Evans v. Barham, 39010.

• Citation: 184 S.W.2d 424
• Decision Date: 04 December 1944
• Docket Number: No. 39010.,39010.
• Parties: EVANS v. BARHAM, Police Judge.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

184 S.W.2d 424

EVANS v. BARHAM, Police Judge.

No. 39010.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

December 4, 1944.

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court en Banc Denied January 2, 1945.

Appeal from Circuit Court, St. Louis County; Raymond E. LaDriere, Judge.

Anne M. Evans was convicted of violating a traffic ordinance, and on appeal to the Circuit Court her motion to quash the proceedings was overruled, and she appeals.

Appeal dismissed.

Anne M. Evans, of University City, pro se.

Malcolm L. Bartley, of St. Louis, for respondent.

BARRETT, Commissioner.

After a trial before the Police Judge of Brentwood the appellant, Anne M. Evans, was fined four dollars and six dollars costs for violating a traffic ordinance. She appealed to the Circuit Court of St. Louis County.

In this court she urges that Division Number One of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County erred in overruling her motion to quash the proceedings. Her position in that court and here is that her rights under both the Constitution of the United States and of the State of Missouri were violated by the City of Brentwood. The trial court overruled her motion to quash the proceedings for the reason that the principal proceeding, the appeal from the police court, was pending before another judge in another division of the Circuit Court of St. Louis County. The judge states that the only proceeding before him was an order to show cause. The appellant appears to contend that because the judge of Division One took judicial notice of the transcript of the proceedings on file in Division Two that the whole proceeding was before him.

Even though we assume that all the proceedings were before the judge of Division One and that the appellant's motion to quash was directed to those proceedings yet we are compelled to sustain the city's motion to dismiss this appeal because it is not taken from a final judgment which disposes of the case one way or another.

It is immaterial whether the proceeding is civil or criminal in its nature, in either case the right to appeal is governed by statute (Mo.R.S.A. §§ 1184, 4130) and an appeal is premature when it is taken before there has been a final judgment or a final disposition of the cause by the trial court from which appeals are allowed and taken. State v. Vinson, 337 Mo. 1023, 87 S. W.2d 637; State v. Pruitt, Mo.Sup., 169 S. W.2d 399; W. A. Ross Const. Co. v. Chiles, 344 Mo. 1084, 1094, 130 S.W.2d 524, 528. Neither the civil nor the criminal s...