Evans' Estate, Matter of, No. 50349

• Decision Date: 31 May 1978
• Docket Number: No. 50349
• Citation: 359 So.2d 1381
• Parties: In the Matter of the ESTATE of Elizabeth EVANS, Deceased. Ora Mae HARRIS and Hesikiah Garrett, Executors v. Mel SPEARMAN.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 1381

359 So.2d 1381

In the Matter of the ESTATE of Elizabeth EVANS, Deceased Ora Mae HARRIS and Hesikiah Garrett, Executors v. Mel SPEARMAN.

No. 50349.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

May 31, 1978.

Rehearing Denied July 12, 1978.

Smith, O'Hare & Atkinson, William E. O'Hare, Cleveland, for appellant.

Laurence Y. Mellen, Cleveland, for appellee.

Before SMITH, SUGG and BROOM, JJ.

SMITH, Presiding Justice, for the Court:

Ora Mae Harris and Hesikiah Garrett, as executors of the will of Elizabeth Evans, deceased, have appealed from a decree of the Chancery Court of the Second Judicial District of Bolivar County under the provisions of which appellee, Mel Spearman, was declared to be the owner of an undivided one-half interest in certain real property ostensibly owned by the testatrix.

In 1921, Elizabeth Evans (then Elizabeth Garrett) had married one Monroe Evans. Six children were born of the marriage, of whom three survive, and there are several grandchildren. In 1953 or 1954 Evans left his family and went to Arkansas where he has continued to reside. There is no claim that these people were ever divorced. Nevertheless, in 1955 Elizabeth Evans ceremonially "married" appellee, Mel Spearman. In 1958 Elizabeth (Evans) Spearman purchased for $1,800 the house and lot which is now the subject of this litigation. At that time she and Spearman were living together as husband and wife and were so regarded by friends and acquaintances. Elizabeth (Evans) Spearman borrowed $325.00 from her employer, and $1,500 from the Cleveland Federal Savings and Loan Association in order to pay the purchase price. The property was then conveyed to her. The loan documents, notes and deeds of trust, were executed by her and by Spearman, who is described in the body of each of the trust deeds as "her husband" and who acknowledged each of them as "her husband." These purchase money indebtednesses were repaid during testatrix's lifetime.

Afterward, the testatrix and Spearman lived in the house as husband and wife, together with several of her grandchildren, for whom she drew Social Security, until she died.

Upon the death of the testatrix in December of 1974, her will was admitted to probate, the relevant provisions of the will being as follows:

I am now the owner of the East Half of Lot 41 of Nowell and Ross' Third Addition to the City of Cleveland, Mississippi, conveyed to me as Elizabeth Spearman, but my real name is Elizabeth Evans for I have never been divorced from said Evans and do not live with said Spearman as his wife, it is my wish and I hereby direct that any real estate that I may own at my death, and to include the property just described, be and I devise the said property to my grandchildren, that is to say:

L. V. Ward, Willie Ruth Ward, Alf Ward, Adeline Ward, May Ella Ward, Willie Lee Bryant and Bruce Bryant or to the survivor of them if any should die before my death.

Some nine months later, Spearman filed in the probate proceedings a pleading which he styled "Contest to Probate Purported Will." In this document, with his affidavit attached wherein he swore that "the facts and things" as set forth were true and correct as therein stated, he alleged that he was the "lawful husband" of the testatrix, claimed that he had paid for the property and that he had not known that the deed had been made to testatrix. He also claimed to be the owner of the property and of all of the furniture in the house, as well as of her bank account in the amount of $2,284.27. He asked the court to declare him to be the owner of the property under a resulting trust.

He then pled in the "alternative" that he was the lawful husband of the testatrix, that as such he was her sole heir and thus was entitled to all of her property, real and personal. He further asserted that, if the will should be found valid, he renounced it as having made no satisfactory provision for him as husband of the testatrix, as provided by section 91-5-27, Mississippi Code Annotated (1972).

Considerable testimony was given by witnesses for both sides and the sources of income of both parties were testified about in what must be described as general terms. It appears that the testatrix had worked for wages, had drawn Social Security payments for the several grandchildren who lived with her and that also she had these grandchildren working and earning money. She was also a known practicing "faith healer" and as such received payment from her patients or clients for her ministrations. There was also testimony that Spearman had done work and that he had contributed to the family expenses; however, this was, perhaps understandably, lacking in specificity and there is no evidence that Spearman made any payment on the purchase price of the property involved or upon the debts incurred to obtain the purchase money.

Of the several propositions sought to be raised by Spearman in his pleading, including the "alternatives," the single issue which remained after the chancellor had found from clear and undisputed evidence that the "marriage" between the testatrix and Spearman was void, was Spearman's claim to ownership of the house and lot under a resulting trust. The chancellor concluded that such a trust had arisen, saying that, in signing the loan instruments, Spearman had obligated himself and, since he was not the testatrix's lawful husband, there was no presumption that he had intended the property as a gift to the testatrix.

Appellants challenge this ruling on the following assigned ground:

Did the lower court commit manifest error in finding that appellee was the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the real property in question by virtue of a resulting trust?

In answering their own question in the affirmative, appellants cite several of the numerous cases in which this Court has held that evidence, to be sufficient to establish a resulting trust, must be clear, unequivocal, convincing and beyond a reasonable doubt. Conner v. Conner, 238 Miss. 471, 119 So.2d 240 (1960); Stovall v. Stovall, 218 Miss. 364, 67 So.2d 391 (1953); Jordan v. Jordan, 145 Miss. 779, 111 So. 102 (1927); Moore v. Crump, 84 Miss. 612, 37 So. 109 (1904); Logan v. Johnson, 72 Miss. 185, 16 So. 231 (1894).

The evidence in the present case was wholly circumstantial. The chancellor seems to have based his conclusion that a resulting trust had arisen almost solely upon the fact that Spearman, in signing the trust deeds and notes, had become obligated for their payment. However, the indebtednesses by means of which the money was obtained for the land, were paid during the lifetime of the testatrix and there is no evidence that he paid anything in their discharge. The property was conveyed to the testatrix in July of 1958 and for more than sixteen years no question was raised as to her exclusive ownership by Spearman and it was not until some nine months after she died in December, 1974 that he first did so in these proceedings. These people as husband and wife, made their home in the house situated upon the property and had gone through a marriage ceremony and were thought of in the community as (and Spearman claimed they were) husband and wife. The circumstances are entirely consistent with the fact that the lender required the signature of "her husband" as the property was, ostensibly, a homestead. As stated, there is no evidence of any payment by Spearman upon...