Estrada v. Cheshire

• Decision Date: 07 July 2015
• Docket Number: NO. 01–14–00014–CV,01–14–00014–CV
• Citation: 470 S.W.3d 109
• Parties: Hector Estrada, Isela Estrada, Maria Martinez, and Jorge Gonzales, Appellants v. Daner Lee Cheshire and Lyndon Charles Cheshire, Appellees
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

470 S.W.3d 109

Hector Estrada, Isela Estrada, Maria Martinez, and Jorge Gonzales, Appellants
v.
Daner Lee Cheshire and Lyndon Charles Cheshire, Appellees

NO. 01–14–00014–CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued July 7, 2015
Rehearing Overruled October 20, 2015

Christina Stone, Gaughan, Stone & Thiagarajan, Houston, TX, for Appellants.

Timothy A. Hootman, Houston, TX, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Brown.

OPINION

Evelyn V. Keyes, Justice

This is a trespass to try title suit. Appellants, Hector Estrada, Isela Estrada, Maria Martinez, and Jorge Gonzales (collectively “the Estrada parties”), sued appellees Daner and Lyndon Cheshire to establish title to land by adverse possession. The contested land was the northern portion of a larger piece of property described in its entirety as Tract 2, Block 5 of Timber Acres in Harris County (“Tract 2”). Both before and after suit was filed, Tract 2 was involved in a convoluted series of transactions. Following a bench trial, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law determining the history of the title of both portions of Tract 2 and a neighboring property (“Tract 1”) and the current rights of the parties to the property. On appeal, the Estrada parties challenge the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court's judgment determining (1) that they did not have a valid deed for the northern portion of Tract 2; (2) that they

470 S.W.3d 114

failed to establish their claim by adverse possession; and (3) that Daner and Lyndon were the proper owners of the northern portion of Tract 2.¹

We reverse and render judgment in favor of appellants.

Background

In 1963, J.H. Hawkins conveyed the southern part of Tract 2 to Cecil and Mary Cheshire by warranty deed. In 1965, Joe and Nila Nettles conveyed the northern part of Tract 2 to Cecil Cheshire. In 1983, Cecil died, and his will, in which he left his entire estate to Mary, was admitted to probate. In 1984, Mary Cheshire conveyed the land she had co-owned with Cecil prior to his death—the southern part of Tract 2—to James and Mercedes Van Gundy, who already owned the neighboring property, Tract 1, by warranty deed. Mary Cheshire's conveyance to the Van Gundys did not include the northern part of Tract 2 that she had inherited from Cecil.

James Van Gundy died in 2002, and, in March 2002, Mercedes Van Gundy and the Estrada parties entered into an earnest money contract and contract of sale involving Tract 1 and Tract 2. The earnest money contract and the contract of sale both stated that Van Gundy agreed to sell the Estrada parties “[Tracts] One (1) and Two (2) in Block (5), of TIMBER ACRES, SECOND SECTION, a subdivision in Harris County, Texas, according to the map or plat thereof recorded in Volume 22, Page 13, of the Map Records of Harris County, Texas.”² However, the warranty deed by which Van Gundy actually transferred the property to the Estrada parties transferred only Tract 1 and a portion of Tract 2 described as

[a] tract of land out of the South portion of Tract 2, Block 5 of TIMBER ACRES, SECTION (2), a subdivision in Harris County, Texas, according to the map or plat recorded in Volume 22, Page 13, of the Map Records of Harris County, Texas, said tract being more particularly described by metes and bounds on Exhibit ‘A’ attached hereto and incorporated herein for all purposes.”

The metes and bounds description of the property conveyed by Van Gundy to the Estrada parties corresponded to the southern portion of Tract 2, which Mary Cheshire had conveyed to the Van Gundys by warranty deed. The warranty deed did not convey the northern portion of Tract 2. However, there was a fence around the entire property for more than ten years during the time the Van Gundys owned it, and the Van Gundys were assessed and paid the taxes on all of Tracts 1 and 2 during the time they owned the property.

In 2005, Mary Cheshire died, and on July 26, 2005, Harris County Probate Court No. 1 entered a judgment that Daner Cheshire and Lyndon Cheshire were her sole heirs and that each was entitled to one-half of her estate.

470 S.W.3d 115

In 2010, the Estrada parties first realized that their 2002 deed from Van Gundy did not convey the northern portion of Tract 2 when they were unable to obtain building permits for the property due to the defect in the title.

In 2012, the Estrada parties sued Mary Cheshire's heirs, Daner and Lyndon Cheshire, seeking clear title and undisputed ownership of the northern portion of Tract 2 (“the Disputed Property”). The Estrada parties alleged that they had entered into an agreement with Van Gundy to purchase the entirety of both Tract 1 and Tract 2 and that they had not realized until 2010 that Van Gundy had deeded them only the southern half of Tract 2 and that Van Gundy was not the record title owner of the Disputed Property. They asserted that they first entered the Disputed Property on March 25, 2002 “and have held the land in peaceable and adverse possession from that date until the present date, claiming under an Earnest Money Contract, the sale of which closed on March 8, 2002.” The Estrada parties alleged that, for more than nine years, they had “cultivated, used, and enjoyed” the Disputed Property and had “timely paid applicable taxes” on that property. They further alleged that their predecessor in interest, Van Gundy, had owned and had “full possession” of Tract 2 and had paid taxes on it for eighteen years. Thus, they argued that they could establish ownership of the full title to the Disputed Property by adverse possession.

At trial, the Estrada parties testified that, once they bought the property, they cut down nearly all of the trees on Tract 2 and mowed the property, which had previously been wooded and had high weeds. They also testified that they leveled the property using heavy equipment and erected two gates in front of the property fronting Hirsch Road. They also made drainage improvements at the front of the property, adjacent to Hirsch Road. They jointly maintained the property and kept it mowed. They also paid taxes on the entirety of Tract 2, as had the Van Gundys before them.

At the time the lawsuit was filed, Daner Cheshire was incarcerated in Cleveland, Texas. In February 2013, he signed a general warranty deed conveying “[t]hat one certain tract of land, being Tract Two (2) in Block Five (5) of Timber Acres, a subdivision in Harris County, Texas, according to the map or plan thereof recorded in Volume 22, Page 13, of the Official Map Records of Harris County, Texas” to two of the Estrada parties, Jorge Gonzales and Maria Martinez. The Estrada parties then moved to dismiss Daner from the suit, stating that they had settled their dispute with him. The trial court granted the partial dismissal on March 22, 2013.

Lyndon Cheshire, on the other hand, filed an answer denying the Estrada parties' claims in February 2013. Lyndon contended that the Estrada parties did not have adequate title to the Disputed Property—the northern portion of Tract 2—and that they could not establish a right to title by adverse possession. Immediately prior to trial, Lyndon amended his answer to assert that there was a defect in the parties because he was not the owner of the Disputed Property. Rather, Lyndon argued that the Disputed Property still belonged to Cecil's estate, so the estate would have been the proper party.

At trial, the Estrada parties argued that, pursuant to the earnest money contract with Van Gundy, they were to have purchased the entirety of both Tract 1 and Tract 2. However, the 2002 deed from Van Gundy only conveyed Tract 1 and the southern portion of Tract 2. They argued that they did not realize until 2010 that the deed from Van Gundy did not convey the

470 S.W.3d 116

Disputed Property and that, in the meantime, they had cleared the land and made other improvements. The Estrada parties thus sought to establish that they were entitled to title to the Disputed Property by virtue of adverse possession.

The Estrada parties further argued that ownership of the Disputed Property passed from Cecil to Mary by virtue of Cecil's will, which named Mary as his heir. They argued that upon Mary's death record title to the Disputed Property passed to Daner and Lyndon, who each owned a 50% interest in the Disputed Property because they were Mary's heirs. The Estrada parties admitted into evidence the deed executed by Daner in February 2013, and argued that they had a 50% interest in the Disputed Property by virtue of that deed and that Lyndon was the owner of the other 50% interest in the land. They argued that no one, including Lyndon, had made any claim on the Disputed Property in all the time since they had entered into their agreement with Van Gundy in 2002, that their possession of the land had been open, notorious, and hostile to Lyndon's interest, and that, therefore, regardless of title, they owned the entirety of Tract 2, including the Disputed Property.

Lyndon argued that the Disputed Property had remained part of Cecil's estate ever since Cecil's death and that both Mary and Van Gundy were aware that the title to...