Ex parte Barnett, 20296

• Citation: 594 S.W.2d 805
• Decision Date: 30 January 1980
• Docket Number: No. 20296,20296
• Parties: Ex parte John Otis BARNETT, Relator.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Civil Appeals of Texas

Page 805

594 S.W.2d 805

Ex parte John Otis BARNETT, Relator.

No. 20296.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Jan. 30, 1980.

Charles W. Yuill, Jr., Yuill & Pittenger, John Otis Barnett, Dallas, for appellant.

Michael Tibbals, Vetter, Bates, Tibbals & Lee, Dallas, for appellee.

Before GUITTARD, C. J., and ROBERTSON and HUMPHREYS, JJ.

GUITTARD, Chief Justice.

In this petition for writ of habeas corpus, relator attacks as void an order of one of the district courts of Collin County finding him in contempt and committing him to jail until he pays an arrearage of $5,250 in child support. He contends that the court had no jurisdiction to enforce the support order because it was rendered by a district court of Dallas County, but that court had transferred the proceeding to Collin County after some of the delinquent payments had fallen due. He attacks the order further on the ground that the motion for contempt fails to identify the support order and fails to allege clearly in what manner he had disobeyed it, and also on the ground that he is unable to pay the arrearage. We hold that the Collin County district court had jurisdiction of the motion for contempt under section 11.06 of the Texas Family Code (Vernon 1975), that the motion was sufficient to give relator notice of the contempt charged, and that relator has not conclusively established his involuntary inability to pay the arrearage. Consequently, we deny the writ and remand relator to the custody of the sheriff of Collin County.

1. Jurisdiction of Transferee Court

In support of the contention that the district court of Collin County had no jurisdiction, relator argues that under the decision of the Supreme Court of Texas in Ex parte Gonzales, 111 Tex. 399, 238 S.W. 635 (1922), one court has no jurisdiction to enforce by contempt the order of another court. He asserts that when a proceeding affecting the parent-child relationship is transferred to another county under section 11.06, the court which issued the support order retains jurisdiction to enforce that order by contempt until another order is issued by the court to which the proceeding has been transferred, and that the transferee court can enforce only its own orders issued after the transfer.

We conclude that this argument is contrary to the concept of continuing jurisdiction in the Family Code. Section 11.05(a) provides that with exceptions not relevant here,

when a court acquires jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, that court retains continuing jurisdiction of all matters provided for under this subtitle in connection with the child, and no other court has jurisdiction of a suit affecting the parent-child relationship with regard to that child except on transfer as provided in Section 11.06 or 17.06 of this code. (Emphasis added.)

Tex.Family Code Ann. § 11.05 (Vernon Supp.1979). Pertinent provisions of section 11.06 are as follows:

(c) For the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice, the court, on the timely motion of any party, may transfer the proceeding to a proper court in any other county in the state.

Tex.Family Code Ann. § 11.06(c) (Vernon 1975).

(g) The court transferring a proceeding shall send to the proper court in the county to which transfer is made the complete files in all matters affecting the child, certified copies of all entries in the minutes, and a certified copy of any decree of dissolution of marriage issued in a suit joined with the suit affecting the parent-child relationship. If the transferring court retains jurisdiction of another child who was the subject of the suit, the court shall send a copy of the complete files to the court to which the transfer is made and shall keep the original files.

Tex.Family Code Ann. § 11.06(g) (Vernon Supp.1979).

(h) A court to which a transfer is made becomes the court of continuing jurisdiction, and all proceedings in the suit are continued as if it were brought there originally. (Emphasis added.)

Tex.Family Code Ann. § 11.06(h) (Vernon 1975).

In enacting these provisions for exclusive continuing jurisdiction, the legislature has recognized "the need to commit the decision of all controversies that directly affect the welfare of particular children to a single court." Curtis v. Gibbs, 511 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Tex.1974). In the light of this policy, we must consider what effect must be given to section 11.06(h), which provides that the transferee court "becomes the court of continuing jurisdiction, and all proceedings in the suit are continued as if it were brought there originally."

We conclude that when this provision is interpreted in the light of the other quoted provisions of the Code, it is clear that the transferee court acquired jurisdiction of the proceeding at the time of the transfer "as if it were brought there originally," and that no other court has jurisdiction. Otherwise, an opportunity would exist for a conflict between the two courts of the sort that the "continuing jurisdiction" provision of section 11.05 is designed to prevent. This intent may be gathered also from section 11(g), which contemplates that the transferring court will no longer retain any papers in the case, other than those entered in its own minutes, unless the court retains jurisdiction of another child that was the subject of the suit. It is unreasonable to suppose that the drafters of the Code intended that the transferring court retains jurisdiction to enforce its order after all the papers in the case, other than the orders entered in its minutes, have been sent to the transferee court. Neither is there any reason to require the transferee court to hold another hearing and issue another support order before it has jurisdiction to entertain a motion for contempt.

We do not consider this holding as contrary to that in Ex parte Gonzales, 111 Tex. 399, 238 S.W. 635 (1922). That case concerned violation of an injunction. The violation was a single act done before the case was transferred. Although a statute provided that upon transfer the transferee court should have jurisdiction of the case as though the suit had been originally brought in that court, that statute, when taken together with other statutes concerning contempt and injunctions, was held not to authorize the transferee court to punish a violation that occurred when the cause was still pending in the transferring court. Thus, the general statement in the opinion that one court is not authorized to punish contempts of another court must be understood to be based on the particular statutes under consideration.

That there is no inherent or constitutional limitation on the power of a court to use its contempt power to enforce the orders of another court is demonstrated by Ex parte Helms, 152 Tex. 480, 259 S.W.2d 184 (1953), which upheld the power of a Texas court to enforce a foreign support order by...