Evans v. Chichester School Dist., Civil Action No. 07-0072.

• Decision Date: 10 January 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-0072.
• Citation: 533 F.Supp.2d 523
• Parties: Kay EVANS, Plaintiff, v. CHICHESTER SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

533 F.Supp.2d 523

Kay EVANS, Plaintiff, v. CHICHESTER SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 07-0072.

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania.

January 10, 2008.

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Carol Herring, Law Offices of. Carol Herring, Glen Mills, PA, William L. McLaughlin, Jr., William L. McLaughlin Law Offices, Paoli, PA, for Plaintiff.

Andria B. Saia, Levin Legal Group, P.C., Huntingdon Valley, PA, John P. Gonzales, Joseph J. Santarone, Jr., Marshall, Dennehey, Warner, Coleman & Goggin, King of Prussia, PA, for Defendants.

Memorandum and Order

YOHN, District Judge.

Plaintiff Kay Evans¹ filed this action on January 5, 2007 against defendants (1) Chichester School District ("the District"); (2) Michael Golde, superintendent of the District; (3) Gloria Senatore, director of pupil services of the District; (4) the Pennsylvania Office of Dispute Resolution ("ODR");² (5) Sharon Montanye, the District's attorney; and (6) Sweet, Stevens, Matz & Williams LLP ("Sweet Stevens LLP"), the law firm where Montanye is employed. Evans brings the following claims: (1) a retaliation claim under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (" § 504"), 29 U.S.C. § 794; (2) a retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for violating her First Amendment rights; (3) a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) for conspiring to violate her equal protection rights; and (4) a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claim for violating her right to contract. Evans additionally seeks a declaratory judgment pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, regarding her rights and liabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA").

Presently before the court are the defendants' motions to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.³ The court held oral argument on December 13, 2007 to clarify the factual allegations in Evans's complaint. For the reasons discussed herein, I will grant the motions to dismiss. Count One against the District will be dismissed without prejudice, to allow Evans the opportunity to exhaust her administrative remedies. Count Two will be dismissed without prejudice against the District and Golde only, and Evans will be granted leave to file an amended complaint against the District and Golde. Count Two against Senatore will be dismissed with prejudice. The remaining counts will also be dismissed with prejudice, and Senatore, ODR, Montanye, and Sweet Stevens LLP will be dismissed as parties to this lawsuit.

Also before this court is the District and ODR's motion to compel the withdrawal of Evans's counsel, Carol Herring. For the reasons discussed below, the motion will be denied. This denial is without prejudice to defendants' right to refile the motion at trial.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Evans's complaint makes the following allegations, which this court must accept as true for purposes of the motions to dismiss. Evans is the parent of a child with disabilities. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Although the complaint does not state that Evans's child is a student within the District, the facts permit an inference by the court that her son does attend a school within the District.

The District does not follow the Individualized Education Programs of students with disabilities and has interfered with Evans's responsibilities to advocate on behalf of her son to ensure he receives a free and appropriate education equal to the education received by nondisabled students. (Id. ¶ 16(1).) ⁴ Evans has made complaints and reports to appropriate officials within the District and ODR regarding the District's treatment of students with disabilities and the District's "deficiencies" in educating these students. (Id. ¶ 15(2).) These reports have included, inter alia, complaints that students with disabilities have been subjected to discrimination and not provided a free and appropriate education equal to services provided to nondisabled students. Id.

Evans alleges that she retained a lawyer, Carol Herring, in 2004 to provide assistance in advocating for her child's rights. (Id. ¶ 11.) Evans asked ODR to hold a due process hearing, which ODR scheduled for January 7, 2005 on the District's premises. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13.) The defendants conspired to deprive Evans, an African American, of equal protection of the laws, and the District had Herring arrested for criminal defiant trespass during the hearing, causing disruption to the due process hearing that Evans had requested. (Id. ¶¶ 14, 33.) ODR ratified the District's conduct by failing to control the process of the hearing. (Id.) All of the defendants have now filed motions to dismiss the complaint, and the District and ODR have filed a motion to compel withdrawal of Evans's counsel.

II. Discussion

A. Motions to Dismiss

I. Standard

Generally, when deciding whether to dismiss a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court is testing the sufficiency of a complaint. Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir.1980) (citation omitted). The court must accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of fact in the plaintiffs complaint, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, to determine whether "under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff[] may be entitled to relief." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.1996). "The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1420 (3d Cir.1997) (internal quotations and citation omitted). "The complaint will be deemed to have alleged sufficient flub if it adequately put the defendants on notice of the essential elements of the plaintiff['s] cause of action." Nami, 82 F.3d at 65.

"While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff s obligation to provide the `grounds' of his `entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, ___ U.S. ___, ___-___, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (citations and alterations omitted). Furthermore, "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 1965 (citations omitted). The complaint must rest on factual allegations, not on unsupported legal conclusions. See Papasan Attain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ("Although for the purposes of [a] motion to dismiss [a court] must take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [the court is] not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,"); Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir.1997) (A "court need not credit' a complaint's `bald assertions' or `legal conclusions' when deciding a motion to dismiss.").

2. Claims Against Montanye and Sweet Stevens LLP

Evans's complaint regarding Montanye and Sweet Stevens LLP only alleges that they conspired to deprive her of her civil rights (see Compl. ¶¶ 24, 32, 34), and that Montanye acted within the scope of her employment with Sweet Stevens LLP by directing `the District or its employees, who are Montanye's clients, to call the police on January 7, 2005 (see id. ¶ 34). The complaint does not allege any conduct by Montanye or Sweet Stevens LLP that took place outside the scope of attorney-client representation.

In the Third Circuit, the intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine bans claims against attorneys based on conspiracies formed in the attorney-client context. See Heffernan v. Hunter, 189 F.3d 405, 413 (3d Cir.1999). When an attorney's alleged conspiratorial conduct occurs within the scope of representation, the conduct cannot be characterized as an actionable conspiracy. See Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. 337 F.3d 297, 313-14 (3d Cir.2003) (applying intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to affirm dismissal of civil conspiracy claim against attorney acting in scope of representation); Heffernan, 189 F.3d at 413-14 (applying, intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, to affirm dismissal of § 1985(1) and (2) claims against attorney who acted in scope of representation); Lewis v. Montgomery County, No. 01-3193, 2002 WL 32349408, at *1 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 8.2002) (dismissing § 1983 suit against lawyer and his employer, a law firm, because they are not state actors and because they cannot form a conspiracy when acting in the attorney-client context). Because Evans did not allege any actions by Montanye or Sweet Stevens LLP other than the alleged conspiracy, which took place in the context of the attorney-client relationship, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies and Evans cannot show Montanye and Sweet Stevens LLP were part of an actionable conspiracy.⁵ Their motion to dismiss will therefore be granted.⁶

3. Section 504 Retaliation Claim (Count. One)

In Count One, Evans claims the District retaliated against her in violation of § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.⁷ The District allegedly retaliated against Evans by accusing her attorney of criminal trespass during a due process hearing regarding Evans's child. (Id. ¶ 4.) The District argues that Evans's § 504 claim is barred for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies.

IDEA requires that before a plaintiff files a civil action seeking relief under § 504 that is also available under IDEA, a plaintiff must exhaust her administrative remedies. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(1). As the parent of a disabled student Evans has standing to bring a claim under IDEA and therefore must first exhaust her administrative remedies.⁸ Accord Brandon v. Chichester Sch. Dist., ...