Evans v. Byers
| Decision Date | 27 January 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 6780.,6780. |
| Citation | 331 A.2d 138 |
| Parties | Beverly EVANS, Appellant, v. Ivory BYERS and Julious Thomas, Appellees. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Jack H. Olender, Washington, D. C., with whom Martin Mendelsohn, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellant.
Richard W. Galiher, Frank J. Martell, and William J. Donnelly, Jr., Washington, D. C., entered appearances for appellee Thomas.
Before REILLY, Chief Judge, GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, and QUINN, Associate Judge, Retired.
This is an appeal from a directed verdict at the conclusion of plaintiff's case of an action brought by a federal employee to recover damages for a personal injury which she attributed to an automobile accident. She sued both the driver of the car in which she was a passenger at the time and the driver of the car which collided with it.
As the case was tried without a jury, a ruling on what was called by both defendants "a motion for directed verdict" is something of a misnomer. Petty v. Rowe, D.C.Mun.App., 91 A.2d 331 (1952), No doubt what defendants intended were motions to dismiss for failure to make out a prima facie case under Superior Court Civil Rule 41(b), which serve the same function as motions for directed verdicts. See Warner Corporation v, Magazine Realty Co., D.C.App., 255 A.2d 479 (1969). It is apparent that the trial court treated the motions as such in granting them, for it ruled that plaintiff's showing was legally insufficient to show negligence on the part of either defendant.
Consequently, as appellant failed to perfect her appeal against defendant Thomas1 — the host driver — the only question before us is whether the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to establish a prima facie case for negligence on the part of the other defendant, appellee Byers.
Appellant testified that she was offered a ride to work by a co-worker (defendant Thomas); that she was a passenger in the rear seat; that the car entered the Southwest Freeway at a point where the freeway itself was barricaded so that the only traffic on it was that entering from the access ramp; that the freeway was three lanes wide in the direction in which they were headed; that the car traveled a &stance of approximately four car lengths in a diagonal manner and was entering the extreme left-hand lane when it was struck in the left rear by the Byers' car; and that the first car hit the median guardrail and came to a stop.
Appellant then called defendant Thomas. He testified that when he entered the freeway he proceeded to the extreme left-hand lane; that his car was completely in the lane and had proceeded directly forward for approximately six car lengths when struck in the right rear by appellee Byers; and that his car thereafter hit the median strip and came to a halt. After the testimony and the introduction of medical and attendance records, appellant rested her case. Counsel for both defendants then moved for "directed verdicts."
Subsequent to the entry of judgment, plaintiff moved the court for a new trial, naming both defendants, but causing notice of the motion to be served only on counsel for one defendant, Byers. After the motion was considered and denied, plaintiff noted an appeal but only Byers was served with notice. Thomas apparently first learned of the pending appeal in this court upon his receipt of appellant's brief. Appearing specially, Thomas successfully moved this court to dismiss the appeal as to him over appellant's opposition.
It is contended that insofar as the ruling of the trial court made it unnecessary for the appellee — the driver of the second car — to go forward and present evidence to disprove negligence on his part, such ruling was erroneous. We disagree. It is fundamental that the mere happening of an accident, even though causing damage to property or person, does not prove negligence on the part of anyone unless the facts not in dispute raise such a strong pesumption of negligent behavior by one of
the parties that the trier of fact, be it judge or jury, could logically infer — in the absence of countervailing evidence — that the accident would not have occurred had such party exercised due care. This is the doctrine popularly called res ipsa loquitur.
As none of the witnesses called by appellant testified that appellee Byers was driving at excessive speed, was inattentive to the traffic in front of him, or doing any of the...
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...nonjury case is a misnomer and will be treated as a motion to dismiss pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 41(b).2 See Evans v. Byers, D.C.App., 331 A.2d 138, 139 (1975).3 See also James v. DuBreuil, 500 F.2d 155, 156 n. 2 (5th Cir. 1974); Federal Insurance Co. v. Hardy, 222 F.Supp. 68, 69......
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