Evans v. Peltin

• Decision Date: 04 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. 3:20-cv-2100-L (BT),3:20-cv-2100-L (BT)
• Parties: CARL DAVED EVANS. Plaintiff, v. CHASE PELTIN, et al. Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

CARL DAVED EVANS. Plaintiff, v. CHASE PELTIN, et al. Defendants.

No. 3:20-cv-2100-L (BT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

June 4, 2021

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Carl Daved Evans, a federal prisoner, filed this pro se civil rights action against various defendants raising causes of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See ECF No. 3. The Court granted Evans leave to proceed in forma pauperis and withheld service subject to screening his complaint. ECF No. 6. The Court also issued a Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire ("MJQ") to Evans so that he could clarify his claims.¹ See ECF No. 10. Having received Evans's responses to the MJQ, and having screened the Complaint, the undersigned now recommends that the Court dismiss this action under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

Background

Evans's suit involves five claims against various state actors for false arrest and false imprisonment, as well as one claim against the district attorney of Montague County, Texas for "intentionally and maliciously initiating false criminal proceedings" against him. ECF 3 at 9. He alleges the following:

On May 15, 2017, Defendants Peltin and Hughes—a deputy and investigator with the Montague County Sheriff's Department respectively—"maliciously and falsely" arrested Evans on charges of aggravated assault. Evans claims that there was no probable cause to make the arrest, which he claims was simply a ruse to "raid" his house. See ECF No. 3 at 6; ECF No. 13 at 5. A bond hearing was held the next day. ECF 13 at 5. According to Evans, the charge was ultimately dismissed.

Next, Evans was arrested on October 4, 2017 by Defendants Holcomb and Berry of the Nocona, Texas Police Department for aggravated assault. Evans claims that the arrest was intentional, malicious, and made without probable cause. Evans alleges that a bond hearing was held on this charge the next day, October 5, 2017, and he provided the Court with a copy of a document purportedly from the Montague County Sheriff's Department to confirm this. ECF No. 13 at 17. According to Evans, the charge was subsequently dismissed.

Evans was again arrested in November 2017 by Defendant Fisher of the Montague Sheriff's Department for felony trash dumping. Evans claims that the arrest was intentional, malicious, and made without probable cause. He claims that a bond hearing on the charge was held, and he provided the Court with a copy of a document indicating that a bond hearing was held on this charge on November 18, 2017. See ECF 13 at 13. According to Evans, the felony trash dumping charge was subsequently dismissed.

Next, on December 8, 2017, Evans was arrested by Defendant Gentry of the Montague Sheriff's Department for jay walking. He claims that the arrest was intentional, malicious, and made without probable cause. He provided the Court with a copy of a document indicating that a bond hearing was held on this charge on December 9, 2017. See ECF 13 at 9. According to Evans, the jaywalking charge was subsequently dismissed.

Evans claims that he was next arrested on January 13, 2019, by Defendant Berry for "failure to comply with sex offender registration." See ECF 3 at 8. He claims that the arrest was intentional, malicious, and made without probable cause. Evans asserts that he was registered to a 703 Young Street location and that this information was present on a "blue card" that he carried. ECF 13 at 25. He was staying at the 703 Young Street location because he was "taking down an old house." Id. at 26. Defendant Berry came by every day that he worked, taking pictures of the property,and pulling over anyone that left the house. Id. Defendant Berry told Evans that he had to sell the house or that Defendant Berry would keep issuing him tickets. Id. Indeed, Defendant Berry had been issuing citations to Evans for residing at the 703 Young Street address for more than a year. Id. Evans maintains that Officer Berry could have "easily check[ed] the sex-offender registration data base" to verify his place of registration. Id. at 25. According to Evans, this charge was subsequently dismissed.

Finally, Evans claims that Defendant Casey Polhemus, the district attorney for Montague County, "intentionally and maliciously initiat[ed] false criminal proceedings against [Evans] for the felony offense of aggravated perjury that resulted in his arrest and imprisonment . . . ." ECF 3 at 9.

Preliminary Matters

Title 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) governs venue of a federal cause of action. That statute states in pertinent part:

A civil action may be brought in -

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;

(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or

(3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicialdistrict in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

In this case, all the named defendants are located in Montague County, Texas, and the events giving rise to Evans's claims occurred in Montague County. Montague County is in the Wichita Falls division of the Northern District of Texas. Thus, Evans should have filed his lawsuit in the Wichita Falls division.

Although venue would be more appropriate in the Wichita Falls division and the Court could transfer this case to that division, see 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (a court has the authority to transfer a case in the interest of justice to any district or division in which the action could have been brought), the Court—in the interest of justice—should decline to transfer this case. The Court has already invested significant judicial resources in screening Evans's complaint and, as explained below, Evans's claims should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B).

Legal Standards

Evans's complaint is subject to preliminary screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. That section provides in pertinent part:

The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may begranted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b).

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), a district court may also summarily dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it concludes the action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

To state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must "plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face[,]" Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007), and must plead those facts with enough specificity "to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Id. at 555. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Analysis

A. Evans's 2017 False Arrest and False Imprisonment Claims are Barred by the Statute of Limitations

Evans's 2017 false arrest and false imprisonment claims are barred by the statute of limitations. A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is governed by a two-year statute of limitations. See Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 250 (1989) (stating federal court should look to general personalinjury limitations period of forum state); Ali v. Higgs, 892 F.2d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding limitations period in Texas is two years). "Although state law sets out the limitations period, federal law determines when the cause of action accrues." Powell v. Wagner, 2018 WL 9439864, at *2 (S.D. Tex. July 31, 2018) (citing Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989)). Under federal law, a "cause of action accrues, so that the statutory period begins to run, when the plaintiff knows or has reasons to know of the injury which is the basis of the action." Gonzalez v. Wyatt, 157 F.3d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir. 1998). "The existence of an injury for false arrest or false imprisonment does not depend on the outcome of any subsequent criminal proceedings." Powell, 2018 WL 9439864, at *2 (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007)). The statute of limitations for false arrest and imprisonment claims begins to run when the alleged victim is first held pursuant to legal process, not the date of the arrest or imprisonment. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 389.

The Fifth Circuit has indicated that a bond hearing is sufficient legal process to start the statute of limitations for false arrest and false imprisonment claims. See Reed v. Edwards, 487 F. App'x 904, 906 (5th Cir. 2012) ("We conclude that a bond hearing satisfies the definition of legal process within the meaning of Wallace . . . .") (per curiam); see also Terry v. Hubert, 609 F.3d at 757, 763 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a warden who was sued under § 1983 "could reasonably have concluded that[the plaintiff's] detention was pursuant to process," because the plaintiff was "afforded a bond hearing on his charges"). And other courts—both within and outside of this Circuit—have reached the same conclusion. See Vodicka v. Ermatinger, 2021 WL 1086979, at *5 (N.D. Tex. 2021) (finding tha...