Evans v. State

• Citation: 68 N.E.2d 546,224 Ind. 428
• Decision Date: 23 September 1946
• Docket Number: 28153.
• Parties: EVANS v. STATE.
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

68 N.E.2d 546

224 Ind. 428

EVANS v. STATE.

No. 28153.

Supreme Court of Indiana

September 23, 1946

Appeal from Vigo Circuit Court; Walter F. Wood Special judge.

Randolph H. Mayes and Wm. B. Edmonds, both of Terre Haute, for appellant.

James A. Emmert, Atty. Gen., and Frank E. Couglin, First Asst Atty. Gen., for appellee.

RICHMAN Judge.

This opinion supercedes written opinion dated May 28, 1946, which is hereby withdrawn because of error in the writer's statement of the record due, as suggested in appellant's petition for rehearing, to the confusion of two exhibits. We have considered not only the questions raised by the original briefs but also those urged in the brief on petition for rehearing.

Appellant was prosecuted on three counts, grand larceny, second degree burglary and entering with felonious intent. Tried without a jury, he was found guilty of grand larceny and acquitted of the other offenses. The only question properly presented is whether the finding is sustained by sufficient evidence.

The affidavit alleged the larceny of an electric grinder and a paint spray gun of the value of $100. The evidence shows that these articles, with an electric drill, were taken from the owner's shop in Terre Haute. Entry was effected through a window which was closed when an employee left at 10 p. m. November 24, 1944, and was found open at 7 a. m. the following day. There were marks on the window ledge and on the glass and footprints outside the window. Appellant sold the spray gun and tried to sell the grinder in Decatur, Illinois, where he was arrested and signed a statement in the presence of police officers. On the 25th of November a parcel was shipped by railway express from Terre Haute to Decatur, Illinois. The purported consignor and consignee were 'National Air Sander' and 'Garland Evans' respectively. The shipment was received in Decatur on November 28 and on the 1st day of December it was delivered to appellant whose signature to the receipt was declared by handwriting experts to be identical with the signature to the statement made and signed by him in the presence of police officers January 21, 1944, in Decatur. While he was at the police station in Decatur one Dale was called by the police and brought in the spray gun. In the presence of appellant Dale said that he had purchased the gun from appellant for $10 which appellant verified. The grinder was also there and was identified by appellant as the one he attempted to sell in Decatur. In appellant's statement he admitted making the shipment and accounted for his possession of the two tools and other chattels, including the electric drill shipped at the same time, by a story of a night spent in Terre Haute. With a 'fellow' he met on a bus, and from whom he proposed to buy tools to start a business, he drove in a car (where it was obtained, he does not say) into an alley about 1 or 2 o'clock in the morning. There he waited about three quarters of an hour until his accomplice returned with the above-mentioned chattels. They then drove around town a little while and made another stop of about two hours, similarly obtaining an adding machine and typewriter. They arrived at his companion's room about 3 a. m. where he spent the rest of the night. In the statement he also says he gave his associate $60 cash and an Elgin pocket watch for all the property.

Appellant contends that the corpus delicti was not proved independently of the written statement made by him after his arrest. As explained in Hawkins v. State, 1941, 219 Ind. 116, 37 N.E.2d 79, 84, 'Generally speaking, the term 'corpus delicti' means, when applied to any particular offense, that the specific crime charged has actually been committed by someone.' The evidence already recounted was sufficient basis for an inference that the crime of which he was convicted had been committed by someone. The appellant's connection therewith is shown not only by his statement but by his unexplained exclusive possession of the stolen property soon after it was stolen. From this alone the court might reasonably have concluded that he was responsible for the theft. Mason v. State, 1908, 171 Ind. 78, 84 N.E. 776, 16 Ann.Cas. 1212; Davidson v. State, 1933, 205 Ind. 564, 187 N.E. 376. It is true that in his statement he attempted to explain his possession as having come by purchase but his story was so fanciful that the court's refusal to credit it is readily...