Etheredge v. Richland School Dist. One, 25159.

• Decision Date: 26 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 25159.,25159.
• Citation: 534 S.E.2d 275,341 S.C. 307
• Parties: Linda L. ETHEREDGE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ernest Dunlap, III, Deceased, Respondent, v. RICHLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT ONE, Petitioner.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

341 S.C. 307

534 S.E.2d 275

Linda L. ETHEREDGE, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Ernest Dunlap, III, Deceased, Respondent, v. RICHLAND SCHOOL DISTRICT ONE, Petitioner.

No. 25159.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard January 19, 2000.

Decided June 26, 2000.

Rehearing Denied July 20, 2000.

Charles E. Carpenter, Jr., Donald V. Richardson, III, Georgia Anna Mitchell and S. Elizabeth Brosnan, all of Richardson, Plowden, Carpenter & Robinson, PA, of Columbia, for petitioner.

Henry Hammer, Howard Hammer, and John W. Carrigg, Jr., all of Hammer, Hammer, Carrigg & Potterfield, of Columbia; and Douglas N. Truslow, of Columbia, for respondent.

PER CURIAM:

We granted certiorari to review the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Etheredge v. Richland School District One, 330 S.C. 447, 499 S.E.2d 238 (Ct.App.1998). We reverse.

On January 25, 1994, Ernest Dunlap (Dunlap), was shot and killed by Floyd Brown (Floyd), a student at Eau Claire High School (Eau Claire), while standing in the hallway during a class change. Linda Etheredge (Etheredge), personal representative of the estate of Dunlap filed an action against Richland County School District One (School District) alleging wrongful death. The School District moved for summary judgment averring that the actions were barred by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. S.C.Code Ann. §§ 15-78-10, et seq. (Supp.1999).

The evidence submitted to the trial court at the summary judgment hearing consisted primarily of several affidavits. The School District submitted the affidavits of two Eau Claire employees (1) Dorothy Walker, a teacher and (2) Ellen Mosely, the principal at the time of the shooting. Etheredge submitted the affidavit of Harland Brown (Brown), one of the campus monitors employed by the school.

Brown was employed at Eau Claire from September 1993 through February 1994. In his affidavit, he stated that he was informed that his job would entail breaking up fights, preventing the students from having drugs and alcohol on the premises at the high school, and providing security for the school. Brown alleged that he received absolutely no training from the School District or Eau Claire.

Brown asserted that he was not given the proper equipment to perform his job¹ and his requests to the School District for the appropriate equipment were ignored. He also insisted that he needed the authority to search the persons, bookbags or lockers of the students. Brown described the situation at Eau Claire as very volatile. He expressed his belief that students apprehended for criminal activity were never disciplined in a manner consistent with the severity of their offense. He was present at Eau Claire in his capacity as campus monitor on the day of the shooting.

The trial court granted the School District's motion based on S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-60 (Supp.1999).² Etheredge appealed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment and finding that there was sufficient evidence to create a jury question whether the School District acted in a grossly negligent manner. We granted the School District's petition for a writ of certiorari.

The School District argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Brown's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact whether the School District was grossly negligent. We agree.

A governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from the "responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student... except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner." S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) (Supp.1999).

Gross negligence is the intentional conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do. Clyburn v. Sumter County District Seventeen, 317 S.C. 50, 451 S.E.2d 885 (1994); Richardson v. Hambright, 296 S.C. 504, 374 S.E.2d 296 (1988). It is the failure to exercise slight care. Clyburn, supra. Gross negligence has also been defined as a relative term, and means the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances. Hollins v. Richland County School District One, 310 S.C. 486, 427 S.E.2d 654 (1993). Additionally, while gross negligence ordinarily is a mixed question of law and fact, when the evidence supports but one reasonable inference, the question becomes a matter of law for the court. Clyburn, supra. Summary judgment is appropriate when it is clear that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the conclusions and inferences to be drawn from the facts are undisputed. SSI Medical Services, Inc. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 392 S.E.2d 789 (1990). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the evidence and the inferences which can be drawn therefrom should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Id.

In Clyburn, supra, we affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and the lower court granting summary judgment to the School District. We held that the School District was not grossly negligent as a matter of law in its handling of a dispute between a student and a nonstudent where the nonstudent attacked the student on a school bus with a knife. After hearing of the initial altercation on the bus, the school bus administrator called the student and the nonstudent's sister into the office to discuss the situation, warned the sister that the nonstudent sister would face criminal...