Evans v. Michigan

• Decision Date: 20 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 11–1327.,11–1327.
• Citation: 133 S.Ct. 1069,185 L.Ed.2d 124,81 USLW 4103
• Parties: Lamar EVANS, Petitioner v. MICHIGAN.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

133 S.Ct. 1069

185 L.Ed.2d 124

81 USLW 4103

Lamar EVANS, Petitioner

v.MICHIGAN.

No. 11–1327.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Nov. 6, 2012.

Decided Feb. 20, 2013.

Syllabus^*

After the State of Michigan rested its case at petitioner Evans' arson trial, the court granted Evans' motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, concluding that the State had failed to prove that the burned building was not a dwelling, a fact the court mistakenly believed was an “element” of the statutory offense. The State Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for retrial. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held that a directed verdict based on an error of law that did not resolve a factual element of the charged offense was not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes.

Held : The Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial for Evans' offense. Pp. 1074 – 1081.

(a) Retrial following a court-decreed acquittal is barred, even if the acquittal is “based upon an egregiously erroneous foundation,” Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143, 82 S.Ct. 671, 7 L.Ed.2d 629, such as an erroneous decision to exclude evidence, Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 68–69, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 57 L.Ed.2d 43; a mistaken understanding of what evidence would suffice to sustain a conviction, Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 473, 125 S.Ct. 1129, 160 L.Ed.2d 914; or a “misconstruction of the statute” defining the requirements to convict, Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164. Most relevant here, an acquittal encompasses any ruling that the prosecution's proof is insufficient to establish criminal liability for an offense. See, e.g.,United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 98, 98 S.Ct. 2187, 57 L.Ed.2d 65;Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 10, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1. In contrast to procedural rulings, which lead to dismissals or mistrials on a basis unrelated to factual guilt or innocence, acquittals are substantive rulings that conclude proceedings absolutely, and thus raise significant double jeopardy concerns. Scott, 437 U.S., at 91, 98 S.Ct. 2187. Here, the trial court clearly “evaluated the [State's] evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 51 L.Ed.2d 642. Evans' acquittal was the product of an erroneous interpretation of governing legal principles, but that error affects only the accuracy of the determination to acquit, not its essential character. See Scott, 437 U.S., at 98, 98 S.Ct. 2187. Pp. 1074 – 1076.

(b) The State Supreme Court attempted to distinguish this Court's cases on the ground that they involved “the sufficiency of the factual elements of the charged offense,” while Evans' case concerned “an error of law unrelated to [his] guilt or innocence,” but this Court perceives no such difference. This case, like the Court's previous ones, involves an antecedent legal error that led to an acquittal because the State failed to prove a fact it was not actually required to prove. The State and the United States claim that only when an actual element of the offense is resolved can there be an acquittal of the offense, but Evans' verdict was based on something that was concededly not an element. Their argument reads Martin Linen too narrowly and is inconsistent with this Court's decisions since then. Martin Linen focused on the significance of the District Court's acquittal based on a nonculpability determination, and its result did not depend on defining the “elements” of the offense. Culpability is the touchstone, not whether any particular elements were resolved or whether the nonculpability determination was legally correct. Scott, 437 U.S., at 98, 98 S.Ct. 2187. Pp. 1076 – 1078.

(c) Additional arguments the State and the United States raise in support of the lower court's distinction are unpersuasive. The State claims that unless an actual element of the offense is resolved by the trial court, the only way to know whether the court's ruling was an “acquittal” is to rely upon the court's label, which would wrongly allow the form of the trial court's action to control. However, the instant decision turns not on the form of the trial court's action but on whether that action serves substantive or procedural purposes. The State and the United States argue that if the grounds for an acquittal are untethered from the actual elements of the offense, a trial court could issue an unreviewable order finding insufficient evidence to convict for any reason at all. But this Court presumes that courts exercise their duties in good faith. The State also suggests that Evans should not be heard to complain when a trial-court error that he induced is corrected and the State wishes to retry him, but most midtrial acquittals result from defense motions. The United States claims that, under Lee v. United States, 432 U.S. 23, 97 S.Ct. 2141, 53 L.Ed.2d 80, Evans was required to ask the court to resolve whether nondwelling status was an element of the offense before jeopardy attached. However, Lee involved a midtrial dismissal that was akin to a mistrial, while this case involves a ruling on the sufficiency of the State's proof. Pp. 1078 – 1080.

(d) This Court declines to revisit decisions such as Fong Foo,Smith,Rumsey, and Smalis v. Pennsylvania, 476 U.S. 140, 106 S.Ct. 1745, 90 L.Ed.2d 116. There is no reason to believe that the existing rules have become so “unworkable” as to justify overruling precedent. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720. And the logic of those cases still holds. As for the objection that the rule denies the prosecution a full and fair opportunity to present its evidence to the jury while the defendant reaps a “windfall” from the trial court's unreviewable error, sovereigns have power to prevent such situations by disallowing the practice of midtrial acquittals, encouraging courts to defer consideration of a motion to acquit until after the jury renders a verdict, or providing for mandatory continuances or expedited interlocutory appeals. Pp. 1080 – 1081.

491 Mich. 1, 810 N.W.2d 535, reversed.

SOTOMAYOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, GINSBURG, BREYER, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. ALITO, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

David A. Moran, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Petitioner.

Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit, Michigan, for Respondent.

Curtis E. Gannon, for United States as amicus curiae, by special leave of the Court, supporting the Respondent.

David A. Moran, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Jonathan B.D. Simon, Birmingham, Michigan, Richard D. Friedman, Ann Arbor, Michigan, Timothy P. O'Toole, Miller & Chevalier, Washington, DC, for Petitioner.

Kym L. Worthy, Wayne County Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Detroit, Michigan, for Respondent.

Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court.

When the State of Michigan rested its case at petitioner Lamar Evans' arson trial, the court entered a directed verdict of acquittal, based upon its view that the State had not provided sufficient evidence of a particular element of the offense. It turns out that the unproven “element” was not actually a required element at all. We must decide whether an erroneous acquittal such as this nevertheless constitutes an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes, which would mean that Evans could not be retried. This Court has previously held that a judicial acquittal premised upon a “misconstruction” of a criminal statute is an “acquittal on the merits ... [that] bars retrial.” Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 211, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984). Seeing no meaningful constitutional distinction between a trial court's “misconstruction” of a statute and its erroneous addition of a statutory element, we hold that a midtrial acquittal in these circumstances is an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes as well.

I

The State charged Evans with burning “other real property,” a violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.73 (1981). The State's evidence at trial suggested that Evans had burned down an unoccupied house. At the close of the State's case, however, Evans moved for a directed verdict of acquittal. He pointed the court to the applicable Michigan Criminal Jury Instructions, which listed as the “Fourth” element of the offense “that the building was not a dwelling house.” 3 Mich. Crim. Jury Instr. § 31.3, p. 31–7 (2d ed., Supp. 2006/2007). And the commentary to the Instructions emphasized, “an essential element is that the structure burned is not a dwelling house.” Id., at 31–8. Evans argued that Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.72 criminalizes common-law arson, which requires that the structure burned be a dwelling, while the provision under which he was charged, § 750.73, covers all other real property.¹ Persuaded, the trial court granted the motion. 491 Mich. 1, 8, 810 N.W.2d 535, 539 (2012). The court explained that the “ ‘testimony [of the homeowner] was this was a dwelling house,’ ” so the nondwelling requirement of § 750.73 was not met. Ibid.

On the State's appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 288 Mich.App. 410, 794 N.W.2d 848 (2010). Evans had conceded, and the court held, that under controlling precedent, burning “other real property” is a lesser included offense under Michigan law, and disproving the greater offense is not required. Id., at 416, 794 N.W.2d, at 852 (citing People v. Antonelli, 66 Mich.App. 138, 140, 238 N.W.2d 551, 552 (1975) (on rehearing)). ² The court thus explained it was “undisputed that the trial court misperceivedthe elements of the offense with which [Evans] was charged and erred by directing a verdict.” 288 Mich.App., at 416, 794 N.W.2d, at 852. But the court rejected Evans' argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause barred retrial. Id., at 421–422, 794 N.W.2d, at 856.

In a divided decision, the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed. It held that “when a trial court grants a...