Bush v. Acton-Boxborough Reg'l Sch. Dist.

Decision Date23 May 2023
Docket NumberCivil Action 1:21-cv-12039-IT
PartiesMICHAEL BUSH, Plaintiff, v. ACTON-BOXBOROUGH REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, PETER LIGHT, DAWN GRIFFIN BENTLEY, and ERIN O'BRIEN BETTEZ, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts
MEMORANDUM & ORDER

INDIRA TALWANI, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Michael Bush brings this action against Defendants Acton-Boxborough Regional School District (School District); its Superintendent, Peter Light; its Director of Community Education, Erin O'Brien Bettez; and its Assistant Superintendent for Diversity, Equity, &amp Inclusion, Dawn Griffin Bentley, after Bush was barred from playing in adult league games because of his non-compliance with a mask requirement imposed by the School District during the COVID-19 pandemic.

In Count I, Bush alleges that the School District violated Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. In Counts II and III, Bush seeks recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants' alleged violation of his rights and under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for Light's and Bettez's alleged conspiracy to deprive him of his rights. In Counts IV, V, and VI, Bush alleges that the Defendants violated his constitutional rights, including his First Amendment Free Exercise (Count IV), First Amendment Peaceable Assembly (Count V), and Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection (Count VI) rights. Now pending before the court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 43] for failure to state a claim. For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 43] is GRANTED.

I. Factual Background as Alleged in the Amended Complaint

After a hiatus from early 2020 to September 2021 due to COVID-19, personnel at the School District's Community Education program announced the resumption of adult volleyball classes and the mandatory usage of face masks by all participants. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-8 [Doc. No. 37]. Bush registered for classes to begin September 21, 2021. Id. at ¶ 9. On August 27, 2021, Bush sent Bettez and Bentley a notice and demand letter, objecting to the mask requirement and asking that the school rescind the requirement, in part because wearing masks was “medically inappropriate for [him] and “objectionable to [his] sincerely held religious convictions.” Notice of Claim, Ex. 7 [Doc. No. 37-10]. On August 31, 2021, Light sent a letter to Bush acknowledging receipt of his letter, informing him that the mask requirement would remain in place, and offering to refund Bush's registration fees if he was uncomfortable with the requirement. Light Letter, Ex. 9 [Doc. No. 37-12]. On September 15, 2021, Bush's counsel sent a letter to Light reasserting Bush's objections to the mask mandate on medical and religious grounds and requesting a meet and confer take place prior to commencing litigation. September 15, 2021 Letter, Ex. 10 [Doc. No. 37-13]. On September 20, 2021, Light emailed Bush requesting documentation regarding his condition and its impact on his ability to wear a mask, Am. Compl. ¶ 86; Light Email, Ex. 11 [Doc Nos. 37, 37-14], and through counsel offered Bush the option of using a face shield instead of a face mask. Am. Compl. ¶ 98, Attorney Emails, Ex. 12 [Doc. No. 37, 37-15]. On September 21, 2021, Bettez, on Light's instructions, barred Bush from entering the school building and participating in the adult volleyball class. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 104, 113, 117 [Doc. No. 37].

II. Procedural Background

On December 14, 2021, Bush filed his original complaint, which alleged that the School District had violated the ADA and that the School District and Light had violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985. Compl. [Doc. No. 1]. The court granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 13] but allowed Bush a brief period to file a motion for leave to amend the complaint. Mem. & Order 11 & n.9 [Doc. No. 26]. Bush, now proceeding pro se, sought leave to file an amended complaint, see Motion for Leave to File [Doc. No. 28], which the court allowed as unopposed, Elec. Order [Doc. No. 36]. Bush filed his 1st Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 37], which Defendants seek to dismiss. Mot. to Dismiss Am. Compl. [Doc. No. 43].

III. Standard of Review

In evaluating a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court assumes “the truth of all well-pleaded facts” and draws “all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor.” Nisselson v. Lernout, 469 F.3d 143, 150 (1st Cir. 2006). To survive dismissal, a complaint must contain sufficient factual material to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations . . . [f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level . . .” Id. at 555 (internal citations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

“Exhibits attached to the complaint are properly considered part of the pleading for all purposes, including Rule 12(b)(6).” Trans-Spec Truck Service, Inc. v. Caterpillar Inc., 524 F.3d 315, 321 (1st Cir. 2008) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

IV. Discussion[1]
A. Claim Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (Count I)

Congress enacted Title II of the ADA to combat discrimination by governmental entities in the operation of public services, programs, and activities.” Toledo v. Sanchez, 454 F.3d 24, 30 (1st Cir. 2006). “It provides that ‘no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.' Id. at 30-31 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132). “The statute authorizes private suits against public entities to enforce its provisions.” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12133).

To state a claim under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege facts showing (1) that he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities or was otherwise discriminated against; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of the plaintiff's disability.” Parker v. Universidad de Puerto Rico, 225 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000). A “qualified individual with a disability” is “an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2). In turn, the term “public entity” includes “any State or local government” as well as “any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States or local government.” Id. § 12131(1).

1. Disability Within the Meaning of the ADA

“Not all physical impairments rise to the level of disability under the ADA.” Lebron-Torres v. Whitehall Laboratories, 251 F.3d 236, 239 (1st Cir. 2001) (citing Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565-66 (1999)). A disability for purposes of the ADA is (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. . .” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.108. In general, major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).

In his original Complaint, Bush alleged that he alerted the School District that the face mask policies would preclude his participation in the volleyball league due to his medical disability, Compl. ¶ 16 [Doc. No. 1], and included a doctor's note asserting that his doctor “found him to have contraindications to mask wearing for a private medical condition.” Doctor's Note, Ex. 7 [Doc. No. 1-9]. This court dismissed Bush's ADA claims because he failed to allege a disability that “substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.” Mem. & Order 6 [Doc. No. 26].

The new facts Bush alleges in his Amended Complaint do not cure this deficiency. Reading Bush's claim generously, he alleges that his disability is “bacterial infections” caused by wearing a mask. Aff. 1, Ex. 1 ¶ 2 [Doc. No. 37-1]. These infections interfere with his ability to perform major life activities, “including but not limited to breathing, walking, bending, lifting carrying, shopping, performing manual tasks, doing errands, speaking, communicating, obtaining food, and interacting with others.” Aff. 1, Ex. 1 [Doc. No. 37-1]. Still, these allegations do not establish that Bush has a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Infections caused by mask-wearing are not themselves an underlying “physiological order or condition.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (defining “physical or mental impairment”). The EEOC's interpretive guidance on the ADA makes clear that short-lived afflictions like Plaintiff's are not disabilities for purposes of the ADA: [T]emporary, non-chronic impairments with little or no long term impact are...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT