Euge v. Bank of St. Louis
Decision Date | 02 May 1978 |
Docket Number | No. 38499,38499 |
Citation | 567 S.W.2d 409 |
Parties | Harvey F. EUGE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BANK OF ST. LOUIS, Joseph A. Trotcha and Harold Rathman, Defendants-Respondents. . Louis District,Division Two |
Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Harvey F. Euge, pro se.
Jim J. Shoemake, J. Richard McEachern, St. Louis, for defendants-respondents.
Motion of defendants for summary judgment was granted by the circuit court and plaintiff appeals. We affirm. The second amended petition, to which the motion was addressed, sought $100,000 actual and $300,000 punitive damages for malicious prosecution of the plaintiff in that the defendant Bank of St. Louis, the other two individual defendants (who were employees of the bank at the time in question), and other unidentified agents and employees of the bank brought about the indictment and conviction of plaintiff for obtaining money by means of a bogus check. 1 Although three "warrants" are referred to in the petition, it appears that we are concerned with only one charge of which plaintiff was convicted. That conviction was later reversed and the plaintiff discharged by the Supreme Court of Missouri. See State v. Euge, 400 S.W.2d 119 (Mo.1966).
The motion for summary judgment consists primarily of legal arguments to the effect that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because plaintiff was indicted, convicted, and the conviction overturned only after the Supreme Court observed that the facts would have permitted charges and convictions of two other crimes, albeit not the one charged in the indictment. Attached as exhibits to the motion were a copy of the second amended petition, a certified copy of the indictment and judgment of conviction, a copy of the original petition, and a copy of the officially reported opinion in State v. Euge, supra. Plaintiff did not respond. 2
The facts upon which the prosecution in State v. Euge was based are set forth at 400 S.W.2d, page 121: 3
In reversing the conviction because the check was not "bogus" within the meaning of § 561.450, the Court said at page 123:
As best we can determine, plaintiff contends here that the motion for summary judgment should not have been granted because (1) the ultimate disposition of his criminal case establishes that there could have been no probable cause for his prosecution; (2) the indictment was improperly procured because "no witnesses appeared before the grand jury" and the information presented to the grand jury was known to the defendants to be false; and (3) the issue as to whether there was probable cause for his arrest and prosecution is necessarily a jury question.
In an action for malicious prosecution, absence of probable cause is a necessary element of the plaintiff's case. Palermo v. Cottom, 525 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Mo.App.1975). Because of the negative nature of this element, only "slight proof" is needed to make a submissible case. Hughes v. Aetna Ins. Co., 261 S.W.2d 942, 945 (Mo.1953). As we perceive plaintiff's first point, it is that his discharge by the Supreme Court establishes that there could have been no probable cause for his prosecution. Such contention is directly contrary to the rule in Missouri that a circuit court conviction O'Donnell v. Chase Hotel, Inc., 388 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Mo.App.1965). See also Bonzo v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 344 Mo. 127, 125 S.W.2d 75, 78 (1939). 4
As indicated, plaintiff accepts the facts as set out above, contending that they do not constitute a violation of § 561.450 and, in that sense, were "false". Thus, we treat the second and third points together. In his brief, but not his petition, plaintiff states that his indictment was irregularly procured in that no witnesses appeared before the grand jury and that the information received by the grand jury was known by the defendants to be false. However, we believe that what the plaintiff is contending is that the grand jury was advised by someone that plaintiff's actions violated §...
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State ex rel. Police Retirement System of St. Louis v. Mummert
...criminal conviction creates a presumption of probable cause for the subsequent civil suit against him. See Euge v. Bank of St. Louis, 567 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo.App.1978). As a general rule, a conviction is prima facie evidence of probable cause for the prosecution, and is rebuttable only by p......
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Henderson v. Armantrout, 40154
...is conclusive evidence of probable cause even though the judgment is erroneous or set aside for irregularities. Euge v. Bank of St. Louis, 567 S.W.2d 409, 411 (Mo.App.1978). ...