Estrada v. Port City Properties Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 April 2011
• Docket Number: No. 107,552.,107,552.
• Citation: 258 P.3d 495,2011 OK 30,32 IER Cases 593
• Parties: Philip ESTRADA, Plaintiff/Appellee,v.PORT CITY PROPERTIES, INC., d/b/a, Hodges Warehouse, Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

258 P.3d 495

32 IER Cases 593

2011 OK 30

Philip ESTRADA, Plaintiff/Appellee,

v.PORT CITY PROPERTIES, INC., d/b/a, Hodges Warehouse, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 107,552.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 19, 2011.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF OKMULGEE COUNTY; Honorable H. Michael Claver, Trial Judge¶ 0 The plaintiff/employee was injured in an on-the-job accident. After the employee received treatment and hired an attorney, his employer no longer needed him. The employee brought a retaliatory discharge proceeding under the Workers' Compensation Act against his employer. After the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee, the employer appealed, alleging numerous issues of error. We retained the cause and hold that: 1) because no evidence was presented which would warrant a punitive damages award, the trial court erred in submitting the issue to the jury; 2) the collateral source rule applies to retaliatory discharge proceedings regardless of whether financial hardship is alleged; and 3) the actual damages awarded were not excessive under the evidence presented.TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD TO BE STRICKEN.

Robert V. Seacat, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff/Appellee.Kenneth L. Brune, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Defendant/Appellant.KAUGER, J:

¶ 1 The dispositive issues presented ¹ are whether: 1) the trial court erred in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury after it had determined that there was no evidence presented which would warrant punitive damages; 2) the collateral source rule applies to retaliatory discharge proceedings when financial hardship is alleged; and 3) the actual damages awarded were excessive under the evidence presented. We hold that: 1) because no evidence was presented which would warrant a punitive damages award, the trial court erred in submitting the issue to the jury; 2) the collateral source rule applies to retaliatory discharge proceedings regardless of whether financial hardship is alleged; and 3) the actual damages awarded were not excessive under the evidence presented.

FACTS

¶ 2 The plaintiff, Phillip Estrada (employee/Estrada), began working for the defendant, Port City Properties, Inc. d/b/a Hodges Warehouse (Hodges/employer), in Okmulgee, Oklahoma, on June 13, 2001. His job was to unload freight coming into the warehouse, and then separate shipping pallets into “good” and “bad” piles before sending them out to two different destinations. After approximately one year and a couple of months, Estrada moved to another division of Hodges called Kelco where he also unloaded freight.

¶ 3 On January 16, 2003, the employee was walking to the time clock when a coworker called his name to get his attention and he tripped over what appeared to be a steel beam or “some kind of debris.” The employee fell back, heard a pop, and fell to the ground, twisting his ankle. At the time of the fall, Estrada thought he had just twisted his ankle, but by the next morning he could not walk on it. Estrada called his supervisor, Sam Thomas (supervisor), and asked what he should do. The supervisor recommended that Estrada go to the local emergency room. He did, and at the emergency room, the employee's ankle was x-rayed, he was given pain medication and crutches, and then referred to a specialist, Dr. Therron Nichols.

¶ 4 The employee filled out an accident report at Hodges on January 20, 2003, and went to an appointment with the specialist the next day.² Dr. Nichols restricted the employee from going back to work until March 7, 2003. ³ The employee returned to work on Monday, March 10, 2003, and started unloading trucks as usual. Estrada talked to an insurance adjuster of Hodge's insurance carrier, Compsource, over his lunch break, who inquired how his ankle was doing. He told the adjuster that his ankle was starting to hurt and swell again, just like it did the first day he injured it. The adjuster arranged for Estrada to see another orthopedic specialist, Dr. Hawkins, on March 12, 2003. Dr. Hawkins again restricted the employee from going to back to work.

¶ 5 According to Estrada, he told his supervisor about the appointment and he also informed the supervisor afterwards that Dr. Hawkins had restricted him from work, and ordered him to attend physical therapy. Estrada hired a lawyer to represent him in filing a Form 3 for a Workers' Compensation Claim and on April 11, 2003, the lawyer filed the claim on behalf of the employee. ⁴

¶ 6 During the course of his treatment the employee was sent to a third doctor, a Dr. Lewis, who after administering an M.R.I. discovered internal damage⁵ to the ankle which required surgery. The employee underwent surgery on June 19, 2003, followed by about eight weeks of rehabilitation. Finally, Dr. Lewis released the employee to return to work with no restrictions on September 23, 2003.

¶ 7 According to the employee, when he showed up for work on the 23rd, he was sent to the shipping office where he was told that they no longer had any work for him. Estrada went home confused about what exactly had happened. On September 30, 2003, he filed for unemployment benefits stating that he was terminated because he was told he was no longer needed.⁶ That same day, the financial manager of Hodges faxed an explanation to the “Unemployment Insurance Service” stating that Estrada was not “discharged,” but that they had replaced Estrada while he was absent and they did not have any work for him to do after his release.

¶ 8 On November 12, 2003, Estrada filed an action in the District Court of Okmulgee County. He alleged that he was fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim and for retaining a lawyer to represent him regarding the claim in violation of 85 O.S. Supp.2005 § 5.⁷ By November 23, 2003, Estrada had secured other employment.

¶ 9 A two-day trial occurred in October of 2005, and upon presentation of the employee's case, the employer interposed a demurrer to the evidence and motion for directed verdict which the trial court granted and which was reversed on appeal.⁸ A second trial was held on March 2–4, 2009, and the employee recounted his story concerning the injury and the alleged firing. He also testified that he suffered financial hardship, physical and mental pain, and emotional and mental anguish as a result of his firing. The employer, on the other hand, presented another version of the facts.

¶ 10 The employer insisted that the employee had not been “fired,” but that he instead “abandoned” his employment in March, 2003. Hodges also explained that the financial manager did not “correctly describe the situation” when she sent in the unemployment report stating that Estrada was turned away because they no longer had any work for him. The evidence at trial indicated that Hodges gave inconsistent versions as to how the events unfolded.⁹

¶ 11 Both parties moved for directed verdicts which were denied. However, the trial court made a preliminary determination that there was not any evidence of any reckless discharge or wilful or intentional discharge or firing which would support an award of punitive damages. Nevertheless, the trial court also determined that, collectively, pursuant to 23 O.S. Supp.2002 § 9.1 and 85 O.S.2001 § 6,¹⁰ “I make a ruling not only that there's no evidence to support that [the issue of punitive damages], that it still goes to the jury.” ¹¹

¶ 12 On March 4, 2009, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the employee and awarded him $76,730.00.¹² It also found that the employer acted in reckless disregard of the employee's rights and acted intentionally with malice. In the punitive damages phase of the jury deliberations, the jury returned a verdict for $18,398.00 in punitive damages.¹³

¶ 13 On September 17, 2009, the employer appealed, raising sixteen issues of error all of which concern whether a new trial should be required. On February 22, 2010, the employer filed a motion to retain the cause in this Court. We retained the cause on April 20, 2010, and the briefing was completed on May 20, 2010. The cause was assigned on June 1, 2010. However, it became apparent that portions of the record were unintentionally omitted.¹⁴ We issued an order on October 20, 2010, allowing the parties an opportunity to correct the incomplete record. The record was finally completed on December 7, 2010.

I.

¶ 14 BECAUSE NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED WHICH WOULD WARRANT THE IMPOSITION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE ISSUE TO THE JURY.

¶ 15 The employer argues that the trial court erred when it determined that, collectively, pursuant to 23 O.S. Supp.2002 § 9.1 ¹⁵ and 85 O.S.2001 § 6,¹⁶ it was required to submit punitive damages issues to the jury, even though the judge had already determined that no evidence of any reckless, malicious, wilful or intentional discharge or firing was presented at trial which would support a punitive damages award. The employee contends that: 1) whether the employer's conduct falls into one of the categories necessary to impose punitive damages under 23 O.S. Supp.2002 § 9.1 ¹⁷ is strictly a jury question and not for the trial court to determine; and 2) between the jury instructions which were given and the two statutes, the proper procedure was followed and the jury was properly instructed.

¶ 16 While an employer is not obligated in an employment-at-will contract to prove good faith or fair dealing when its employee is terminated,¹⁸ 85 O.S. Supp.2005 § 5 ¹⁹ represents the public policy of this state, that no employer may discharge (retaliate against) an employee for exercising a legal right to file a workers' compensation claim.²⁰ When a breach of obligations arises from tortious conduct, punitive (exemplary) damages may be recoverable.²¹

¶ 17 Prior to 1995, the statutory framework for awarding punitive damages was found at 23 O.S.1991 § 9.²² In Sides v. Cordes, Inc., 1999 OK 36, ¶ 11, 981 P.2d 301...