Rodriguez–Ronda that, under the auspices of Law 7, he would be laid off on July 10, 2009, from the position classified as Office Clerk I. Id.
On July 18, 2008, Betances was appointed to a probationary position as Assistant of Office System I to the Department of the Family in ADSEF. Id. at 6. On April 23, 2009, Betances received a letter similar to that sent to Rodriguez–Ronda stating that her total seniority in the employment was seven months and nineteen days pursuant to Law 7. Id. Although the letter also notified Betances of her right to contest that seniority determination, she did not seek to do so. Id. On May 29, 2009, Betances received a letter notifying her that, under the auspices of Law 7, she would be laid off on July 10, 2009 from her position. Id.
On September 4, 2009, Rodriguez–Rivera was laid off pursuant to Law 7 from her position as Assistant of Services in the Department of the Family, Administration of Families and Children (“ADFAN” by its Spanish acronym). Id. On October 18, 2010, an arbitrator issued an award ordering the reinstatement of Rodriguez–Rivera to the position of Assistant of Services because, after Rodriguez–Rivera's dismissal, the Executive Director of the “Junta de Reestructuracion y Estabilizacion Fiscal” (“JREF”) sent a letter to the ADFAN Administrator notifying her that Rodriguez–Rivera's position was excluded from the application of Law 7. Id. The arbitration award also ordered the back-payment of Rodriguez–Rivera's salary and benefits from the time of her dismissal. Id. at 6–7. Rodriguez–Rivera was reinstated to her former position on November 16, 2010. Id. at 7.
II. Legal AnalysisA. Standard under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
A district court may refer, inter alia, “a motion ... for summary judgment” to a magistrate judge for report and recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)-(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); Loc. Rule 72(a)(4). Any party adversely affected by the report and recommendation may file written objections within fourteen days of being served with the magistrate judge's report. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party that files a timely objection is entitled to a de novo determination of “those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which specific objection is made.” Sylva v. Culebra Dive Shop, 389 F.Supp.2d 189, 191–92 (D.P.R.2005) (citing United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980)). Failure to comply with this rule precludes further review. See Davet v. Maccarone, 973 F.2d 22, 30–31 (1st Cir.1992). In conducting its review, the court is free to “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)(b)(1). Templeman v. Chris Craft Corp., 770 F.2d 245, 247 (1st Cir.1985); Alamo Rodriguez v. Pfizer Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 286 F.Supp.2d 144, 146 (D.P.R.2003). Furthermore, the Court may accept those parts of the report and recommendation to which the parties do not object. See Hernandez–Mejias v. General Elec., 428 F.Supp.2d 4, 6 (D.P.R.2005) (citing Lacedra v. Donald W. Wyatt Detention Facility, 334 F.Supp.2d 114, 125–126 (D.R.I.2004)). B. Summary Judgment Standard
The Court's discretion to grant summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule states, in pertinent part, that the court may grant summary judgment only if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Santiago–Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir.2000). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
Once a properly supported motion has been presented, the opposing party has the burden of demonstrating that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the Court's denial of the motion for summary judgment. For issues where the opposing party bears the ultimate burden of proof, that party cannot merely rely on the absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir.2000).
In order for a factual controversy to prevent summary judgment, the contested facts must be “material” and the dispute must be “genuine.” Material means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under governing law. The issue is genuine when a reasonable jury could return a...
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...that a trial-worthy issue exists that would warrant the Court's denial of the motion of the summary judgment. Estrada v. Alemañy-Noriega, 806 F. Supp. 2d 510, 514 (D.P.R. 2011). A party may not rely upon bare allegations to create a factual dispute but is required to point to specific facts......