Ethridge v. Hwang
| Decision Date | 12 February 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 44545-6-I.,44545-6-I. |
| Citation | 105 Wash.App. 447,20 P.3d 958 |
| Parties | Mary ETHRIDGE, a single woman, Respondent, v. Anna HWANG and David Hwang, wife and husband d/b/a Duvall Highlands Mobile Home Park, Appellants. |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
Howard Goodfriend, Edwards, Sieh, Smith & Goodfriends, P.S., Seattle, for Appellants.
Dan Yung, law Offices of Dan R. Young, Seattle, for Respondent.
Mary Ethridge, a tenant of a mobile home park, sued the mobile home park owner, Anna Hwang, alleging that Hwang unreasonably rejected her potential home purchasers. Ethridge prevailed following a jury trial, and Hwang appeals. Hwang argues that the trial court erred in not dismissing Ethridge's claims under the Mobile Home Landlord Tenant Act ("MHLTA") and the Consumer Protection Act, and that the verdicts based on these claims were not supported by substantial evidence. Hwang also claims that the jury's finding that Hwang tortiously interfered with Ethridge's business expectancy was not supported by substantial evidence. Finally, Hwang argues that the trial court erred in awarding Ethridge attorney's fees and costs. Each contention, while strenuously argued, lacks merit. We therefore affirm.
Mary Ethridge owned a mobile home located at space # 119 in Duvall Highlands Mobile Home Park. The park is owned by Anna Hwang. In April 1997, Ethridge sued Hwang, alleging that she attempted to sell her home to a buyer, Mr. Qualls, but that Anna Hwang unreasonably refused to permit the sale. Ethridge also alleged that she found another buyer, Ms. Cubine, but Hwang again unreasonably and wrongfully refused to approve the sale. The complaint further alleged that Ethridge had been forced to live and work in an area in which she no longer wished to live, thereby causing her emotional distress.
Ethridge alleged that this conduct violated the Mobile Home Landlord Tenant Act ("MHLTA") (RCW 59.20.010 et seq.) and constituted tortious interference with contract.
In addition, Ethridge alleged that Hwang had a widespread pattern and practice of refusing to permit the assignment of tenants' rental agreements, denying applications for tenancy in the mobile home park, and refusing to approve sales of mobile homes in the park on idiosyncratic, frivolous, unreasonable, and unlawful grounds. Ethridge alleged that Hwang engaged in these practices in the park in which Ethridge resided, and in the White River Estates Mobile Home Park, which Hwang also operated.1 Ethridge alleged that as a proximate result of Hwang's unfair and deceptive conduct, Ethridge suffered injury to business or property and Hwang's conduct violated the Consumer Protection Act ("CPA").
Hwang moved for summary judgment and to compel arbitration. The court denied the motion for summary judgment and transferred the case to mandatory arbitration. The arbitrator ruled that Ethridge had suffered damages of $384 in lost wages as a result of Hwang's untimely rejection of the Cubine sale and that Ethridge was entitled to attorney's fees as the prevailing party in the amount of $14,277.60. Hwang appealed, requesting a trial de novo.
The jury returned a special verdict, finding that Hwang had violated the MHLTA and the CPA, and had intentionally interfered with a business relationship or expectancy, causing damage of $3,000. The jury awarded Ethridge $10,000 in additional damages for pain and suffering as a result of the intentional interference. The jury found for Hwang in the amount of $1,140 on her counterclaim for rent or other charges.
Following the jury verdict, Ethridge filed a motion for attorney's fees as the prevailing party in the litigation. The court determined that $39,585 was a reasonable lodestar fee, and then increased the lodestar fee by 25%, for a total of $49,481.25 in attorney's fees. In addition, the court awarded increased damages of $9,000 for violation of the CPA. A total judgment of $72,759.52 was entered against Hwang.
Following the verdict, Hwang filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, or alternatively for a new trial, which was denied.
In this appeal, Hwang argues that the trial court should have dismissed Ethridge's MHLTA and CPA claims; the damages awarded were not supported by substantial evidence; Ethridge was not entitled to increased damages; the fees and costs awarded were improper, and the court erred in failing to give certain requested jury instructions. Because these arguments lack merit, we affirm.
In reviewing a summary judgment order, this court evaluates the matter de novo, performing the same inquiry as the trial court. Kruse v. Hemp, 121 Wash.2d 715, 853 P.2d 1373 (1993). The appellate court considers the facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Wilson v. Steinbach, 98 Wash.2d 434, 437, 656 P.2d 1030 (1982). Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c).
The MHLTA, RCW 59.20.240 provides that:
The tenant shall be current in the payment of rent including all utilities which the tenant has agreed in the rental agreement to pay before exercising any of the remedies accorded the tenant under the provisions of this chapter: PROVIDED, That this section shall not be construed as limiting the tenant's civil remedies for negligent or intentional damages: ....
The jury found that Ethridge owed Hwang $1,140 for "rent or other charges." CP 1186. Hwang argues that, under RCW 59.20.240, this finding precludes Ethridge's recovery under the MHLTA. Hwang is incorrect. Ethridge did not seek MHLTA remedies, and in any case, she was current in her rent and utilities at the time the case was filed.
The only remedies available under the MHLTA are under RCW 59.20.210 and RCW 59.20.220, and Ethridge did not seek these remedies. The plain language of the statute, especially given the proviso preserving the tenant's civil remedies, does not bar Ethridge's claim.
The summary of unpaid bills presented by the landlord (Ex. 129) does not show any unpaid charges until January 1998, nine months after the complaint was filed. Inasmuch as the statute requires the tenant to be current in rent and utilities "before" seeking remedies under the MHLTA, that requirement was met in this case.
The MHLTA also imposes a duty of good faith on tenants and landlords. RCW 59.20.020. Hwang argues that Ethridge's failure to comply with certain aspects of the assignment provisions of RCW 59.20.073 established her bad faith as a matter of law and bars her claim. This is incorrect. Failure to comply with the assignment provisions is a ground for denial of prospective purchasers, but Hwang waived the ability to object on this basis by not using Ethridge's failure to comply as the reason for her denial. See White River Estates v. Hiltbruner, 84 Wash. App. at 363, 928 P.2d 440
.
In addition, Hwang argues that Ethridge's failure to comply with RCW 59.23.040, which governs the park owner's right of first refusal, establishes her bad faith as a matter of law and bars her claim. However, RCW 59.23.040 provides that the remedy for a tenant's failure to comply with that statute is that the park owner may have the sale set aside. Ethridge's failure to comply did not bar her claim. In addition, the right of first refusal is "forfeited" by a party that fails to act in good faith. RCW 59.23.010. The jury was instructed on good faith. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Ethridge, the jury could have reasonably found that Hwang forfeited her right of first refusal.
The jury awarded Ethridge $3,000 in "damages to her business or property" under the MHLTA. Hwang argues that this award is not supported by substantial evidence.
However, courts are reluctant to set aside a jury determination as to the amount of damages and do so rarely. See Adcox v. Children's Orthopedic Hosp., 123 Wash.2d 15, 32-33, 864 P.2d 921 (1993)
. The determination of the amount of damages is primarily and peculiarly within the province of the jury. Henderson v. Tyrrell, 80 Wash. App. 592, 630-632, 910 P.2d 522 (1996). A jury damage award will be overturned only in the most extraordinary circumstances. Hill v. GTE Directories Sales, 71 Wash.App. 132, 138, 856 P.2d 746 (1993).
In this case, there is substantial evidence that Ethridge suffered economic damage on the failed sale to the Qualls based on the loss of use of the sales proceeds for the 4.5 years between the wrongful interference with the sale to the Qualls and Ethridge's sale of her home. Qualls had offered to buy the mobile home for $31,500 in June of 1994. Ethridge ultimately sold her home in December 1998 for $32,500. Where, as here, a landlord unreasonably withholds consent to an assignment of a mobile home lot lease, compensatory damages are properly awarded to the tenant for the delay in the sale. See Gillette v. Zakarison, 68 Wash.App. 838, 841, 846 P.2d 574 (1993)
.2
There is additional evidence that Ethridge suffered economic damage from Hwang's interference with the sale. Ethridge's second buyer, Carmen Cubine, had offered in January 1997 to buy the mobile home for $32,250. Ethridge presented evidence that Cubine was unfairly rejected as a buyer. In addition, Ethridge showed that, in reliance on Hwang's not rejecting Cubine during the statutory period, she had quit her job, packed up her belongings, and was prepared to move to Missouri to be with her mother, who had congestive heart disease and diabetes. Ethridge missed one week of work and incurred lost wages of $384.
On this record, the $3000 damage award was supported by substantial evidence.
Because the decision whether to give a particular instruction to the jury is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, this court...
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