Evans Timber Co. v. Central of Ga. R. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 June 1999
• Docket Number: No. A99A0174.,A99A0174.
• Parties: EVANS TIMBER COMPANY, INC. v. CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RAILROAD COMPANY.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

519 S.E.2d 706

239 Ga. App. 262

EVANS TIMBER COMPANY, INC. v. CENTRAL OF GEORGIA RAILROAD COMPANY.

No. A99A0174.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

June 22, 1999.

Reconsideration Denied July 22, 1999.

Jones, Cork & Miller, Carr G. Dodson, Thomas W. Joyce, Macon, for appellant.

Hall, Bloch, Garland & Meyer, John S. Stewart, Macon, for appellee.

Cathey & Strain, Dennis T. Cathey, James E. Staples, Jr., Cornelia, Blackwood, Matthews & Steel, John D. Steel, John B. Briggs, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, Robert C. Lamar, David W. Davenport, Casey, Gilson & Williams, Matthew D. Williams, Glenn C. Tornillo, James F. Grubiak, Atlanta, amici curiae.

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

Evans Timber Company, Inc. (Evans Timber) appeals the trial court's grant of directed verdict to Central of Georgia Railroad Company (Central) on its cross-claim. The trial court found that the Georgia Code of Public Transportation (GCPT), enacted in 1973, preempted the railroad's common-law duty with regard to the installation of protective devices at grade crossings on public roads. Evans Timber also contends the trial court erred in excluding evidence of other accidents at the crossing. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

The relevant facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff Wilbert Brezial filed suit against both Evans Timber and Central for injuries he suffered when the train he was operating struck a truck owned by Evans Timber. The collision occurred at a crossing at grade on a public road. Evans Timber filed a cross-claim against Central alleging that Central was negligent in failing to install warning devices, such as gates, lights or bells, at the grade crossing to warn motorists of approaching trains.

1. At the close of trial of the case, the trial court granted Central's motion for directed verdict on Evans Timber's cross-claim finding that the GCPT, OCGA § 32-1-1 et seq., displaced the common-law duty of a railroad to install warning devices at a public road grade crossing. Central argued, and the trial court agreed, that the GCPT delegated responsibility for protective devices at grade crossings to the governmental entity responsible for the road.

A directed verdict is proper only if there is no conflict in the evidence as to any material issue and the evidence introduced, with all reasonable deductions therefrom, shall demand a particular verdict. OCGA § 9-11-50(a). In determining whether any conflict in the evidence exists, the court must construe the evidence most favorably to the party opposing the motion for directed verdict. The standard used to review the grant or denial of a directed verdict is the any evidence test.

(Punctuation omitted.) McCannon v. McCannon, 231 Ga.App. 601(1), 499 S.E.2d 684 (1998).

Prior to the enactment of the GCPT in 1973, Georgia recognized that a railroad could be negligent for the failure to install protective devices at grade crossings on public roads. See Isom v. Schettino, 129 Ga. App. 73, 199 S.E.2d 89 (1973). Even after the enactment of the GCPT, this court recognized a common-law cause of action against a railroad for the failure to install adequate warning signals. See Southern R. Co. v. Ga. Kraft Co., 188 Ga.App. 623(5), 373 S.E.2d 774 (1988); Wall v. Southern R. Co., 196 Ga.App. 483, 396 S.E.2d 266 (1990); Central of Ga. R. Co. v. Markert, 200 Ga.App. 851(4), 410 S.E.2d 437 (1991). However, the Supreme Court's decision in Kitchen v. CSX Transp., 265 Ga. 206(1), 453 S.E.2d 712 (1995) causes us to revisit the application of the GCPT to a railroad's common-law duty to install protective devices.

In Kitchen, supra, our Supreme Court held that pursuant to OCGA § 32-6-197(b) CSX had no statutory or common-law duty to install warning devices on a public road on which an overpass had been removed. In reaching its holding, the Court emphasized the purpose and intent of the GCPT.

In 1973, the [GCPT], OCGA § 32-1-1 et seq., Ga. L.1973, p. 947, § 1, was enacted to revise, classify, consolidate and repeal other laws relating to all public roads and bridges, and to establish new laws relating thereto. Ga. L.1973, p. 947. The purpose and legislative intent of the GCPT [are] further set out in OCGA § 32-1-2, as follows: to provide a code of statutes for the public roads and other transportation facilities of the state, the counties, and municipalities of Georgia. The legislative intent is to provide an effective legal basis for the organization, administration, and operation of an efficient, modern system of public roads and other modes of transportation.

(Punctuation omitted.) Kitchen, 265 Ga. at 207(1), 453 S.E.2d 712.

The issue before this court, a railroad's common-law duty to install protective devices at a grade crossing on a public road, was not directly addressed in Kitchen, which addressed only a duty with respect to overpasses on a public road. However, the Kitchen decision provides insightful guidance as the Supreme Court noted:

OCGA §§ 32-6-50 and 32-6-51(a) ... place the exclusive duty in the governmental body to install and maintain traffic control devices on public roads (including railroad crossings), and ... statutorily prohibit private entities, including railroads, from placing traffic control devices on the public roads. An exception is enumerated with respect to railroad crossings at grade on the state highway system; at such crossings the Department of Transportation [(DOT)] is required to place and maintain traffic control devices on the public road and the railroad is required to erect and maintain a railroad crossbuck sign.

Id. at 208, fn. 6, 453 S.E.2d 712.

As Kitchen recognizes, the scope of the GCPT is broad, encompassing not only the highway system, but also "any transportation facility ... including but not limited to railroads." OCGA § 32-1-3(18). Accord Kitchen, supra. The definition of "public road" is correspondingly broad, including, in part, ferries, overpasses, underpasses, railroad grade crossings, tunnels, signs, signals, markings, or other traffic control devices.

"Public road" means a highway, road, street, avenue, toll road, tollway, drive, detour, or other way open to the public and intended or used for its enjoyment and for the passage of vehicles in any county or municipality of Georgia, including but not limited to the following public rights, structures, sidewalks, facilities, and appurtenances incidental to the construction, maintenance, and enjoyment of such rights of way: (A) Surface, shoulders, and sides; (B) Bridges; (C) Causeways; (D) Viaducts; (E) Ferries; (F) Overpasses; (G) Underpasses; (H) Railroad grade crossings; (I) Tunnels; (J) Signs, signals, markings, or other traffic control devices; (K) Buildings for public equipment and personnel used for or engaged in administration, construction, or maintenance of such ways or research pertaining thereto; (L) Wayside parks; (M) Parking facilities; (N) Drainage ditches; (O) Canals and culverts; (P) Rest areas; (Q) Truck-weighing stations or check points; and (R) Scenic easements and easements of light, air, view, and access.

OCGA § 32-1-3(24).

The Court in Kitchen recognized that the GCPT delegates comprehensive management and control of public roads exclusively to the governmental entity responsible for the road. See OCGA § 32-6-1 et seq. The GCPT delegates management and control of grade crossings, traffic control devices and signals to the governmental entity because they are part of the public road. Thus, where a public road is a county's responsibility, that county, exclusively, has the duty to "plan, designate, improve, manage, control, construct, and maintain an adequate county road system." OCGA § 32-4-41(1). See Purvis v. Virgil Barber Contractor, 205 Ga. App. 13, 421 S.E.2d 303 (1992). In addition, the county has the "control of and responsibility for all construction, maintenance, or other work related to the county road system." Id. at 15(1), 421 S.E.2d 303.

Likewise, the GCPT delegates responsibility for the installation of protective devices on a public road to the governmental entity.

Whenever, in the judgment of the department in respect to the state highway system, a county in respect to its county road system, or a municipality in respect to its municipal street system, such protection is reasonably necessary for the safety of the traveling public, the department or the county or the municipality may order the protection of a grade crossing by the installation of protective devices.

OCGA § 32-6-200.

"Protective devices" means gates, flashing light signals, and similar devices or combinations thereof, together with necessary appurtenances, to be installed or in operation at any grade crossing and which comply with the safety standards determined by the department as being adequate at that time for the protection of traffic.

OCGA § 32-1-3(23).

Thus, the governmental entity responsible for the public road orders the installation of protective devices. OCGA § 32-6-200(a). Prior to installation, the DOT must approve the plans and specifications for any protective devices. Id.; OCGA § 32-1-3. After the protective device has been ordered and approved by the governmental entities, the railroad has a duty to install the device. OCGA § 32-6-200(a). Contrary to the dissent's assertion, the statute expressly prohibits a railroad from taking unilateral action and voluntarily installing protective devices: "However, no work leading to the installation of protective devices at a grade crossing on a county or municipal public road system shall commence until and unless the plan and specifications for such device are approved by the department." (Emphasis supplied.) Id.

This delegation of responsibility was corroborated at trial. The testimony at trial showed that a railroad could not unilaterally install a protective device on a public road. Instead, the appropriate governmental entities first had to order and approve the device. Here, the railroad had not...