Evans v. Lukas, 52832
| Decision Date | 25 October 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 52832,No. 3,52832,3 |
| Citation | 230 S.E.2d 136,140 Ga.App. 182 |
| Parties | R. M. EVANS v. Genevieve LUKAS et al |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Neely, Freeman & Hawkins, Andrew M. Scherffius, Atlanta, for appellant.
J. E. Wilson, College Park, Henning, Chambers & Mabry, Peter K. Kintz, Atlanta, for appellees.
The sole issue on this appeal is whether or not the statute of limitation in a third-party action for contribution runs from the date of the accrual of the plaintiff's cause of action.
We start with the proposition that a third-party action 'has the nature of an independent suit.' Register v. Stone's Independent Oil Distributors, Inc., 227 Ga. 123, 126, 179 S.E.2d 68, 71. (Emphasis supplied.) A third-party complaint must be against one who is or may be liable to the third-party plaintiff for all or part of the original plaintiff's claim against him; Code Ann. § 81A-114 does not allow the tender of another defendant who is or may be liable to the plaintiff. Balkcom v. Mull, 129 Ga.App. 277, 278, 199 S.E.2d 346. A third-party complaint is maintainable under Code Ann. § 81A-114(a) for contribution among several trespassers, pursuant to Code § 105-2012, as amended. McMichael v. Georgia Power Co., 133 Ga.App. 593, 594, 211 S.E.2d 632.
It is thus clear that a third-party complaint seeking contribution from one who is alleged to be a joint tortfeasor is an independent suit between the third-party plaintiff and defendant in which the third-party defendant is secondarily liable to the third-party plaintiff rather than directly liable to the original plaintiff. Balkcom v. Mull, 129 Ga.App. 277, 199 S.E.2d 346, supra. Therefore, the applicable statute of limitation for the plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant has no bearing on the defendant's third-party complaint for contribution against an alleged joint tortfeasor. 'The rule generally recognized is that a claim for contribution based on tort, where such claim is authorized, does not accrue, and the statute of limitations does not start to run thereon, at the time of the commission of the tort, or of the resulting injury or damage, bur from the time of the accrual of the cause of action for contribution . . .' Anno., 57 A.L.R.3d 867, 875 (1974).
When does the statute of limitation begin to run on a cause of action for contribution? '(T)he right to obtain contribution does not arise until a judgment is entered . . .' Maxwell Bros., Inc. v. Deupree Co., 129...
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Union Camp Corp. v. Helmy, 45285
...plaintiff's action, in order to enforce such party's right of contribution against another alleged joint tort-feasor. Evans v. Lukas, 140 Ga.App. 182, 230 S.E.2d 136 (1976); Gosser v. Diplomat Restaurant, Inc., supra. And, CPA § 49, OCGA § 9-11-49, constitutes specific statutory authority f......
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Putnam v. Williams
...the right to obtain contribution doesn't arise until a judgment has been entered on the debt. Cf. Evans v. Lukas, 140 Ga.App. 182, 230 S.E.2d 136 (1976) (joint tort-feasors). As Williams points out, many of the creditors who provided goods and services to the corporation apparently have not......
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Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Cobb County, Ga.
...must satisfy separate venue requirements, Id. at 126, 179 S.E.2d at 71, and meet its own statute of limitations. Evans v. Lukas, 140 Ga.App. 182, 230 S.E.2d 136 (1976). The Georgia Court of Appeals explained the result in Evans as The rule generally recognized is that a claim for contributi......
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Independent Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Automotive Products, Inc., s. 53136
...specifically, the statute of limitation. This question, at least as to contribution, was presented in recent case of Evans v. Lukas, 140 Ga.App. 182, 230 S.E.2d 136. In that case, this court concluded that, inasmuch as the cause of action for contribution is an independent suit (Register v.......