Evans v. American Pub. Co.
| Decision Date | 01 May 1929 |
| Docket Number | (Motion No. 8491; No. 984-5135.) |
| Citation | 16 S.W.2d 516 |
| Parties | EVANS v. AMERICAN PUB. CO. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Appellees have presented a very vigorous motion for rehearing, stressing especially the point that the questions certified necessarily involve a jurisdictional question, as contradistinguished from one of pure venue. They argue that, although the certificate disclaims the intention to present the question of jurisdiction, nevertheless the inquiry as to venue requires necessarily a determination of the jurisdictional nature of the statutory requirement as to place of suit. If this contention be true, and it appears logical, then we have necessarily held that the statute of place is not one of jurisdiction, but of venue. All parties below have treated the matter as one of venue by plea of privilege, followed by controverting affidavit in the usual form. The Court of Civil Appeals has certified it as such, and we have so treated it in our answer. But it is now contended that there is presented a question of jurisdiction. Out of deference to the earnest insistence of counsel, and in view of the fact that in a sense the jurisdiction of the subject-matter is involved in any question of law certified in a given case, we will express briefly our conclusion upon that point.
Assuming that a libel suit under our statute is not an ordinary suit or action within the venue statutes, but is a special proceeding, and that the place of suit is jurisdictional in the strictest sense, yet we adhere to our original views that the language of the statute requiring such suit to be brought in the county in which the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action, or at the time of filing suit, uses the word "resided," not in the sense of actual pedal presence, but rather of legal residence, as that term has been used throughout the venue statutes. Our reasons for this holding are sufficiently stated in the original opinion by Presiding Judge Short.
But we are not to be understood as assenting to the contention that a libel suit under our statutes is not an ordinary suit or action within the meaning of our venue statutes. There is a well-marked line of distinction between ordinary suits or actions, which are controlled by the venue statutes, and those special proceedings authorized by statute, which do not come within that...
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...applies to other exceptions to the general venue provision of Article 1995. Evans v. American Pub. Co., 118 Tex. 433, 13 S.W.2d 358, 16 S.W.2d 516 (1929). In order to establish venue in Tyler County, plaintiffs had to make prima facie proof of three venue facts: (1) that a cause of action f......
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...Court. Houston Printing Co. v. Tennant, 120 Tex. 539, 39 S.W.2d 1089; Evans v. American Publishing Co., 118 Tex. 433, 13 S.W.2d 358, 16 S.W.2d 516; Taylor v. Wilson, 99 Tex. 651, 93 S.W. 109; Pearson v. West, 97 Tex. 238, 77 S.W. 944; Brown v. Boulden, 18 Tex. 431, 432. Revised Statutes 192......
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...some of the common law elements, but the statute has its roots in the tort of misrepresentation. In Evans v. American Pub. Co., 118 Tex. 433, 16 S.W.2d 516 (Com.App.1929, opinion adopted), a claim was made on motion for rehearing that a statute governing libel suits was a special proceeding......
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