Evans v. Rogerson

Decision Date15 December 1999
Docket NumberNo. 4-98-CV-90369.,4-98-CV-90369.
PartiesJack Spencer EVANS, Petitioner, v. Russell ROGERSON, Warden, Iowa Medical Classification Center, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

Jack Spencer Evans, Oakdale, IA, Alfredo G Parrish, Parrish Krruidenier Moss Dunn & Montgomery LLP, Des Moines, IA, for Jack Spencer Evans.

Robert P Ewald, Attorney General of Iowa, Des Moines, IA, for Russell Rogerson.

MEMORANDUM OPINION, RULINGS, AND ORDER GRANTING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, AS AMENDED BY ORDER DATED DECEMBER 15, 1999

PRATT, District Judge.

Petitioner, Jack Spencer Evans ("Evans"), brings this habeas corpus petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his custody after conviction for first degree murder. Evans's petition is based on five claims: 1) Fifth Amendment constitutional violations in obtaining incriminating statements; 2) ineffective assistance of trial counsel; 3) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; 4) newly discovered evidence; and 5) insufficiency of the evidence. Because this Court finds that Evans's petition for writ of habeas corpus should be granted based on Fifth Amendment constitutional violations, his other claims are not addressed. The Fifth Amendment claims are properly before this Court as Evans has exhausted his state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A).

I. Procedural History

On January 15, 1991, Evans was convicted of first degree murder in the Iowa District Court for Van Buren County and sentenced to life in prison. Evans appealed his conviction alleging violations of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. The Iowa Court of Appeals reversed Evans's conviction on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. The Iowa Supreme Court reinstated the District Court's conviction, finding that Evans's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not attached. Evans subsequently filed an application for post-conviction relief. The District Court denied his application, the Iowa Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court, and the Iowa Supreme Court denied further review. On July 1, 1998, Evans filed this petition.

II. Facts1

On September 11, 1990, eighty-one year old Della Forbes ("Forbes") was found dead in her rural home near Keosauqua, Iowa. She had been shot five times with .38 special bullets. Twenty-one year old Evans lived with his parents and brother, approximately one mile from Forbes's home. Evans is physically handicapped, graduated from high school in special education, and was not regularly employed. By canvassing local gun shops, law enforcement officials learned that Evans recently had purchased a .357 magnum, a gun which is capable of shooting .38 special bullets. On September 18, 1990, Agent Larry Hedlund ("Hedlund") of the Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation ("DCI") and Deputy Ron Parker of the Van Buren County Sheriff's Department ("the Sheriff's Department") visited the Evanses' residence. The officers interviewed Evans and his family and obtained his .357 magnum, which ballistics tests indicated was the murder weapon. During this visit, Hedlund determined that Evans most likely would be alone in the house the next day.

Around 11:30 A.M. the next day, September 19, 1990, Hedlund and another DCI Agent, Ronald Mower ("Mower"), returned to the Evanses' residence to interview Evans and execute a search warrant for the house and Evans's car. Evans was home alone, and he gave the agents permission to enter. Before beginning the interview, Hedlund read Evans his Miranda rights, and asked him if he understood those rights. Evans responded, "I think so." Mower then re-explained to Evans his Miranda rights and asked if he would sign a waiver form. Evans asked if signing the form would "get him into trouble" and Mower told him it would not. Evans signed the waiver form. Evans asked if he was under arrest and Hedlund said no.

The agents initially questioned Evans in the living room. Evans sat in a chair facing the television, which was on. After approximately thirty minutes of questioning Evans about his whereabouts, his gun, and what he thought should happen to the murderer, the agents told Evans his .357 magnum was the murder weapon and indicated he was a suspect in the case. At one point during this period of questioning, Hedlund moved his chair directly in front of the television and about one foot away from Evans because Evans was watching television and not responding to questions.

Near the end of the questioning Evans told the agents, "I know you don't believe me." and said he was scared. Shortly, thereafter, at 12:22 P.M., Evans told the agents he did not want to answer more questions. The agents ceased questioning. Mower told Evans they had a search warrant, and Mower began to explain the warrant to him. While Mower was explaining the warrant. Hedlund called the Sheriff's Department and was told that the warrant was defective and not to serve it. Mower left the Evanses' residence to obtain a new warrant. Hedlund remained at the residence, without a vehicle, to prevent destruction of evidence. Hedlund also kept a close eye on Evans out of concern for his own safety because he knew there were loaded firearms in the house. Hedlund did not explain to Evans why he stayed at the house or why he chaperoned Evans.

Evans and Hedlund watched television without speaking for at least thirty minutes. At around 1:00 P.M., Evans asked Hedlund if he could ask him some questions. Hedlund reminded Evans about his prior invocation of the right to remain silent and told him, "You've been advised of your rights." Evans then began to ask general questions about Hedlund's job and personal life, but avoided any conversation about the murder. At some point in the conversation, Evans asked if he could make a phone call. Hedlund replied affirmatively, Evans moved toward the phone, but then stopped and never did make a call. At another time, Evans made himself lunch and offered to make lunch for Hedlund. When Evans went outside to check the mailbox, Hedlund followed him. Twice, Evans went to the bathroom, and both times Hedlund told him to leave the door open. Later, Hedlund redirected the conversation with Evans to the murder investigation and asked Evans if he thought his parents would believe him. Hedlund asked Evans if he was sorry for what he did to Forbes. Evans said he was sorry. Evans became visibly upset and went outside. Hedlund followed. Evans told Hedlund he was scared of prison and asked what it would be like. Hedlund asked Evans if he was drunk or sober when he committed the murder. Evans stated "kind of both." Evans then told Hedlund he wanted to talk with an attorney, and Hedlund returned to the house.

Sometime during this conversation, at approximately 2:30 P.M., Mower and other law enforcement officials arrived at the residence and served Evans with the search warrant. Around 3:00 P.M., Van Buren County Sheriff Hugh Hardin arrested Evans pursuant to an arrest warrant.

III. Habeas Corpus Standard

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this petition. Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) applies to this case because the question before the Court is whether errors were committed by the Iowa courts in the determination of the facts as examined for violations of the Fifth Amendment. Title 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) states that an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment shall not be granted unless the adjudication of the claim "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." This provision applies only to questions of fact, not to questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact. See Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 887 (3d Cir.1999) (en banc).

IV. Discussion
A. Unreasonable Determination of the Facts

"As several courts have recognized, the text of AEDPA offers little guidance to the courts charged with applying it." Matteo, 171 F.3d at 887 (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997)). Its standard of review provision is "far from self-explicating." Id. (quoting O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 20 (1st Cir.1998)). "Nevertheless, we must begin our analysis with the words of the statute."2 Id. (citing Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995)).

Section 2254(d)(2) prohibits the grant of a writ of habeas corpus unless the adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Under § 2254(e)(1), however, "a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." The clear and convincing evidence standard is an intermediate standard that is more exacting than the preponderance of the evidence standard, but less demanding than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. See Cornell v. Nix, 119 F.3d 1329, 1335 (8th Cir.1997).

If the petitioner presents "clear and convincing evidence" of error in the record, it is unclear whether the petitioner has thereby proved an "unreasonable determination of the facts" as required under (d)(2). This Court must determine whether (e)(1)'s clear and convincing standard is the standard by which to judge "unreasonable determination of the facts" in (d)(2).

In making this determination, this Court considers the following sources: (1) case law interpreting § 2254(d)(2); (2) case law interpreting § 2254(d)(1); (3) pre-AEDPA law; and (4) principles of statutory interpretation. First, this Court looks to the case law interpreting § 2254(d)(2). There is almost no case law interpreting "unreasonable determination of...

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    ...F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding five factors, including "[a] different officer resumed the questioning"); Evans v. Rogerson, 77 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1031 (S.D. Iowa 1999) (identifying nine factors cited by the Mosley Court); People v. Fleming, 103 Ill. App. 3d 194, 58 Ill. Dec. 956, 431......
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    ...43, 46 n. 2 (5th Cir.2005) (citing Anderson v. Calderon, 232 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir.2000) (five-factor test); Evans v. Rogerson, 77 F.Supp.2d 1014, 1031 (S.D.Iowa 1999) (nine factors); People v. Fleming, 103 Ill.App.3d 194, 58 Ill.Dec. 956, 431 N.E.2d 16, 18 (1981) (three factors)); see a......
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    ...the murder.2 The details of Evans's in-home interview are essentially undisputed and fully vetted in the record. See Evans v. Rogerson, 77 F. Supp. 2d 1014 (S.D. Iowa 1999); Iowa v. Evans, 495 N.W.2d 760 (Iowa 1993) (en banc); Iowa v. Evans, No. 2-016/91- 288 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 24, 1992); ......

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