Evans v. Buente

Decision Date14 November 1955
Docket NumberNo. 1,No. 44701,44701,1
Citation284 S.W.2d 543
PartiesAnne M. EVANS, Appellant, v. Martha BUENTE et al., the City of St. Louis and Union Electric Company of Missouri, Respondents
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Jones & Alexander and D. Calhoun Jones, St. Louis, for appellant.

Samuel H. Liberman, City Counselor, Oliver T. Johnson, Associate City Counselor, Freeman L. Martin, Asst. City Counselor, St. Louis, for respondent City of St. Louis.

Russell H. Doerner, Keefe, Doerner, Schlafly & Griesedieck, St. Louis, for respondent Union Electric Co. of Missouri, John A. Woodbridge, St. Louis, of counsel.

HOLMAN, Commissioner.

Plaintiff (appellant) Anne M. Evans, instituted this action seeking to quiet title to two contiguous parcels of real estate in the City of St. Louis. Each parcel was made the subject of a separate count. The court decreed that the defendant (respondent), Union Electric Company of Missouri, was the owner of the fee simple title to the property described in the first count of the petition. As to that described in the second count, the court found the title to be vested in plaintiff, sujbect to lien for taxes, including interest and other legal charges, in the sum of $2,923.74, which taxes were held to be properly payable to and collectible by the City of St. Louis (respondent). There were a number of individuals that were made defendants, apparently because of some previous record interest in the real estate. They defaulted and the decree divested them of any title or interest in either parcel of the land in question. The plaintiff has appealed.

We have jurisdiction of this appeal as title to real estate is directly involved and we are also asked to construe certain revenue laws of this State. Article V, Section 3, Constitution of Missouri 1945, V.A.M.S.

Plaintiff purchased all of the property herein mentioned for $143.26 at a sheriff's sale held by virtue of the levy of a special execution issued upon a benefit judgment previously rendered in a condemnation suit. At that time general taxes for 1930 and all subsequent years were unpaid. Plaintiff inquired about the taxes but refused to pay them as she entertained the view (obviously erroneous) that she was only required to pay such taxes as were assessed in her name. She never paid any taxes on the land involved in the first count and none were paid on the other parcel until 1947.

The Jones-Munger Act, Laws of Missouri, 1933, pp. 425-449, see now as reenacted and amended, Chapter 140, Title 10, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S., was then applicable to the City of St. Louis. In an effort to collect these delinquent taxes the parcel described in the first count was advertised and offered for sale for the third time on November 1, 1937, and was purchased by the City for $33.75. Plaintiff contends this sale was void because the price paid was grossly inadequate. After this suit was instituted the City sold this parcel to Union Electric Company; that corporation was permitted to intervene as a defendant and filed an answer and cross-bill in which it sought a decree to the effect that it was the fee simple owner of said land.

W. J. Holdway became the purchaser of the other parcel at the aforementioned tax sale and received a certificate of purchase. However, after the lapse of the period of redemption, this purchaser apparently refused to pay taxes that had subsequently become due and therefore never received a deed to the land.

The Jones-Munger Act, with respect to the sale of property for the collection of delinquent taxes in the City of St. Louis, proved to be unsatisfactory. Therefore, in 1939, the Act was amended by the enactment of eighteen new sections, applicable to said city, which provide for the collection of delinquent taxes by suit. Laws of Missouri, 1939, p. 878, Sections 9952A-1 to 9952A-18, inclusive, see now, as reenacted and amended, Sections 141.820 to 141.970, inclusive (unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.). After this law became effective (May 31, 1939) the collector of the City of St. Louis filed various suits seeking to collect delinquent taxes assessed against the parcel described in count two, which will be hereinafter more fully described and discussed.

At the outset we must consider the motion of respondent Union Electric Company to dismiss the appeal, which motion this court has heretofore ordered taken with the case. The main ground relied on by said respondent for dismissal is that the transcript filed herein was not agreed to by it, nor was it settled and approved by the trial court. While unnecessary to a decision on this question, it is also alleged and proved by affidavits that the attorney for said respondent was not given a reasonable opportunity to examine said transcript; that many exhibits were not included; and that a number of pages had been inserted therein after the transcript had been prepared by the official reporter and delivered to plaintiff. Section 512.110, subd. 3 provides, in part, as follows: 'If the parties agree that the transcript correctly includes all of the record, proceedings and evidence, it need not be approved by the trial court. * * * If there is any dispute concerning the correctness of any transcript, or any part thereof, or if the parties fail to agree within a reasonable time as to its correctness, the transcript shall be settled and approved by the trial court.' This provision requiring the approval of the trial court in case the parties fail to agree concerning the correctness of the transcript applies to complete, as well as abbreviated, transcripts. It is obvious that it applies to the transcript in this case. Since it clearly appears that the transcript herein was not agreed to by the Union Electric Company, and was not settled or approved by the trial court, it necessarily follows, under the situation here presented, that the appeal must be dismissed insofar as applicable to the respondent, Union Electric Company of Missouri. Brand v. Brand, Mo.Sup., 245 S.W.2d 94; Gildehaus v. Jones, 356 Mo. 8, 200 S.W.2d 523. We will therefore give no further attention to the issues raised by the first count of plaintiff's petition and the pleadings responsive thereto. The City claims no interest in the land described in that count.

The defendant, City of St. Louis, agreed to the transcript and hence we will proceed to determine the questions presented upon this appeal as relate to the second count. The City concedes that plaintiff owns the parcel of land described in that count. The only issue for our determination is the amount of the taxes that had been assessed against said land, were unpaid, and a lien thereon at the time of trial. In her petition plaintiff alleged 'that she is still ready, willing and able to pay such general taxes on said property as the court may find properly and legally due thereon.' The trial court included in the aggregate amount allowed as a lien all of the taxes the City contended were due and unpaid. We will therefore consider here the various assignments wherein plaintiff asserts the court erred.

We will first consider the taxes for the years 1931 to 1935, inclusive, which apparently totaled $1,129.99. The amount is comparatively large because of the accumulation of interest and penalties over a long period of time. Suit was filed to collect these taxes (as well as taxes for the year 1943) on December 20, 1944. Plaintiff contends that the collection of these taxes was already...

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9 cases
  • Hendershot v. Minich
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 10, 1956
    ...and approved by the trial court, as indeed it should be. St. Louis Housing Authority v. Evans, Mo., 285 S.W.2d 550, 553; Evans v. Buente, Mo., 284 S.W.2d 543, 545. And, if the record does not reflect the facts, it should be corrected in the trial court. Ragsdale v. Young, Mo.App., 215 S.W.2......
  • Tillman v. Deese
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 1972
    ...default judgments and equitable proceedings to set aside judgments for extrinsic fraud. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 289, p. 533; Evans v. Buente, Mo., 284 S.W.2d 543; Whitledge v. Anderson Air Activities, Inc., Mo., 276 S.W.2d 114; Askew v. Brown, Mo.App., 450 S.W.2d 446; Linneman v. Whitley, Mo.......
  • Cox v. Crider
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • December 4, 1986
    ...of Riley Cox for loss of consortium, that statute is applicable. However, the discretion under § 514.090 is not unbridled. Evans v. Buente, 284 S.W.2d 543 (Mo.1955); Roy A. Scheperle Construction Co. v. Seiferts, Inc., 687 S.W.2d 222 (Mo.App.1984). The apportionment of costs must bear some ......
  • Sitzes v. Raidt
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • May 13, 1960
    ...by apportioning the costs among the parties. Section 514.060 RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S.; Amitin v. Izard, Mo.App., 262 S.W.2d 353; Evans v. Buente, Mo.Sup., 284 S.W.2d 543. Under the facts in this case we deem it our duty to order the judgment as to costs set aside and judgment entered requiring e......
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