Eustache v. State
| Decision Date | 31 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 4D15–2596.,4D15–2596. |
| Citation | 199 So.3d 484 |
| Parties | Robin EUSTACHE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Robin Eustache, Okeechobee, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Rachael Kaiman, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
In this appeal from the denial of a rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief, we address the applicability of minimum mandatory sentencing provisions to defendants who are initially sentenced to probation or community control as youthful offenders, but whose supervision is later revoked for a substantive violation. The case law from this district and others appears to be conflicting and unsettled.
We interpret the applicable statutory provisions to grant discretion to trial judges, upon revocation of youthful offender supervision for a substantive violation, to either continue with a youthful offender cap sentence or impose any sentence that might have been originally imposed without regard to the defendant's youthful offender status. If the court exercises its discretion not to impose a youthful offender cap sentence upon revocation, then where the offense originally required a minimum mandatory sentence, the court must impose that sentence.
Because the trial court in this case exercised its discretion not to impose a youthful offender cap sentence upon revocation of appellant's probation, it properly imposed the minimum mandatory sentence for the offense. We affirm the denial of appellant's motion for post-conviction relief.
In 2006, Eustache entered a plea to robbery with a firearm, which carries a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. § 775.087(2)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2005). Instead, however, he was sentenced as a youthful offender to four years in prison followed by two years of probation. He subsequently violated probation by committing two new drug offenses. After entering a plea admitting the violation, his probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison.
Eustache moved for relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, contending that his trial counsel was ineffective for not advising him that he was subject to a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence upon revocation of probation. The trial court granted the motion and allowed Eustache to withdraw his plea.
In 2013, represented by new counsel, Eustache entered an open plea to the violation of probation. The parties advised the court that, if it revoked Eustache's probation, it was required to impose at least the ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. The court revoked probation and sentenced Eustache to fifteen years in prison with a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. No direct appeal was taken.
Eustache moved for relief under rule 3.850 a second time, asserting three alternative grounds for relief: (1) his plea was involuntary because counsel misadvised him that the court was required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence; (2) his counsel was ineffective for advising the court that it was required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence; and (3) his sentence is illegal, either because the court was not permitted to impose the minimum mandatory sentence, or because the trial court erroneously believed that it was required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence. Eustache asserted that the imposition of the minimum mandatory sentence was either prohibited under our decision in Blacker v. State, 49 So.3d 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010), or discretionary under our decision in Goldwire v. State, 73 So.3d 844 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011).
The State contended that both Eustache and the trial court were properly advised, pursuant to Goldwire, that once the trial court exercised its discretion to revoke Eustache's probation and impose a sentence above the youthful offender cap, it was required to impose at least the minimum mandatory sentence. The trial court adopted the State's reasoning in summarily denying the motion. Eustache gave notice of appeal.
The Youthful Offender Act was created as an alternative sentencing modality for criminal defendants younger than twenty-one years of age at the time of sentencing, if the crime charged is not a capital or life felony and the defendant has not been previously sentenced as a youthful offender. See Christian v. State, 84 So.3d 437, 441 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). A sentence imposed under the Act is “[i]n lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law.” § 958.04(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). The most significant benefit to being sentenced as a youthful offender is a cap on the initial sentence of either six years or the maximum sentence for the offense, whichever is less, with regards to incarceration, supervision on probation or community control, or a combination of both. Id. Minimum mandatory sentences do not apply to an initial youthful offender sentence. Mendez v. State, 835 So.2d 348, 349 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003).
Sentencing of a youthful offender upon revocation of probation or community control supervision is governed by sections 948.06 and 958.14, Florida Statutes. Section 958.14 provides that “[a] violation ... of probation or the terms of a community control program shall subject the youthful offender to the provisions of s. 948.06.” § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2005).1 In turn, section 948.06 provides, in part:
If probation or community control is revoked, the court shall adjudge the probationer or offender guilty of the offense charged and proven or admitted, unless he or she has previously been adjudged guilty, and impose any sentence which it might have originally imposed before placing the probationer on probation or the offender into community control.
§ 948.06(2)(b), Fla. Stat. (2005) (emphasis added); see also § 948.06(2)(e), Fla. Stat. (2005).
These two statutory sections read together mean that, upon revoking the probation or community control supervision of a youthful offender for a substantive violation, the trial court has two choices. First, if an incarcerative sentence is still available under the cap provisions of section 958.04(2), the court may continue to sentence under the cap provisions. Alternatively, the court may impose any sentence that could have been imposed at the initial sentencing, regardless of the defendant's youthful offender status.
Once a youthful offender sentence is imposed at initial sentencing, a defendant retains certain benefits of the Act, even after probation or community control has been revoked and incarceration above the cap has been imposed. See Christian, 84 So.3d at 442 (“[E]ven when a youthful offender is sentenced above the cap following a substantive violation of probation, the defendant still maintains his or her ‘youthful offender status.’ ”2 As we explained in Blacker, a defendant's status as a youthful offender affects his or her classification within the prison system and his or her eligibility for certain programs and facilities. Blacker, 49 So.3d at 787 n. 2. Furthermore, the Department of Corrections may recommend early termination of a youthful offender's prison sentence. Id.
There is an unsettled question in Florida's case law regarding whether minimum mandatory sentencing provisions apply when a youthful offender's probation or community supervision is revoked for a substantive violation. Significantly, there is seemingly a conflict within case law of this district on the issue.
In Blacker, the defendant's youthful offender supervision was revoked for a substantive violation. Id. at 786. The trial court revoked his status as a youthful offender and imposed a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory sentence. Id. Blacker sought relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a). Id. at 787. On appeal from the denial of his motion, we held that improper revocation of a youthful offender's status constitutes a cognizable claim under rule 3.800(a). Id. We reversed the trial court's order and remanded for resentencing as a youthful offender, stating that, “[b]ecause [the defendant] maintains his youthful offender status, the minimum mandatory penalties do not apply. ” Id. at 789 (emphasis added).
Approximately a year later, we issued our opinion in Goldwire. Goldwire sought review of his prison sentence imposed after revocation of his youthful offender probation. Goldwire, 73 So.3d at 845. Goldwire contended that the trial court erroneously believed it was required to impose a minimum mandatory sentence consistent with the offense for which he had originally been convicted, simply because the violation was substantive. Id. at 846. We reversed and held that:
[I]t is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether a youthful offender should be sentenced as such, or if it should impose a non-youthful offender sentence when a substantive violation occurs. Therefore, the trial court is not required to impose the minimum mandatory sentence, but instead, is able to do so when exercising its discretion, dependent upon the circumstances of the case.
Id. Thus, Goldwire explained that, upon a substantive violation, the trial court has discretion to sentence the defendant as a youthful offender (meaning within the cap provisions of section 958.04(2) ) or to sentence in accordance with the statutory punishment for the offense regardless of the defendant's youthful offender status (in Goldwire's case, that meant a minimum mandatory sentence).
In other words, the trial court in Goldwire was mistaken that it could only sentence the defendant to the minimum mandatory sentence for the offense. See id. We held that the trial court had the discretion instead to sentence the defendant within the youthful offender cap provisions. Id. Our decision in Goldwire did not signify that the trial court could choose not to impose a minimum mandatory sentence if it exercised its discretion to sentence the defendant above the youthful offender cap provisions under section 948.06(2), Florida...
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