Everfield v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 57410

• Decision Date: 22 January 1981
• Docket Number: No. 57410,57410
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Leroy EVERFIELD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Defendant and Respondent. Civ.

Page 164

171 Cal.Rptr. 164

115 Cal.App.3d 15

Leroy EVERFIELD, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE COMPENSATION INSURANCE FUND, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. No. 57410.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 2, California.

Jan. 22, 1981.

Hearing Denied April 2, 1981.

Michael S. Fields, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and appellant.

James J. Vonk, Richard Krimen, George Bjornsen, and Errol L. Searle, San Francisco, for defendant and respondent.

BEACH, Associate Justice.

NATURE OF APPEAL:

Appeal from judgment of dismissal after demurrer sustained without leave to amend.

ISSUE:

The issue simply stated is: Do the facts pleaded in plaintiff's complaint establish any reason to warrant a departure from the basic general rule that matters relative to claims for workers' compensation, their payment and enforcement, are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers' Compensation Act and ordinarily do not give rise to a cause of action at law?

OUR DECISION:

We hold they do not and we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND:

Pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act, plaintiff (appellant), an injured worker, made application before the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board and received workers disability benefits from his employer through its insurance carrier State Compensation Insurance Fund (respondent). Appellant subsequently brought action in superior court against respondent alleging two causes of action entitled "Count 1" and "Count 2." In the first "count", appellant alleged consistent delay in payments of compensation; arbitrary reduction in the periodic amount paid; and intentional disregard of a subpoena duces tecum, all on the part of respondent resulting in physical and emotional suffering to appellant. In the second "count", appellant repeats the allegations and adds that all of the acts by respondent were done intentionally, deceitfully, fraudulently and in bad faith with intent to injure plaintiff. He sought $20 million in damages.

DISCUSSION:

For injury in the course of employment, Labor Code section 3600 ¹ provides for the liability of an employer to an employee in lieu of any other liability whatsoever. Section 3601 expressly states that the right to recover under section 3600 is "the exclusive remedy" for injury of an employee against the employer. Within the general framework and application of the Workers' Compensation laws, the employer's insurance carrier stands in the same shoes as the employer. (§ 3850(b)). Notwithstanding the explicit statutory language, the California Supreme Court in Unruh v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1972) 7 Cal.3d 616, 102 Cal.Rptr. 815, 498 P.2d 1063, created an exception to the exclusive jurisdiction established by statute. The court there held that where an employer's insurance carrier intentionally commits outrageous and extreme conduct totally unnecessary to and far beyond the bounds of normal investigation and defense of a worker's claim, such conduct removes the carrier from the protective insulation of sections 3600 and 3601 which limit the injured worker to the remedies provided under the Workers' Compensation Act and bar actions at law.

However, comparison between the Unruh case and the matter at bench discloses the total failure of the pleadings at bench to state a cause of action and the total inapplicability of Unruh to the facts pleaded at bench. The holding in Unruh is based upon the specific conduct and the outrageous and extreme perfidious nature clearly described by the pleadings in Unruh. There the complaint alleged that investigators for the carrier had deceived plaintiff and for the purpose of obtaining motion pictures had caused her to conduct herself in a manner beyond her normal physical capacities. One investigator had further misrepresented his capacity and intentions and intentionally caused plaintiff to become emotionally interested in him. He had invited her on an outing to Disneyland where he caused her to cross a rope bridge and a barrel bridge while he shook the bridge in order that a second investigator could film the events. Upon learning of this deception plaintiff alleged that she suffered a mental breakdown.

By contrast at bench, plaintiff has described three things: delay, the change in the amounts paid and disobedience to the subpoena duces tecum issued by the Workers' Compensation Board. These three acts in themselves are not fraudulent, deceitful, outrageous, perfidious or so extreme or abnormal as to fit in the class of misconduct considered in Unruh. In the first count only the disobedience to the subpoena is alleged to be intentional. The second count adds nothing to the complaint. It contains only the ancient and sham procedure of asserting the conclusion that the acts are "fraudulent, deceitful and intentional." The addition of these words does not describe the conduct but simply asserts the subjective characterization of them by plaintiff-appellant.

If every case in which there is a delay, a change of amount, or a disobedience to a subpoena could be brought into a court of law by an unhappy worker by merely alleging that the acts were intentional, deceptive, outrageous and fraudulent without alleging the specific conduct and how it was carried out, it would make shambles of the Workers' Compensation system now quickly and efficiently handled for the benefit of the injured workers by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board.

The reasons for the delay, whether intentional or negligent, whether excusable or not, can be well inquired into by the board and where necessary discipline imposed. The same is true of reasons for changing amounts of periodic payments. They may be justified. They may be unjustified. The change may be the result of errors in computation or good faith disagreements. In the case at bench, for example, the change was found to be justified and respondent given credit for the...