Evans v. Jackson City Lines, 38149

• Decision Date: 07 January 1952
• Docket Number: No. 38149,38149
• Citation: 212 Miss. 895,56 So.2d 80
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: EVANS v. JACKSON CITY LINES, Inc.

Page 80

56 So.2d 80

212 Miss. 895

EVANS v. JACKSON CITY LINES, Inc.

No. 38149.

Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division B.

Jan. 7, 1952.

Barnett, Jones & Montgomery, and Francis Bowling, all of Jackson, for appellant.

Forrest B. Jackson, Jackson, for appellee.

ETHRIDGE, Commissioner.

This appeal questions the validity of four instructions granted appellee, Jackson City Lines, Inc., defendant in the court below. Appellant, Mrs. Mattie Lou Evans, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County seeking damages from appellee for the alleged negligence of its bus driver in closing a bus door on her while she was entering the bus. Appellant and another witness testified that the bus driver negligently slammed the door on appellant while she was on the bottom step of the bus in the process of boarding it, that the door struck her on her arms and shoulders, that there was nothing in the way to prevent the driver from seeing her before and while she was boarding the bus, and that as a result of such negligence appellant fell on the curb of the street and was injured. For the appellee, the bus driver testified that as soon as he saw appellant's foot come up in the door of the bus, he stopped the door in the process of closing and threw it back open, that the door did not knock appellant down, that she fell because she lost her balance in stepping on the bus step and sat down on the ground. The jury returned a verdict for appellee with conflicting evidence on the issue of negligence. This was a jury question, and the verdict is not contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence.

Appellant says that the trial court erred in granting defendant's instruction Number 2: 'The Court instructs the jury that the fact that an accident occurred is not of itself any proof of negligence, and in the case under consideration, to warrant a recovery by the plaintiff, it is not enough for her to show that she fell, or that she fell and sustained certain injuries therefrom; nor is the negligence of Jackson City Lines, Inc., to be presumed or inferred by you from the mere fact that the plaintiff fell, but before the plaintiff can recover, she must prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that the defendant, acting by and through its duly authorized agents and servants, failed to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent man would exercise under the same or similar conditions, and that such negligence, if any you find, was the proximate cause of the injuries, if any, sustained by Mrs. Mattie Lou Evans, the plaintiff.'

Appellant argues that this instruction placed upon her too high a degree of proof; that a common carrier must exercise the highest degree of care and diligence for the safety of its passengers, and that the instruction is based upon ordinary care alone. It is true that the law requires the highest degree of care and skill by common carriers. Teche Lines, Inc. v. Britt, 1936, 176 Miss. 681, 693, 170 So. 294. But appellant did not submit that theory to the jury. The only instruction obtained by appellant on the issue of liability was based upon a theory of 'reasonable care' and 'negligence'. Plaintiff's instruction Number 4 stated: 'The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that on the day in question the plaintiff was attempting to board the defendant's bus, and you further believe that the driver of the bus closed the door on the plaintiff, at a time when the driver knew, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have known, that plaintiff was getting into the bus, and you further believe from a preponderance of the evidence that such action on the part of the driver was negligence, and that such negligence, if any, if shown by a preponderance of the evidence, proximately caused or proximately contributed to plaintiff's injuries, then it is your sworn duty to return a verdict for the plaintiff.'

By this instruction appellant submitted to the jury her theory of 'reasonable care', and 'negligence', and not one of a high degree of care and skill. The instruction complained of, and quoted above, defendant's instruction Number 2, submits this same theory. A party may not complain of an instruction where he has procured a similar one which used substantially the same language or theory. Liverpool and London and Globe Insurance Co. v. Van Os and Schuster, 1886, 63 Miss. 431; Ross v. Louisville & N. R. Company, 1938, 181 Miss. 795, 181 So. 133; Gulf and Ship Island R.R. Co. v. Boswell, 1904, 85 Miss. 313, 38 So. 43. Moreover, the instruction complained of required defendant 'to exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent man would exercise under the same or similar conditions * * *.' And as was said in Supreme Instruments Corp. v. Lehr, 1941, 190 Miss. 600, 199 So. 294, suggestion of error sustained, 190 Miss. 623, 627, 1 So.2d 242, 245, 'requisite care remains always that degree of care commensurate with appreciable danger appraised in terms of ordinary prudence and interpreted in the light of the attendant circumstances.'

Appellant also complains of defendant's instruction Number 3. The court there told the jury that plaintiff must prove her charge of negligence by a preponderance of the credible evidence. That instruction then stated: 'If, therefore, you find the evidence touching the charge of negligence against the defendant to be evenly balanced, after fairly considering it, it is your sworn duty to return a verdict for the defendant.'

We do not approve this type of instruction, because of the risk of error to be incurred in trying to properly phase and further define the requirement that a plaintiff must prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence. See Blalock v. Magee, 1949, 205 Miss. 209, 38 So.2d 708, 714. The instructions...