Evans v. State
| Decision Date | 19 June 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 95-0128,95-0128 |
| Citation | 675 So.2d 1012 |
| Parties | 21 Fla. L. Weekly D1420 Terrence EVANS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Karen E. Ehrlich, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Don M. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.
Appellant Terrence Evans appeals from a sentencing order for violation of probation where the trial court sentenced the appellant to five years in custody on the charge of possession of cocaine and fifteen years in custody on the charge of aggravated battery to run consecutive with the possession of cocaine charge. Appellant maintains that the trial court's modification of its oral pronouncement to reflect habitual offender status after double jeopardy attached was in error. Based on the following sequence of events, we affirm in part and reverse and remand for resentencing, deleting the habitual offender status of appellant.
On April 26, 1993, appellant entered into a written plea agreement on the charges of aggravated battery, a second-degree felony, and possession of cocaine, a third-degree felony. In addition, the agreement stated that the "Defendant agrees he qualifies as a habitual offender and if found guilty of a V.O.P. he will be sentenced as a Habitual Offender." Appellant was adjudicated guilty of both charges and was sentenced in each case to three years probation, to run concurrently, with the special condition that he successfully complete the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office Drug Farm Program. Further, pursuant to the plea agreement, Evans was sentenced as an habitual offender pursuant to Section 775.084, Florida Statutes.
In October 1993 appellant was sentenced to thirty years on the aggravated battery charge and to ten years on the possession of cocaine charge consecutive to each other for a total of forty years as an habitual offender for violating his probation by not completing the drug farm program. The sentences were then suspended and appellant was placed on probation for five years with the special condition that he complete the Drug Farm Long-Term Track. However, the judgment of habitual felony offender status was never set aside. Subsequent thereto, by agreement of the parties, the court entered an order vacating the suspended sentences, thereby placing Evans in the position to be resentenced before the court on his initial violation of probation.
Appellant was again charged with violating his probation for failing to complete the drug farm program. The violation hearing was held on December 20, 1994, at which time the appellant was sentenced to five years in custody on the possession charge and to fifteen years on the aggravated battery to run consecutive with the possession charge. At the sentencing hearing, the parties agreed that the appellant's guidelines scoresheet fell within the permitted sentencing range of twelve to twenty-seven years.
During the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence, the court did not state that appellant's sentence for the violation of probation was as an habitual offender. However, the written sentence entered explicitly states that appellant was sentenced as an habitual offender. The court in pronouncing sentence stated:
THE COURT: With regard to your case, and giving you credit for the time that you have already served with regard to these matters, I am going to sentence you to five years on the possession of cocaine charge, I am going to sentence you to 15 years on the aggravated battery charge consecutive to the possession of cocaine charge, for a total of 20 years, giving you credit for the time you have already served with regard to these matters.
After the hearing, the prosecutor had a discussion with the court clerk and was informed that the written commitments prepared for the Department of Corrections did not reflect an habitual offender sentence because she did not hear the judge pronounce one.
Two days later, the State filed a motion to clarify sentence stating that "[t]he Sentencing Orders reflect that this Court sentenced the defendant as a Habitual Felony Offender, however the Commitments prepared by the Clerk of the Court does not reflect this declaration." Hence, the State requested the court clarify its sentence and to correct or to have corrected the documentation to reflect the order of the court. Essentially, the state was seeking a corrected Commitment to reflect that Evans was sentenced as an habitual offender. The appellant objected on double jeopardy grounds, recalling that the court's sentence...
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State v. Akins
...of the HFO status is inconsistent with the decisions in White v. State, 892 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), and Evans v. State, 675 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); (4) Akins is distinguishable from O'Neal v. State, 862 So.2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); (5) the trial court's amendments to Akins' s......
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State v. Akins
...of the HFO status isinconsistent with the decisions in White v. State, 892 So. 2d 541 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005), and Evans v. State, 675 So. 2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); (4) Akins is distinguishable from O'Neal v. State, 862 So. 2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); (5) the trial court's amendments to Akins'......
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Ashley v. State
...review Ashley v. State, 772 So.2d 42 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000), which expressly and directly conflicts with the decision in Evans v. State, 675 So.2d 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we approve the decision in Evan......
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