Estrada v. Hanson

• Decision Date: 11 June 1943
• Docket Number: No. 33405.,33405.
• Citation: 215 Minn. 353,10 N.W.2d 223
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court
• Parties: ESTRADA v. HANSON et al.

10 N.W.2d 223

215 Minn. 353

ESTRADA v. HANSON et al.

No. 33405.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

June 11, 1943.

Appeal from District Court, Hennepin County; Vince A. Day, Judge.

Action by L. Elizabeth Estrada against George R. Hanson and another to set aside a deed. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Alfred W. Anderson, William A. Tautges, and Louis B. Schwartz, all of Minneapolis, for appellant.

George C. Stiles, of Minneapolis, for respondent George R. Hanson.

LORING, Justice.

This was an action to set aside a deed on the ground (1) of failure of consideration; (2) that it was part of a gambling transaction; and (3) of fraud. The case was tried to the court, which made findings of fact and conclusions of law contrary to all of plaintiff's contentions and ordered judgment for defendants. The appeal is from the judgment.

Plaintiff was the vendee in a contract for deed from defendant Hanson for the purchase of an apartment house in Minneapolis at a price of $34,372. There was still $31,755 unpaid on the contract. Payments were fixed at $300 per month until July 10, 1936, when they became $400 per month. The evidence tended to prove that plaintiff felt it was too difficult to pay at the increased rate, and on April 26, 1938, she traded her equity in the contract to one Henry Larson for his equity in a farm in Blue Earth county. At that time plaintiff did not have in mind the exact amount due under the apartment house contract, but Hanson by letter authorized her to represent to Larson that it was $31,000. It later developed that the exact figure was $31,755. The following day, April 27, 1938, plaintiff conveyed to the defendant Hanson a one-half interest in the Larson farm in consideration of his agreement to reinstate plaintiff in her rights under the apartment house contract for deed if Larson should default and be dispossessed by Hanson "within one year from May 1, 1938." Hanson also agreed that if plaintiff needed funds between October 1, 1938, and May 1, 1939, and if Larson did not default before or during this period, he, Hanson, would lend plaintiff $50 per month for not to exceed six months, these loans to be repaid during 1939 or out of the sale of the Blue Earth farm if it were sold. He agreed to pay plaintiff $25 for each month from May 1, 1939, to April 30, 1941, provided Larson was not dispossessed of the apartment house property before or during that time. Hanson agreed to assign (the contract does not say to whom, but presumably to plaintiff) all rents from the Blue Earth farm over and above expenses, including payments on principal and interest.

On the same day the same parties entered into another agreement to the effect that Hanson would accept $31,000 as the unpaid balance on the apartment house contract; that plaintiff would be released from all personal liability for the unpaid balance on this contract unless she should afterward again come into possession of the premises; and that Hanson would consent to plaintiff's conveying her interest in this contract to Henry Larson.

Forty-two days after the execution of these contracts and the plaintiff's conveyance of a one-half interest in the Blue Earth farm to Hanson, he sold his vendor's interest in the apartment house contract to Henry Larson and his brother. Plaintiff now seeks to set aside her conveyance on the grounds above stated.

1. Plaintiff contends there was a total failure of consideration for the contract by which she agreed to and did convey to Hanson a one-half interest in the farm, because the consideration was Hanson's agreement to reinstate her in her rights in the apartment house contract upon Larson's default and dispossession and that Hanson has disabled himself from performing by selling his vendor's interest therein.

A valuable consideration may consist of some benefit accruing to one party or some detriment suffered by the other, and the tendency is to emphasize the detriment to the promisee. 1 Williston, Contracts, Rev. Ed., § 102. As we said in Johnson v. Kruse, 205 Minn. 237, 241, 285 N.W. 715, 717: "Consideration means, not so much that one party is benefited,...