Estrada v. State

• Decision Date: 24 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. 30821/32755.,30821/32755.
• Citation: 149 P.3d 833,143 Idaho 558
• Parties: Krispen ESTRADA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 833

149 P.3d 833

143 Idaho 558

Krispen ESTRADA, Petitioner-Appellant, v. STATE of Idaho, Respondent.

No. 30821/32755.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, September 2006 Term.

November 24, 2006.

Rehearing Denied January 22, 2007.

Molly J. Huskey, State Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.

Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. John C. McKinney argued.

TROUT, Justice.

This Court has granted Appellant Krispen Estrada's request for review of an Idaho Court of Appeals decision upholding the district court's denial of Estrada's petition for post-conviction relief. The petition was grounded on Estrada's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which was based on his attorney's failure to advise Estrada of his Fifth Amendment privilege to refuse to submit to a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation for sentencing purposes.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the underlying criminal case, Estrada pleaded guilty to the rape of his estranged wife. An associated charge of kidnapping was dismissed. From the record in that case it appears that Estrada's crime was brutal. He choked and battered the victim before raping her, and committed these acts in the presence of his five young children. After the victim and children were able to leave the house, Estrada engaged in a seven-hour armed standoff with police before he surrendered.

At the plea hearing, the district court advised Estrada that he was waiving his constitutional right against self-incrimination. After accepting Estrada's plea, the district court ordered a psychosexual evaluation of Estrada pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-8316. Estrada then wrote to the district court, asserting that the evaluation was unnecessary and caused a frustrating delay in his sentencing. Estrada's attorney responded by writing a letter to Estrada advising him that the evaluation was not a delay tactic, but "must be completed before sentencing." The attorney also commented, "I want every single good piece of evidence that I can get my hands on to be able to argue at your sentencing." Based on the letter, Estrada decided to participate in the evaluation. Later, however, Estrada failed to complete certain evaluation forms, which prompted the evaluator, Larry Gold (Gold), to contact Estrada's attorney to relay Estrada's refusal to cooperate. The attorney sent Estrada another letter, in which he noted that the evaluation was ordered by the district court. The attorney wrote, "We would not want the judge to consider your lack of cooperation to mean that you are not willing to comply with court orders." Thereafter, Estrada participated in the evaluation, which took place in the county jail.

The evaluation was filed with the district court and included a number of unfavorable and derogatory comments about Estrada, including references to his potential for future violent actions. Estrada's attorney did not attempt to suppress the evaluation, but instead pointed to the evaluator's observation that Estrada was not a perpetrator on strangers and Estrada's risk to children was "nonexistent." Nevertheless, the district court imposed a life sentence, twenty-five years fixed, relying in part on the evaluation's conclusion that Estrada had an "extreme violent nature" and a low level of treatment motivation. The district court summed up the evaluation as indicating "a serious problem and danger involved in releasing you [Estrada] back into society." The district court also observed the violent nature of the rape, noted Estrada's two prior felony convictions, and emphasized the protection of the victim and her family as the "guiding principle" by which the sentence was determined.

The sentence was affirmed on appeal. Estrada then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Estrada argued his attorney should have advised him that even after entering a guilty plea, he still retained his right against self-incrimination and was not required to participate in the psychosexual evaluation. Estrada also claimed his attorney was ineffective in not moving to suppress the evaluation on the grounds that it was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Had the court not considered the evaluation, Estrada contended, he would have received a more favorable sentence.

After an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the petition.¹ The court concluded that Estrada did have a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination relating to the psychosexual evaluation and his attorney was deficient in failing to advise him of such. Applying the test articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the district court concluded, however, that Estrada was not prejudiced by the deficiency under the second prong of the Strickland test because the psychosexual evaluation did not affect the length of his sentence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed that the privilege against self-incrimination applied to psychosexual evaluations ordered by the court for sentencing. The Court of Appeals further concluded that Estrada's attorney's performance was not deficient because "no decision of the Idaho appellate courts or of the United States Supreme Court had held that a defendant may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination in a court-ordered mental health evaluation conducted for sentencing in a non-capital case." Because the attachment of the privilege was "not clear" when Estrada's evaluation occurred, the court concluded, Estrada's attorney could not be faulted for failing to give this advice. As to the attorney's failure to move to suppress the evaluation, the court concluded that it did not constitute deficient representation because Estrada waived his right by failing to invoke it before or during the evaluation. Finding no deficiency, the Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's order denying post-conviction relief without addressing the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. This Court granted Estrada's petition for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

While this Court gives serious consideration to the views of the Court of Appeals when considering a case on review from that court, this Court reviews the district court's decisions directly. State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 226, 91 P.3d 1127, 1130 (2004). Where the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing in a post-conviction proceeding, the court's findings of fact will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Ray v. State, 133 Idaho 96, 98, 982 P.2d 931, 933 (1999). The reviewing court, however, exercises free and independent review of the district court's application of law. Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 976 P.2d 927, 930 (1999). Constitutional issues are pure questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. Quinlan v. Idaho Com'n for Pardons and Parole, 138 Idaho 726, 729, 69 P.3d 146, 149 (2003).

In reviewing claims for ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court utilizes the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, supra., Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). To prevail on such a claim, an applicant for post-conviction relief must demonstrate (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different. Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730; Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693-94, 696-97. When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, strategic and tactical decisions will not be second-guessed or serve as a basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584, 6 P.3d 831, 834 (2000). When considering whether an attorney's failure to file a motion to suppress constitutes deficient performance, the Court examines the probability of success of such a motion in order to determine whether counsel's decision was within the wide range of permissible discretion and trial strategy. Hollon, 132 Idaho at 579, 976 P.2d at 933.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Critical stage under the Sixth Amendment

The first question presented by this case is whether a court-ordered psychosexual evaluation constitutes a critical stage of litigation at which the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies. While neither party in this case directly raises this issue, the question is indirectly raised as a necessary precursor to the arguments presented regarding Estrada's claim for ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to counsel during all "critical stages" of the adversarial proceedings against him. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 1931, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149, 1156 (1967); State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P.2d 415 (1981). A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel "extends to all critical stages of the prosecution where his substantial rights may be affected, and sentencing is one such stage." Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 796, 874 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct.App.1994) (citing Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 S.Ct. 254, 256, 19 L.Ed.2d 336, 340 (1967)). In determining whether a particular stage is "critical," it is necessary "to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice." Wade, 388 U.S. at 227, 87 S.Ct. at 1932, 18 L.Ed.2d at 1157. "[I]f the stage is not critical, there can be no constitutional violation, no matter how deficient counsel's performance." United States v. Benlian, 63 F.3d 824, 827 (9th Cir.1995).

It makes no sense that a defendant would be entitled to counsel up through conviction or...