Eustace v. Springfield Pub. Sch., Civil Action No. 17-30158-MGM

• Citation: 463 F.Supp.3d 87
• Decision Date: 29 May 2020
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 17-30158-MGM
• Parties: Mary Jane EUSTACE, Ruth Chappel, Constance Rodd, and Deryl Blanks, Plaintiff, v. SPRINGFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts

463 F.Supp.3d 87

Mary Jane EUSTACE, Ruth Chappel, Constance Rodd, and Deryl Blanks, Plaintiff,

v.SPRINGFIELD PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17-30158-MGM

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.

Filed May 29, 2020

Terence E. Coles, Pyle, Rome & Lichten, P.C., Jillian M. Ryan, Pyle Rome Ehrenberg PC, Boston, MA, for Plaintiffs Mary Jane Eustace, Ruth Chappel, Constance Rodd.

Terence E. Coles, Pyle, Rome & Lichten, P.C., Boston, MA, for Plaintiff Deryl Blanks.

Mary J. Kennedy, Mary Ellen MacDonald, Bulkley, Richardson & Gelinas, Springfield, MA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER REGARDING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

(Dkt. Nos. 32, 37, 42, 47, 52)

MASTROIANNI, U.S.D.J.

Plaintiffs Mary Jane Eustace, Ruth Chappel, Constance Rodd, and Deryl Blanks ("Plaintiffs" or "Plaintiff") allege that Defendant Springfield Public Schools ("SPS," "the district," or "Defendant") violated the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. (Count I); the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 794 et seq. (Count II); and state non-discrimination law under Massachusetts General Laws, chapter 151B (Count III) and chapter 152, section 75B (Count IV). Plaintiffs have also brought a claim for declaratory judgment that Defendant's reliance on the Massachusetts Education Reform Act ("MERA"), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 59B, in refusing to transfer employees to vacant positions as a reasonable accommodation is in violation of the ADA (Count V).

Defendant has moved for summary judgment on all claims. (Dkt. Nos. 32, 37, 42, 47.) Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment on its declaratory judgment claim. (Dkt. No. 52.) The court heard argument on the summary judgment motions on November 7, 2019. For the reasons below, Defendant's summary judgment motions will be denied as to Plaintiffs’ federal claims except for Chappel's claims; granted as to Chappel's federal claims and all Plaintiffs’ state claims; and denied with respect to Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment. Plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion on its claim for declaratory judgment will be granted.

I. BACKGROUND

The court provides a general overview of the facts here and will incorporate further facts relevant to its decision in the analysis itself. The court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, but ignores conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation in doing so. Prescott v. Higgins , 538 F.3d 32, 39–40 (1st Cir. 2008). Unless otherwise noted, the court bases the recitation of facts from the Statements of Undisputed Material Facts (Dkt. Nos. 54, 58, 60, 62, 64, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71).

Defendant SPS employs approximately 2,040 teachers in more than 60 schools in the school district of Springfield. SPS faces challenges that include: a high percentage of economically disadvantaged students (67% in 2015-2016); a high percentage of high needs students (78% in 2015-2016); and numerous reported assaults and/or batteries on staff (95, 92, 41, 35, and 30 in the five schools with the most reported assaults and/or batteries in 2015-2016 (D.’s Resp. to P.’s Req. for Production of Documents, Dkt. No. 60-2)). Some of SPS's schools are "alternative schools," where the student population presents more behavioral problems than in non-alternative schools.

All four Plaintiffs were teachers for SPS, members of the labor union Springfield Education Association ("SEA"), and subject to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") that included provisions concerning the hiring, transfer, and promotion of teachers.¹ The CBA includes a policy whereby teachers wishing to transfer to another building for the next school year are directed to use the "voluntary Annual Transfer Process," which begins no later than April 15 of each year. The process requires a teacher to apply for positions she would like to transfer to for the next school year. The principal of the school to which transfer is requested considers and makes a decision on the applications received. The Annual Transfer Process is in essence an opportunity to apply for a new or different position within the district. The CBA indicates that "the convenience and wishes of the individual teachers will be honored to the extent that these considerations do not conflict with the instructional requirements and best interests of the school system and the pupils." (CBA ¶ A.3, Dkt. No. 36-5.) It also states: "the Superintendent may assign, transfer or reassign teachers, voluntarily or involuntarily, to a position(s) and/or a school(s) according to the operational needs of the School District and the educational needs of the students," and that "[t]he Parties recognize that transfer and reassignment of teachers, during the school year or at other times is sometimes necessary and/or desirable." (CBA § A.pmbl., Dkt. No. 36-5.)

Each of the four Plaintiffs sought reasonable accommodation from SPS for an alleged disability, specifically in the form of a transfer to a school that they currently did not work in. Plaintiff Rodd requested to be transferred from the Van Sickle Middle School because of her severe allergic response to mold in the Van Sickle building. Plaintiffs Blanks and Eustace requested transfer to a different school because of emotional distress—anxiety and depression in Blanks's case and PTSD in Eustace's case—that arose from working with the "volatile student population" of Balliet, one of SPS's alternative schools. Plaintiff Chappel requested to be assigned to a part-time position teaching science after the elimination of her part-time job as an Instructional Leadership Specialist in science, which was a district job as opposed to a school-specific job.

In response to her request, each Plaintiff was advised that she could avail herself of the Annual Transfer Process to apply competitively for a vacant position in another school (or simply in a school, in the case of Chappel). SPS would not transfer Plaintiff unless the principal of a school to which transfer was desired approved Plaintiff for a vacant position. Some of the Plaintiffs received interviews with the principal of a school with a job opening, but none received a job offer. After not receiving job offers through the Annual Transfer process and being refused their request for transfer, all Plaintiffs stopped working for SPS.

II. OVERVIEW OF ISSUES

The arguments raised by the parties are complicated. To orient, the court provides an overview of the issues and arguments before diving into a fuller discussion of the law and its application to the facts.

The motions for summary judgment turn in part on what is required under the ADA with respect to a reasonable accommodation of reassignment and in part on what the state education statute MERA requires. Defendant relies on cases holding that the ADA requires nothing more than the employer to treat a disabled employee in the same manner as any other employee when it has a non-discriminatory, best-qualified system in place. Defendant also argues that any obligation to preferentially reassign a disabled employee without following the usual procedure would be unreasonable and an undue hardship in this case because MERA gives the authority over hiring to principals as a way to improve accountability and the management and performance of schools. Accordingly, Defendant argues, to reassign a teacher would be unfair to the principal forced to accept a teacher, unfair to the teacher who the principal would have hired instead, and an undermining of the system put in place by MERA.

Plaintiffs argue that the ADA requires employers to preferentially reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position, even if preferential reassignment violates the employer's established policy or procedure for filling in positions or even MERA. In support, they cite cases that hold that an employer cannot simply treat a disabled employee in the same manner as any other employee under a best-qualified system, showing a circuit split on the issue. With respect to MERA, Plaintiffs argue that MERA gives principals authority over the hiring of new employees but does not give them authority over voluntary transfers of existing SPS teachers from one school to another. In addition, Plaintiffs argue that even if MERA gives principals the authority over voluntary transfers, nothing in MERA prevents the district from setting a policy that directs principals to preferentially accept the transfer of disabled employees. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue, preferential reassignment of employees is not an unreasonable accommodation or an undue burden to SPS.

The parties also argue additional issues including whether a Plaintiff was disabled, whether a vacant position existed that Plaintiff could have transferred to, and whether Defendant is separately liable for a failure to participate in the interactive process meant to determine the appropriate accommodation.

Finally, the parties address Plaintiffs’ request for declaratory judgment that "Defendant's reliance on M.G.L. c. 71, Section 59B of the Education Reform Act in refusing to transfer employees to vacant positions as a reasonable accommodation is in violation of the ADA." Plaintiffs again argue that the ADA requires the employers to preferentially reassign a disabled employee to a vacant position, even if preferential reassignment violates the employer's established policy or procedure for filling positions; and doing so here would not create an undue burden on SPS. Defendant argues that the relief sought is overbroad; the ADA does not give disabled employees a "right" to reassignment to a vacant position; and, in this case, reassigning Plaintiffs without a principal's approval is not reasonable on its face nor in the specific circumstances because MERA, and the CBA that incorporates MERA, requires that a principal approve of any transfer or hire into his or her school. Defendant also raises a...