Evans v. Cook Cnty. State's Attorney
Decision Date | 02 September 2021 |
Docket Number | Docket No. 125513 |
Citation | 2021 IL 125513,183 N.E.3d 810,451 Ill.Dec. 353 |
Parties | Alfred EVANS Jr., Appellant, v. The COOK COUNTY STATE'S ATTORNEY et al., Appellees. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Bryant Chavez, of Bryant Chavez Law Office, LLC, of Chicago, and David G. Sigale, of Law Firm of David G. Sigale, P.C., of Wheaton, for appellant.
Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee Illinois State Police.
¶ 1 Petitioner, Alfred Evans Jr., applied to the Illinois State Police (ISP) for a Firearm Owner's Identification (FOID) card. The ISP denied the request, and petitioner filed a petition for review with the Cook County circuit court. The Cook County State's Attorney objected to the petition, and the circuit court sustained the objections. The circuit court found that federal law barred petitioner from obtaining a FOID card and that petitioner had not met his burden of showing that issuing him a FOID card would not be contrary to the public interest. The Appellate Court, First District, affirmed. 2019 IL App (1st) 182488, 436 Ill.Dec. 304, 142 N.E.3d 407. The court disagreed with the circuit court that issuing petitioner a FOID card would be contrary to the public interest. Id. ¶¶ 26-28. The court held, however, that petitioner was barred from obtaining a FOID card because federal law prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Id. ¶¶ 30-42. The court believed that petitioner was caught in a statutory loop between state and federal law that prohibited him from obtaining a FOID card. Id. ¶ 37.
¶ 2 We allowed petitioner's petition for leave to appeal. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Oct. 1, 2019).
¶ 4 In March 1994, petitioner was convicted of Class 2 felony manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance and Class X felony manufacture or delivery of more than 15 grams of cocaine. He was sentenced to three years in the Department of Corrections for the Class 2 offense. The sentence for the Class X offense does not appear in the record. In addition, defendant's criminal history shows numerous contacts with the police that did not result in convictions. In 1987, he was arrested for battery and theft. In 1992, he was arrested for aggravated assault. 1n 1993, he was arrested for battery. In 1999, he was arrested for various controlled substance offenses, and in 2008 he was arrested for battery.
¶ 5 In January 2018, petitioner applied to the ISP for a FOID card. The ISP denied the application, explaining in a letter that he was ineligible because of his felony convictions. In Illinois, felons are prohibited from owning firearms pursuant to section 24-1.1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2018)).
¶ 6 Petitioner then filed a pro se complaint in the circuit court to have his firearm rights restored pursuant to section 10(c) of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act) ( 430 ILCS 65/10(c) (West 2018)). In petitioner's complaint, he stated that he was not contesting the validity of his past infractions. However, he noted that his felony convictions were more than 20 years in the past.
¶ 7 Section 10(c) provides a mechanism for the restoration of firearm rights. That section provides as follows:
¶ 8 The Cook County State's Attorney filed an objection to the petition. See id. § 10(b). The State's Attorney objected on two grounds. First, the State's Attorney argued that petitioner was prohibited from owning a firearm under federal law. Section 10(c)(4) of the FOID Card Act provides that relief should not be granted when it would be contrary to federal law (id. § 10(c)(4)), and section 10(b) provides that the court shall not issue an order to grant the petitioner a FOID card if the petitioner is "otherwise prohibited from obtaining, possessing, or using a firearm under federal law" (id. § 10(b)). Section 922(g)(1) of the Federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun Control Act) prohibits an individual from possessing a firearm when that person "has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year." 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2018). Alternatively, the State's Attorney argued that, if the court determined that petitioner was not prohibited from possessing a firearm under federal law, then it should find that granting petitioner relief would not be in the public interest. The State's Attorney focused on petitioner's criminal history. While acknowledging that petitioner's felony convictions were not for "forcible felonies," the State's Attorney contended that they showed a decided contempt for the law. The State's Attorney pointed out that petitioner was arrested on other charges after he was released from prison. The State's Attorney conceded that petitioner has had no documented contacts with the police for the past 10 years but argued that his adult transgressions and criminal history cast substantial doubt on whether he is an honest individual with a responsible and mature nature.
¶ 9 Petitioner retained counsel to file a response to the State's Attorney's objections. Counsel argued that granting relief would not be contrary to federal law. According to counsel, the references to federal law in sections 10(b) and 10(c)(4) meant "a disqualifying offense based on Federal Law and not a prohibition." Counsel also cited a New Hampshire case, DuPont v. Nashua Police Department , 167 N.H. 429, 113 A.3d 239 (2015). In that case, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire noted that a conviction for which a person has had his civil rights restored is not considered a conviction for purposes of the federal firearms ban. Id. at 244 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2012) ). The court concluded that, for purposes of this section, the second amendment right to keep and bear arms is a civil right. Id. at 247. Accordingly, when the petitioner in that case had his right to possess firearms restored under state law, he was not barred from possessing a firearm under section 922(g)(1). Id. at 248-50.
¶ 10 Counsel also argued that granting petitioner a FOID card would not be contrary to the public interest. Counsel noted that petitioner's felony convictions were not for forcible felonies. Counsel argued that petitioner has turned his life around and that his last arrest was more than 10 years ago. He pointed out that petitioner has been working as a tow truck operator for over 10 years and has worked with the City of Chicago and the Chicago Police Department. Because towing vehicles often results in irate motorists, petitioner wants a firearm for protection. He claimed to have been threatened with bodily harm over 100 times in the past 10 years.
¶ 11 Petitioner supported his petition with four character references, and he also supplied his own statement in which he took responsibility for his past mistakes and argued that he had transformed himself into a productive individual who is not a threat to society. Petitioner's wife explained in a letter that her husband has been operating his own towing business since 2005. She acknowledged the "blemishes in his past" but explained that he is now a changed man. She argued that he has paid his debt to society and is now an upstanding and trustworthy citizen. Dr. Althea Jones explained in her letter that she has known petitioner since childhood. She said that petitioner is not a person to create danger or put others in harm's way. She believed that petitioner has changed his life tremendously. Kristi Brown, of Catholic Charities, wrote that she has been petitioner's friend for 37 years. She believed that his criminal history was the result of the poor choices he made as a young man. She said that he has since become a responsible person and has been free from criminality for over two decades. Brown explained that petitioner is now an upstanding member of the community who gives back by teaching young men the value of staying free of the penal system, working a tax-paying job, and owning a business. Finally, petitioner's sister, Charlotte Hogan, wrote that petitioner was a hardworking, trustworthy individual who owns his own towing business. She said that he works long hours and is an upstanding and reliable person. She is confident in his ability to discern right from wrong, and she said that he is always willing to lend a helping hand....
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