Evanson v. Wigen
Decision Date | 30 August 1974 |
Docket Number | No. 9012,9012 |
Citation | 221 N.W.2d 648 |
Parties | Richard E. EVANSON, Petitioner/Appellee, v. J. O. WIGEN, Commissioner of Insurance, Respondent/Appellant. |
Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The Commissioner of Insurance, before revoking a license under § 26--17--01.12, N.D.C.C., after a hearing has been requested and conducted, must make findings of fact and separate conclusions of law, and a decision based upon such findings and conclusions.
2. Failure of a party, who has made an appearance by requesting a hearing, to appear personally at that hearing does not obviate the necessity of establishing a prima facie case through evidence adduced at the hearing for the revocation of an insurance agent's license.
3. The judicial review provisions of Chapter 28--32, N.D.C.C., are not exclusive and § 26--17--01.13, N.D.C.C., provides an additional remedy that is separate from and independent of Chapter 28--32.
4. Whenever a general provision in a statute shall be in conflict with a special provision in the same or in another statute, the two shall be construed, if possible, so that effect may be given to both provisions, but if the conflict between the two provisions is irreconcilable the special provision shall prevail and shall be construed as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision shall be enacted later and it shall be the manifest legislative intent that such general provision shall prevail. Section 1--02--07, N.D.C.C.
5. For reasons stated in the opinion, the judgment reversing the order of the Insurance Commissioner and remanding the matter to the Insurance Commissioner is affirmed.
Thomas O. Smith, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Ins., Bismarck, for respondent/appellant.
McGee, Hankla, Backes & Wheeler, Minot, for petitioner/appellee.
This is an appeal by the Commissioner of Insurance (hereinafter Commissioner) from an order of the district court declaring void the Commissioner's order revoking the licenses of Richard E. Evanson (hereinafter Evanson) as a resident insurance agent, and remanding the matter to the Commissioner for a hearing on the merits.
A complaint was filed with the Commissioner by Grayce E. Twito in regard to Evanson's conduct as an insurance agent. Pursuant to the complaint, the Commissioner gave a notice of opportunity for hearing, stating the Commissioner's proposed order:
'IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the licenses of the said Richard E. Evanson to act as a resident insurance agent in the State of North Dakota be and hereby are revoked.'
Upon receipt of the notice of opportunity for hearing, Evanson filed with the Commissioner a request for a hearing and asserted therein that the allegations in the complaint were false. Thereupon the Commissioner issued a notice of hearing notifying Evanson that a hearing would be held in the Commissioner's office on September 18, 1973 at 3:00 P.M. CDST. Evanson was neither present nor represented by counsel at the hearing. The Commissioner proceeded in the absence of Evanson with the hearing and received the following documents:
1. Commissioner's Exhibit #1, complaint signed by Grayce E. Twito;
2. Commissioner's Exhibit #2, the notice of opportunity for hearing;
3. Commissioner's Exhibit #3, Evanson's request for a hearing; and
4. Commissioner's Exhibit #4, the notice of hearing.
Upon the motion by the counsel for the Commissioner and the exhibits received, the Commissioner entered an order revoking Evanson's licenses. The Commissioner's findings of fact, conclusions of law, decision, and order were served upon Evanson by certified mail.
Evanson asserts that shortly thereafter he met with the Commissioner and discussed the matter of obtaining a rehearing. The date of the meeting is not clear and the substance of the discussion is in dispute. However, it is agreed that the Commissioner at this time advised Evanson to retain counsel. Whatever may have been the matter discussed, no rehearing was granted by the Commissioner.
Evanson then filed with the district court a petition for a judicial review of the proceedings of the Commissioner with an affidavit in support thereof for an order to show cause why the licenses should not be reinstated. The Commissioner filed a motion to vacate the order to show cause and a return to the order to show cause. The matter came on for hearing before the district court, whereat no additional testimony was taken.
The court declared the order revoking Evanson's licenses void, and remanded the matter to the Commissioner for a hearing on the merits. It is from this order that the Commissioner appeals.
The Commissioner charged Evanson had violated the provisions of paragraphs (e), (h) and (j) of § 26--17--01.12, N.D.C.C., which provides the Commissioner with authority to revoke an insurance agent's license under certain conditions. It provides, in part relevant to this matter:
'1. A license may be refused or a license duly issued may be suspended or revoked or the renewal thereof refused by the commissioner of insurance, if he finds that the applicant for or holder of such license:
'e. Has otherwise demonstrated lack of trustworthiness or competence to act as an insurance agent; or 'h. Has been guilty of fraudulent or dishonest practices; or
The Commissioner contends, notwithstanding that a request for a hearing had been filed with him, that upon the nonappearance by Evanson at the hearing, the Commissioner could enter the proposed order. This contention is not persuasive. The statute, subsection 4 of § 26--17--01.12, provides that when a hearing is requested and conducted the Commissioner shall make and state his findings of fact and separate conclusions of law and his decision based upon such findings and conclusions. The statute does not state that one must appear at the hearing after requesting it in order to set in motion the requirement that the Commissioner must make findings of fact before making a decision. The language used is an apt method of ensuring that upon a request for a hearing the Commissioner's decision would be based upon a careful consideration of the evidence adduced, rather than upon a mere statement of the allegations in the complaint and upon a motion by counsel for the Commissioner to enter the order.
Evanson was entitled to a notice from the Commissioner of the intent to make an order revoking Evanson's licenses regardless of his failure to attend the hearing, as he had made an appearance in the proceeding by his request for a hearing. In the usual civil action, judgment by default may be entered if a party has failed to plead or appear, but if the party against whom judgment is sought has made an appearance in the action he must be served with notice of the application for judgment. North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 55, provides:
'(3) . . . If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least eight days prior to the hearing...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
ND Fair Housing Council, Inc. v. Peterson
...the presumption is that no change in the law was intended, absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary. See Evanson v. Wigen, 221 N.W.2d 648, 654 (N.D.1974) (a simple change in diction or phraseology—absent a clear legislative intent to the contrary—is presumed to be a change "for pur......
-
Schmitz v. N. D. State Bd. of Chiropractic Exam'rs
...Procedure do not apply to administrative agencies" and was "highly improbable ... [it] intended to reverse its holding in Evanson v. Wigen , 221 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1974), which held that Rule [55], N.D.R.Civ.P., and Rule 43(e), N.D.R.Civ.P., apply to administrative agencies without even menti......
-
Envtl. Law & Policy Ctr. v. N. Dakota Pub. Serv. Comm'n
...Procedure do not apply to administrative agencies" and was "highly improbable ... [it] intended to reverse its holding in Evanson v. Wigen , 221 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1974), which held that Rule [55], N.D.R.Civ.P., and Rule 43(e), N.D.R.Civ.P., apply to administrative agencies without even menti......
-
Grace Lutheran Church v. North Dakota Employment Sec. Bureau
...28-32, NDCC, are not exclusive. Special statutes prevail if in conflict with the more general provisions of Chapter 28-32. Evanson v. Wigen, 221 N.W.2d 648 (N.D. 1974). However, in the instant case it appears that no such conflict exists. Both § 52-06-27 and § 28-32-15 provide that an appea......