Evans v. State

• Decision Date: 03 March 1909
• Parties: EVANS v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

117 S.W. 167

EVANS v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 3, 1909.

Appeal from Randall County Court; A. N. Henson, Judge.

Red Evans was convicted of violating the local option law, and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Reeder, Graham & Williams, for appellant. F. J. McCord, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

BROOKS, J.

Appellant was convicted of violating the local option law, and his punishment assessed at a fine of $25 and 20 days in jail.

Appellant insists that article 3391, Sayles' Ann. Civ. St. 1897, is void for uncertainty, in that it fails to provide by what authority an order of the commissioners' court declaring the result of a local option election shall be published. Appellant insists that the act of the 30th Legislature, passed May 14, 1907 (Acts 1907, p. 447, c. 8), regulating contests of local option elections, and providing for conclusiveness thereof in court trials, has no application to persons other than those that, under the provisions of said law, could have contested, and if said law can be construed to have said effect it is violative of defendant's rights as a citizen of the United States, in that it deprives him of life, liberty, and property without due process of law. This statute is not only constitutional, but is a salutary provision of the election law. It does not deprive appellant of life, liberty, or property. The contest of an election is an action in rem, and not in personam, and after the expiration of 60 days or 30 days, as the case may be, all parties are inhibited under the statute from contesting the regularity of an election. In passing this statute there was no effort made or intention on the part of the Legislature to pass a local option law for any given county that had not already adopted a local option law. The statute simply serves as a statute of limitation and repose against any one contesting irregularities thereof after the expiration of 60 days.

We have frequently upheld the validity of this statute. We have carefully reviewed appellant's brief, and note with pleasure his able argument therein; but after the most deliberate reflection and conclusion we hold, without a further discussion thereof, that the article is constitutional, and it follows, therefore, that the court did not err in refusing to permit appellant, after the expiration of 60 days, to introduce evidence going to show irregularities or defects in the initiatory steps necessary to place local option into effect. It...