Estes Et Ux v. Jackson

• Decision Date: 01 November 1892
• Citation: 111 N.C. 145,16 S.E. 7
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: ESTES et ux. v. JACKSON.

16 S.E. 7

111 N.C. 145

ESTES et ux.

v.JACKSON.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Nov. 1, 1892.

Estoppel—By Deed—New Trial—Review.

1. Where one owning the fee of land, but supposing, under a misapprehension of title, that she has only a life estate, and that heirs are entitled to the remainder, assents to a conveyance by the heirs of their supposed interest, with reservation only of a life estate, and without receiving any part of the consideration, or making any representation as to the rights of said heirs, or being guilty of any misrepresentation as to her own, but merely signs the deeds executed by the heirs, although not a party, this does not estop her grantee from asserting interest in the premises.

2. The granting of a new trial on affidavits, alleging the courts misunderstanding of the testimony in a case, is a matter of discretion not liable to review.

Appeal from superior court, Granville county; Winston, Judge.

Action by L. D. Estes and wife against M. J. Jackson, for waste alleged to have been committed by defendant on land claimed by him under a deed from Mrs. Lloyd, and claimed also by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, after submitting to a nonsuit, appealed. Affirmed.

J. T. Strayhorn and A. W. Graham, for appellants.

J. H. Fleming, for appellee.

Shepherd, J. Without discussing the general doctrine, it is sufficient to say inthe present ease that, in order to work an estoppel in pais, "there must be conduct— acts, language, or silence—amounting to a representation or a concealment of material facts, " and that "the truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the party claiming the benefit of the estoppel." 2 Pom. Eq. Jur. 264. "The estoppel is removed by proof that the party claiming its existence, even though mistaken in regard to his rights at law, had notice of the actual state of the facts at the time of acting upon the representation; and this, though the representation was made under oath." Bigelow, Estop. 520. "The estoppel does not apply where everything is equally well known to both parties." Herm. Estop. § 957; Bisp. Eq. 288; Duchess of Kingston's Case, notes. Smith, Lead. Cas. 1999, 2010; Holmes v. Crowell, 73 N. C. 613; Loftin v. Crossland, 94 N. C. 76; Exum v. Cogdell, 74 N. C. 139;. Mayo v. Leggett, 96 N. C. 237, 1 S. E. Rep. 622. In Exum v. Cogdell the court uses thef ollowing language: "In this case it appears, either by admission or the findings of the jury, that the plaintiff knew all the material facts in regard to the title, and could not have been deceived by misrepresentations of the defendant." Applying the foregoing principles to the facts before us, it is plain that there is no estoppel. Mrs. Lloyd was the owner in fee of the land in controversy, the same having been conveyed to her by one N. E. Cannady. She, her children, and the purchaser were all alike ignorant of the legal effect of the conveyance, which was read to...