Evans v. Lorenz
| Decision Date | 27 June 1969 |
| Citation | 454 S.W.2d 691 |
| Parties | Carol L. Harrington EVANS and John R. Harrington, Appellants, v. Otto J. LORENZ, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Edwin O. Davis, Davis & Mahan, Louisville, for appellants.
David J. Thompson, Jr., William P. Swain, Raymond O. Harmon, Boehl, Stopher, Graves & Deindoerfer, Louisville, for appellee.
ROBERT M. COLEMAN, Special Commissioner.
This is an appeal from a judgment on a directed verdict resulting from a car-truck collision. There is little or no disagreement as to the facts. The plaintiff-appellee's van truck was parked in front of his residence about one-half on the blacktop and one-half on the shoulder, or grass, headed in the wrong direction. The defendant-appellant Carol L. Harrington Evans was driving her father's (John R. Harrington's) car at about 20 to 25 miles per hour and struck the parked vehicle. The collision happened on Millgate Road, which is a two-lane subdivision road in an unincorporated area of Jefferson County. It was a dark, cold night with no streetlights, or lighting of any nature, at the scene. As the driver of the car approached the blue truck headed toward her on her side of the road, she was meeting two cars with bright lights approaching her from the opposite direction. She dimmed her lights and struck the parked truck without seeing it.
The county policeman who investigated the wreck testified that the car stopped at the point of impact; that the pavement was 18 to 20 feet in width; and that to have passed the parked truck, the driver of the car would have been compelled to leave her lane of travel.
At the conclusion of all the evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for the plaintiff-appellee, Lorenz, and rendered judgment for $915.15, the stipulated damages to his truck, and dismissed the counterclaim of defendants-appellants for $1,000 personal injuries to Carol Harrington Evans and for $673.69 to John R. Harrington, the stipulated damage to his car.
The appellants contend that KRS 189.450, prohibiting the parking of motor vehicles 'upon the main traveled portion of a highway' is applicable in this case, and that the definition set out in KRS 189.010(2) brings the site of this accident within the statute. The trial judge held that the statute was not applicable, and relying upon the opinion of this court in Lee v. Dutli, Ky., 403 S.W.2d 703, he directed a verdict for appellee upon the ground that the negligence of the driver of the car in failing to see the parked van was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
We first deem it necessary to determine if KRS 189.450(1) imposed any duty upon appellee. The pertinent provision thereof is:
'No person shall stop a vehicle, leave it standing or cause it to stop or to be left standing upon the main traveled portion of a highway; provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to prevent parking off the main traveled portion of a highway or street in a city or suburban area where such parking is otherwise permitted.'
The place where this accident happened was a 'highway' under the definition appearing in KRS 189.010(2). This being a paved street 18 to 20 feet in width, appellee's truck was partially parked on the 'main traveled portion' thereof. Appellee therefore violated the provisions of this statute unless it does not apply to a suburban area in Jefferson County.
It is appellee's contention that KRS 189.390(4)(c) has the effect of exempting appellee from the traffic regulation of KRS 189.450(1) above quoted. The former section provides that under certain conditions 'the county court may by order establish 'no parking' areas on and along such highways * * *' (those other than state highways). It is contended that since the county has not designated the place where appellee's truck was parked as a 'no parking' area, parking was therefore permitted because the county had been given the exclusive authority to promulgate this sort of traffic regulation. We do not so construe KRS 189.390(4)(c).
In KRS 189.450(1) the legislature had prohibited parking on the main traveled portion of a highway. KRS 189.390(4)(c) does not authorize a county to permit parking in such areas. It authorizes Jefferson County to designate additional areas on a highway as 'no parking' zones. According to appellee...
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Wheeler v. Creekmore
...cannot prevail because this court expressly held the statute applicable to suburban streets in unincorporated areas in Evans v. Lorenz, Ky., 454 S.W.2d 691. Furthermore, it is our opinion that the common-law standard of care of the ordinary prudent man would impose the duty not to stop a ca......