EX PARTE ALLOY WHEELS INTERN., LTD.

• Decision Date: 21 November 2003
• Citation: 882 So.2d 819
• Parties: Ex parte ALLOY WHEELS INTERNATIONAL, LTD. (In re Sue S. Vance, as personal representative of the estate of Katherine Victoria Vance, deceased v. Sonic-Williams Imports, Inc., d/b/a Tom Williams Land Rover; et al.)
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

882 So.2d 819

Ex parte ALLOY WHEELS INTERNATIONAL, LTD.

(In re Sue S. Vance, as personal representative of the estate of Katherine Victoria Vance, deceased v. Sonic-Williams Imports, Inc., d/b/a Tom Williams Land Rover; et al.)

1020778.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

November 21, 2003.

Thomas S. Rue, Tracy P. Turner, and William H. Hardie, Jr., of Johnstone, Adams, Bailey, Gordon & Harris, L.L.C., Mobile; an Nathan G. Watkins, Jr., Livingston, for petitioner.

D. Bruce Petway and Rodney F. Barganier of Lucas, Wash, Petway, Tucker & Stephens, P.C., Birmingham; and David T. Shaw of Griess & Shaw, Eutaw, for respondent (Sue S. Vance).

JOHNSTONE, Justice.

The defendant Alloy Wheels International, Ltd., a foreign corporation engaged in manufacturing aluminum alloy wheels, petitions this Court for a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to vacate his order denying the motion of Alloy Wheels for a summary judgment grounded on lack of personal jurisdiction. Alloy Wheels asks this Court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the trial judge to issue an order granting a summary judgment in favor of Alloy Wheels. Because the materials before us establish that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Alloy Wheels, we grant the petition and issue the writ.

On September 26, 1999, Katherine Victoria Vance was killed in the rollover wreck of her 1998 Land Rover Discovery sport-utility vehicle. On September 10, 2001, Katherine's mother, Sue Vance, as the personal representative of Katherine's estate, sued a number of defendants, and eventually added Alloy Wheels as a defendant, for Katherine's wrongful death. The plaintiff alleged product liability claims and Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine claims against the defendants. The plaintiff specifically alleged that Alloy Wheels had defectively designed and manufactured the aluminum alloy wheels on Katherine's Land Rover and that a crack in at least one of the wheels caused the fatal wreck. Answering the amended complaint, Alloy Wheels asserted, among other defenses, the lack of personal jurisdiction.

Thereafter, Alloy Wheels moved for a summary judgment on the ground that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Alloy Wheels. Alloy Wheels relied on the allegations of the complaint and on two affidavits of Paul Merritt, the operations director of Alloy Wheels in the United Kingdom. Alloy Wheels argued that it did not have sufficient minimum contacts with the State of Alabama for the trial court to exercise personal jurisdiction over Alloy Wheels.

The plaintiff submitted a brief and evidentiary materials in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. The brief submitted by the plaintiff is not among the materials before us, but the evidentiary submissions are.

"[M]andamus is a drastic and extraordinary writ that will be issued only when there is: (1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court." Ex parte Horton, 711 So.2d 979, 983 (Ala.1998). "Subject to certain narrow exceptions ..., the denial of a motion to dismiss or a motion for a summary judgment is not reviewable by petition for writ of mandamus." Ex parte Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 825 So.2d 758, 761 (Ala.2002) (citing Ex parte Jackson, 780 So.2d 681, 684 (Ala.2000)). One of the exceptions is the denial of a motion grounded on a claim of lack of personal jurisdiction, Ex parte Sekeres, 646 So.2d 640 (Ala.1994),Ex parte Paul Maclean Land Servs., 613 So.2d 1284 (Ala.1993), and Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So.2d 880 (Ala.1983).

"The standard of review applicable to a summary judgment is the same as the standard for granting the motion, that is, we must determine whether there was a genuine issue of material fact and, if not, whether the movant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Our review is further subject to the caveat that this Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant."

Brewer v. Woodall, 608 So.2d 370, 372 (Ala.1992).

"A summary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c)(3), Ala. R. Civ. P. The party moving for the summary judgment, here [Alloy Wheels], has the burden of establishing a prima facie showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686 (Ala.1989). If the moving party makes such a showing, then the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to rebut that showing by presenting substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. Substantial evidence is `evidence of such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved.' West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989)."

Young v. La Quinta Inns, Inc., 682 So.2d 402, 403 (Ala.1996).

"Rule 4.2, Ala. R. Civ. P., [Alabama's long-arm statute] extends the personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the limit of due process under the federal and state constitutions. Sieber [v. Campbell, 810 So.2d 641 (Ala.2001)]. See also World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980); Duke [v. Young, 496 So.2d 37 (Ala.1986)]; Brooks v. Inlow, 453 So.2d 349 (Ala.1984); and Alabama Waterproofing Co. v. Hanby, 431 So.2d 141, 144-146 (Ala.1983). `A physical presence in Alabama is not a prerequisite to personal jurisdiction over a nonresident.' Sieber, 810 So.2d at 644. See also Sudduth [v. Howard], 646 So.2d [664] at 667 [(Ala.1994)].

"`"`What is required is that the out-of-state resident have "some minimum contacts with this state [so that], under the circumstances, it is fair and reasonable to require the person to come to this state to defend an action." Rule 4.2(a)(2)(I), Ala. R. Civ. P. [(Emphasis added.)]

"`"`"`[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."'"' McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957), quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945)....

"`"`....

"`"A relevant factor in a due process analysis is whether the defendant should have reasonably anticipated that he would be sued in the forum state. [(Emphasis added.)] In Dillon Equities [v. Palmer & Cay, Inc., 501 So.2d 459, 462 (Ala.1986)], this Court, quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980), noted:

"`"`"The foreseeability that is critical to due process analysis ... is that the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum state are such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." (Citations omitted.) [(Emphasis added.)]'"'

"Sudduth, 646 So.2d at 667 (quoting Knowles v. Modglin, 553 So.2d 563, 565-66 (Ala.1989))."

Ex parte McInnis, 820 So.2d 795, 802-03 (Ala.2001) (quoting Sudduth v. Howard, 646 So.2d 664, 667 (Ala.1994)). Rule 4.2(a) provides, in pertinent part:

"(2) Sufficient Contacts. A person has sufficient contacts with the state when that person, acting directly or by agent, is or may be legally responsible as a consequence of that person's

"....

"(D) causing tortious injury or damage in this state by an act or omission outside this state if the person regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct or derives substantial revenues from goods used or consumed or services rendered in this state;

"....

"(I) otherwise having some minimum contacts with this state and, under the circumstances, it is fair and reasonable to require the person to come to this state to defend an action. The minimum contacts referred to in this subdivision (I) shall be deemed sufficient, notwithstanding a failure to satisfy the requirements of subdivisions (A)-(H) of this subsection (2), so long as the prosecution of the action against a person in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States."

In Ex parte McInnis, this Court explained the application of the stream of commerce doctrine to a products liability case:

"In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. [v. Woodson], 444 U.S. [286] at 297-98, 100 S.Ct. 559 [(1980)], the Supreme Court stated that `[t]he forum State does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.' In Asahi Metal Industry Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of California, Solano County, 480 U.S. 102, 107 S.Ct. 1026, 94 L.Ed.2d 92 (1987), the Supreme Court clarified the `stream of commerce' doctrine of personal jurisdiction:

"`Since World-Wide Volkswagen, lower courts have been confronted with cases in which the defendant acted by placing a product in the stream of commerce, and the stream of commerce eventually swept defendant's product into the forum State, but the defendant did nothing else to purposefully avail itself of the market in the forum State. Some Courts have understood the Due Process Clause, as interpreted in World Wide Volkswagen, to allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction to be based on no more than the defendant's act of placing the product in the stream of commerce. Other courts have understood the Due Process Clause and the above-quoted language in World-Wide Volkswagen to require the action of the

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