Singleton v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Educ., Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-1431
| Decision Date | 24 August 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:11-cv-1431 |
| Parties | GERALD SINGLETON, Plaintiff, v. PITTSBURGH BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by Defendant Paul Lalley, Esquire (ECF No. 24) be granted with prejudice.
This civil rights action arises out of grievance and arbitration proceedings held with regard to Plaintiff's termination as a police officer for the Pittsburgh School District. Plaintiff, Gerald Singleton, who is proceeding in this matter pro se, appears to be raising a due process violation under the 14th Amendment with regard to the manner in which his Loudermill hearing and subsequent arbitration were handled, as well as a conspiracy to deprive him of his due process rights. As relief, Plaintiff asks this Court to overturn the arbitrator's ruling and to order his reinstatement as well as back pay and other damages.
The Defendants in this action consist of the Pittsburgh Board of Education ("Board") for the Pittsburgh School District, the Pittsburgh Federation of Teachers ("PFT" or "Union"), theattorney for the PFT, John Bacharach, Esquire, the then-president of the PFT, John Tarka, Plaintiff's union representative, William Heilman, the arbitrator, Michelle Miller-Kotula,1 several co-workers/police officers: Dante Borgini, Latisha Cassidy McClelland, Kenneth Scott, and Margaret Seig, his immediate supervisor and School Safety Chief, Robert Fadzen, the Human Resources Director for the District, Jody Spolar, and the attorney representing the Board at the proceedings, Paul Lalley, Esquire. All of the Defendants have moved to dismiss this action in five separate motions which are presently before the Court for disposition.
This report and recommendation addresses the motion to dismiss (ECF No. 24) filed by Defendant Paul Lalley, Esquire ("Attorney Lalley"). For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Attorney Lalley's motion to dismiss be granted with prejudice.
The relevant facts and procedural history have been set forth at length in this Court's Report and Recommendation dated August 13, 2012 regarding Defendant Miller-Kotula's motion to dismiss and will not be reiterated here. See ECF No. 64 at 2-7. Only those factual allegations pertaining to the claims against Attorney Lalley are presented below.2
Plaintiff alleges that Attorney Lalley attended the Loudermill hearing3 that was held on February 26, 2010. (Compl. at ¶8, ECF No. 1.) The next mention of Attorney Lalley appears in paragraph 12 of the Complaint, where Singleton alleges that the arbitrator, Miller-Kotula, is a "friend and associated with the law firm of Paul Lalley." (Compl. at ¶12.) Later on in paragraph12, Singleton alleges that Attorney Lalley, along with Fadzen, Attorney Bacharach, Heilman, Miller-Kotula, and the three school police officers, "conspired . . . to terminate [him] without cause through conspiracy and a fraudulent arbitration process." (Id.)
In Part IV of his Complaint, Plaintiff identifies three causes of action in Sections A, B and C (hereinafter referred to as "Count A," "Count B," and "Count C"); however, only Count B has any relevance to the claims asserted against Attorney Lalley.4 In Count B which is entitled, "The Defendants improper grievance procedures gives evidence Defendant's reason for discharge was a pretext for an improper purpose," Singleton alleges that Attorney Lalley participated in arbitration proceedings on August 16, 2010 and/or September 1, 20105 to intentionally present false statements against him. (Compl. at ¶15.) Plaintiff further alleges, after setting forth the two options for proceeding in arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA"), that "Defendants chose to conspire by utilizing a person who is not associated with [the American Arbitration Association], but a friend or associate of Paul Lalley or the Law firm of Paul Lally where the arbitration proceedings took place." (Compl. at ¶16.)
Plaintiff commenced the instant lawsuit on November 9, 2011 in response to which Attorney Lalley filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on January 26, 2012. Plaintiff filed a response and brief in opposition to said motion on July 23, 2012. This motion has been fully briefed and thus is ripe fordisposition.
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it does not allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly at 556). The Supreme Court further explained:
The plausibility standard is not akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a defendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'"
Id. (citing Twombly at 556-57). The court of appeals has expounded on this standard in light of its decision in Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2008) (), and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Iqbal:
After Iqbal, it is clear that conclusory or "bare-bones" allegations will no longer survive a motion to dismiss: "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. To prevent dismissal, all civil complaints must now set out "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. This then "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 1948. The Supreme Court's ruling in Iqbal emphasizesthat a plaintiff must show that the allegations of his or her complaints are plausible. See Id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 505 U.S. at 555, & n. 3.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). In light of Iqbal, the Fowler court then set forth a two-prong test to be applied by the district courts in deciding motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. First, the district court must accept all well-pleaded facts as true and discard any legal conclusions contained in the complaint. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11. Next, the court must consider whether the facts alleged in the Complaint sufficiently demonstrate that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." Id. at 211. To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must show an entitlement to relief through its facts. Id. (citing Phillips at 234-35).
Courts generally consider only the allegations of the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record in deciding motions to dismiss. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Factual allegations within documents described or identified in the complaint may also be considered if the plaintiff's claims are based upon those documents. Id. A district court may consider these documents without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997).
Finally, a court must employ less stringent standards when considering pro se pleadings than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). In a § 1983 action, the court must liberally construe the pro se litigant's pleadings and "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) () (citing Holder v. City of Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)).
Attorney Lalley seeks dismissal of the claims against him with prejudice and advances several arguments in support thereof. First, Attorney Lalley submits that the claims against him fail because Singleton has failed to allege any conduct on his part that violated either Singleton's right to due process and/or equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In addition, Lalley argues that Singleton has failed to establish that he is a state actor. Finally, Lalley submits that as to Singleton's claim for violation of his due process, it is clear from the Complaint that Singleton was afforded all the due process to which he was entitled. The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
Initially, Attorney Lalley argues that Singleton has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Section 1983, which provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United...
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