Evans v. Rockdale Hospital
Decision Date | 30 March 2020 |
Docket Number | A18A0233 |
Citation | 355 Ga.App. 33,841 S.E.2d 449 |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parties | EVANS et al. v. ROCKDALE HOSPITAL, LLC. |
Lloyd Noland Bell, Atlanta, Sidney Leighton Moore III, James O. Wilson Jr., Marietta, for Appellants.
Sharonda Helen Boyce, Daniel James Huff, Atlanta, Randolph Page Powell Jr., for Appellee.
Shawn G. Evans, individually and as the guardian of his wife, Janice K. Evans, appealed from the trial court's order denying their motion for additur or, alternatively, for a new trial on damages against Rockdale Hospital, LLC d/b/a Rockdale Medical Center ("Rockdale"). This Court reversed, concluding that the trial court erred in failing to grant a new trial under OCGA § 51-12-12 because the jury's award of zero damages for Mrs. Evans's past pain and suffering was so clearly inadequate under a preponderance of the evidence as to shock the conscience. Evans v. Rockdale Hosp. , 345 Ga. App. 511, 511-512, 813 S.E.2d 601 (2018) (physical precedent only) (" Evans I "). The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari and determined that this Court applied the wrong standard in reviewing the trial court's decision regarding the adequacy of the verdict under OCGA § 51-12-12, vacated the judgment of this Court, and remanded the case with direction that we apply the proper standard of review. Rockdale Hosp. v. Evans , 306 Ga. 847, 834 S.E.2d 77 (2019) (" Evans II "). The Supreme Court also explained that whether the verdict was void as inconsistent was a different question from whether the verdict was inadequate under OCGA § 51-12-12, but the Court did not reach the inconsistency issue because it had not been fully briefed by the parties and certiorari had not been granted on that question. See id. at 853 (3), n. 5, 834 S.E.2d 77.
Now that the case is back before us on remand, we vacate our original opinion, and applying the abuse-of-discretion standard of review set forth in Evans II , we affirm the trial court's order to the extent that it denied the plaintiffs’ challenge to the adequacy of the damages award under OCGA § 51-12-12. As to the separate question of whether the verdict should be set aside as void because it was inconsistent, we vacate the trial court's order to the extent that it denied the plaintiffs’ challenge to the consistency of the damages award and remand the case to the trial court to determine that question in the first instance under the proper framework discussed in Evans II .
1. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred in rejecting their claim under OCGA § 51-12-12 that the damages award was so clearly inadequate as to be inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence. We disagree.
The record reflects that the plaintiffs sued Rockdale for medical malpractice and loss of consortium based on the alleged failure to properly assess and treat Mrs. Evans's brain aneurysm.1 As explained in Evans II :2
(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Evans II , 306 Ga. at 849-850 (1), 834 S.E.2d 77.
The plaintiffs appealed, and we reversed the trial court's decision and ordered a retrial of the entire case. Evans I , 345 Ga. App. at 511-512, 813 S.E.2d 601. We concluded that "the jury's award of zero damages for Mrs. Evans's past pain and suffering was so clearly inadequate under a preponderance of the evidence as to shock the conscience and necessitate a new trial under OCGA § 51-12-12 (b)."3
Evans I , 345 Ga. App. at 521 (1), 813 S.E.2d 601. We further concluded that "[b]ecause Mrs. Evans's medical malpractice claim against Rockdale must be retried on all issues of liability and damages, Mr. Evans's derivative claim for loss of consortium also must be retried." Id. at 521 (2), 813 S.E.2d 601.
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari and determined that we applied the wrong standard in reviewing the trial court's decision under OCGA § 51-12-12 because this Court was not authorized to determine whether the damages that were awarded were so inadequate as to be inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence. Evans II , 306 Ga. at 851-853 (2) (b), 834 S.E.2d 77. As explained by the Supreme Court, OCGA § 51-12-12 sets out a standard for a trial court to apply when reviewing jury damages awards and thus authorizes only that court to determine whether the damages awarded were clearly so inadequate or excessive as to be inconsistent with a preponderance of the evidence. Evans II , 306 Ga. at 850-851 (2) (a), 834 S.E.2d 77. In contrast, appellate courts are limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in deciding a claim under OCGA § 51-12-12. Evans II , 306 Ga. at 851-853 (2) (b), 834 S.E.2d 77. The Supreme Court pointed to three instances where an appellate court can determine that the trial court abused its discretion in reviewing a verdict under OCGA § 51-12-12 : (1) where the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in reviewing the award; (2) where the trial court's exercise of its discretion "was infected by a significant legal error or a clear error as to a material factual finding"; or (3) where the verdict was "so excessive or inadequate as to be irrational and thus the apparent result of jury bias, prejudice, or corruption." Evans II , 306 Ga. at 851-852 (2) (b), 834 S.E.2d 77. The Supreme Court disapproved several cases that it viewed as inconsistent with its articulation of the proper standard of review, id. at 853 (2) (b) & n. 4, 834 S.E.2d 77, and it vacated the judgment of this Court and remanded for this Court to apply the proper standard as outlined in its opinion. Id. at 847, 834 S.E.2d 77.
Guided by the standard of review articulated in Evans II , we conclude that the trial court acted within its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion under OCGA § 51-12-12. First, it is clear from the trial court's order that the court exercised its discretion in reviewing the verdict, and the plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Second, the trial court's exercise of its discretion was not "infected by a significant legal error or a clear error as to a material factual finding." Evans II , 306 Ga. at 851 (2) (b), 834 S.E.2d 77. The plaintiffs do not point to any errors of material fact made by the trial court, and thus the sole issue is whether the court's discretion was "exercised in conformity with the governing legal principles." Ford Motor Co. v. Conley , 294 Ga. 530, 538 (2), 757 S.E.2d 20 (2014), cited in Evans II , 306 Ga. at 852 (2) (b), 834 S.E.2d 77. In its order, the trial court noted that it was being asked to determine whether the damages award was "clearly so inadequate as to be inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence" and that this was a determination within its discretion. The trial court further pointed to the general principle of Georgia law that an award for pain and suffering is a matter...
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