Evans v. State

• Decision Date: 20 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. PD-1911-05.,PD-1911-05.
• Citation: 202 S.W.3d 158
• Parties: OLIVER EVANS, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

202 S.W.3d 158

OLIVER EVANS, JR., Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS.

No. PD-1911-05.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Delivered: September 20, 2006.

COCHRAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which KELLER, P.J., and PRICE, WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, and HOLCOMB, JJ., joined. WOMACK, J., filed a concurring opinion in which PRICE and JOHNSON, JJ., joined. MEYERS, J., dissents. HERVEY, J., not participating.

OPINION

COCHRAN, J.

A jury convicted appellant of possession of cocaine. The court of appeals, finding that the evidence was legally insufficient, reversed that conviction and entered an acquittal.¹ We conclude that the court of appeals failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict.² We therefore reverse the court of appeals's judgment.

I.

San Antonio Police Officer Reyes testified that he and his partner, Officer Larios, were "targeting" a known drug-trafficking area on the evening of November 18, 2002, when they saw a woman walk toward a car, make contact with someone inside of it, and then walk away. She reappeared about fifteen minutes later as the passenger in a van that had its headlights turned off. The woman got out of the van and started toward the first car. When the officers got out of their car and started toward the van, the woman threw something down on the ground and started to run. Officer Larios caught her and retrieved the abandoned itemBa package of rock cocaine. Meanwhile, Officer Reyes approached the van and found crack cocaine in plain view on the driver's side floorboard and on the rear floorboard next to the back seat passengerBCynthia Priestley. The officers arrested the first woman, Terry Lee, the van driver, Robert Ochoa, and the back seat passenger, Cynthia Priestley.

Terry Lee told the officers that they could find more drugs at 923 Lombrano, which was Ms. Priestley's home. Ms. Priestley signed a consent-to-search form, and several officers accompanied her to 923 Lombrano. As Officer Reyes walked up the path to the house, he could see appellant through the transparent storm door. Appellant was sitting on a couch or chair watching TV and talking on the phone. The officers walked in the unlocked door. Appellant hung up the phone. When the officers asked appellant if he knew why they were there, he said, "Drugs." Immediately in front of appellantBwithin one foot of his armB was a coffee table with numerous baggies of cocaine and pill bottles, also containing cocaine.³ There were two types of baggies; some had white powder in them, others had yellow rocks or yellowish rock powder. All were in plain view. In total, the cocaine weighed approximately fourteen grams and had an estimated street value of $1,300.⁴

The officers arrested appellant and then looked through the rest of the house. They found no other drugs and no one else in the house. In the front bedroom, they found a large quantity of men's clothing in disarray. In the back bedroom they found women's clothing. They found "a lot of letters" with appellant's name on them in a mail slot. One, a handwritten letter addressed to "Mr. Oliver Evans" at 923 Lombrano, from a "Mr. CED. D. Haynes #887472, Lynaugh Unit, 1098 S. Hwy 2037, Fort Stockton, Tx. 79755" was postmarked October 28, 2002, or slightly less than a month before the search. That envelope was admitted as an exhibit. Appellant had $160 in twenty dollar bills in his pocket.

After their search, the officers brought Ms. Priestley inside. She repeatedly told the officers that all of the drugs were hers and that appellant, who is her nephew, had no knowledge of them.

Appellant's former wife, Joslyn Jorden, testified on his behalf. She said that she was in the Army, stationed at Fort Hood. She said that, since early October of 2002, appellant had been living with their two young sons at her parents' home about fifteen miles from the Lombrano house. On weekends she would come down to see her family and help appellant fill out job applications. She said that Ms. Priestley lived with appellant's grandmother at 923 Lombrano. Appellant was "checking" on the house while his grandmother was in Oklahoma for a few days because Ms. Priestley was involved with drugs and had been selling items, including an airBconditioning unit, a stereo, and a TV, from her grandmother's home. "It was a huge issue" with Ms. Priestley's family. Ms. Jorden testified that, on the evening appellant was arrested, he had called her while he was checking on the Lombrano house. During that conversation, she "heard a lot of scuffling and then the phone hung up." When she called back, a police officer answered and said that appellant was going to jail.

Appellant was charged with (1) possession of a controlled substanceBcocaineBwith the intent to deliver it, and (2) simple possession of a controlled substance. The jury found him not guilty of the former, but guilty of the latter, and the trial judge sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment.

On appeal, appellant argued that the evidence was both legally and factually insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he had exercised "actual care, custody, control, or management of the cocaine." The court of appeals agreed, concluding that the record evidence failed to "affirmatively link" appellant to the cocaine other than by evidence of his presence and proximity to the drugs.⁵

II.

The court of appeals set out the correct standard for reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence:

When deciding whether evidence is [legally] sufficient to support a conviction, a reviewing court must assess all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.⁶

The court of appeals then noted that, in a possession of a controlled substance prosecution, "the State must prove that: (1) the accused exercised control, management, or care over the substance; and (2) the accused knew the matter possessed was contraband."⁷ Regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must establish that the defendant's connection with the drug was more than fortuitous.⁸ This is the so-called "affirmative links" rule⁹ which protects the innocent bystanderBa relative, friend, or even stranger to the actual possessorBfrom conviction merely because of his fortuitous proximity to someone else's drugs.¹⁰ Mere presence at the location where drugs are found is thus insufficient, by itself, to establish actual care, custody, or control of those drugs.¹¹ However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, either direct or circumstantial (e.g.," links"), may well be sufficient to establish that element beyond a reasonable doubt.¹² It is, as the court of appeals correctly noted, not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all of the evidence, direct and circumstantial.¹³

The court of appeals also stated that this Court has held that "a factfinder may disbelieve some or all of a witness's testimony, even when that testimony is uncontradicted."¹⁴ It then compared this rule to one recently set out by the Texas Supreme Court: reviewing courts cannot disregard undisputed facts that allow of only one logical inference.¹⁵ We need not, of course, follow our sister court by applying its rules for assessing the legal sufficiency of evidence in civil cases to criminal cases where the burden of proof is always on the State and always "beyond a reasonable doubt," but we note that these two rules are not inconsistent. There is, however, an important distinction between "uncontradicted testimony" and "undisputed facts." For example, a defendant's mother may testify that the defendant was with her in Oshkosh on the night of the murder. Even though the State does not cross-examine the defendant's mother, the jury is not required to believe her uncontradicted testimony. She is, after all, the defendant's mother. On the other hand, facts that both parties agree (or assume) are trueBin this case, for example, that appellant was seated within arm's length of a coffee table strewn with baggies of cocaine when the police entered the houseBare "undisputed facts,"¹⁶ Although the parties may disagree about the logical inferences that flow from undisputed facts, "[w]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact finder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."¹⁷

With this general background, we turn to the facts in this case.

III.

The State argues that the single most important link or connection between appellant and the fourteen grams of cocaine rocks is the simple fact that he was sitting directly in front of them. They were within arm's reach; the coffee table was less than a foot away. This evidence constitutes two extremely strong "presence" and "proximity" links. Appellant was not merely present in a house with drugs cached away somewhere, they were right under his nose. The drugs were in plain viewBa third link. He was alone in the houseBa fourth link. He immediately admitted that he knew why the police had walked in the doorB"Drugs." That is a fifth link. He received mail at 923 Lombrano, thus raising a reasonable inference that he lived there, which, in turn, raises a reasonable inference that he had actual care, custody, and control of items found in plain view on the coffee table. This is a sixth link. He had $160 in twenties in his pocket, but he was apparently unemployed. This is a seventh, albeit weak, link. The State argues that the sum total of this circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a rational jury's finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant exercised actual care, custody, control, or management of the fourteen grams of cocaine on the coffee table. We agree.

The court of appeals, however, analyzed each one of these facts or links in isolation. Apparently relying on alternative inferences from or explanations for...