Ex Parte Beckenstein

Decision Date30 April 1937
Docket NumberNo. 19022.,19022.
Citation104 S.W.2d 404
PartiesEx parte BECKENSTEIN.
CourtMissouri Court of Appeals

This is a habeas corpus proceeding originated in this court by petitioner who was arrested, tried, convicted, and fined because of his alleged violation of an ordinance of the city of St. Joseph. The proceedings were had in police court, and petitioner, not being able to pay the fine, was ordered incarcerated in the Buchanan county jail. Our provisional writ was directed to the sheriff of that county, who filed return, setting up the foregoing proceedings, orders, and judgments, and also filing herein a certified copy of the ordinance forming the basis thereof. The city of St. Joseph filed motion to quash, and issue is joined on the motion. Oral argument was heard, and the matter is now before us for final disposition.

The city complains that no notice was given to it of this application. The city was not a party to the proceeding and was not entitled to any notice. Notice was given respondent, the sheriff of Buchanan county, and he does not complain. But the writ of habeas corpus is of such importance to the liberty of the people that our writ may issue even though unsupported by any petition. Section 1430, R.S.Mo.1929 (Mo.St.Ann. § 1430, p. 1638); State ex rel. Hulen v. Trimble, 310 Mo. 274, loc. cit. 286, 275 S.W. 536, loc. cit. 540. And it is not necessary that application first be made to an inferior court. Ex parte Hagan, 295 Mo. 435, loc. cit. 440, 441, 245 S.W. 336.

Petitioner admittedly solicits and accepts articles for dry cleaning to be sent to plants outside the city of St. Joseph to be cleaned and pressed. He has no license, although he had made application therefor, had tendered the license fee, and inspection fee as required, and license had been refused. He challenges the validity of sections 24 and 25 of the ordinance under which he was required to post a bond and to file daily lists of articles to be removed from the city for cleaning. License was refused him solely because of his refusal to comply with the provisions of those two sections of the ordinance, which are in words and figures as follows:

"Section 24: No person, firm, partnership or corporation engaged in the business of operating a dry cleaning establishment, a pressing establishment or in the business of agent for dry cleaning, or who shall in any way take orders for or solicit such business in the City of St. Joseph, shall remove any clothing, wearing apparel, fabrics or towels from the City of St. Joseph for the doing of any such cleaning, pressing or renovating without having filed with the License Inspector of said City a bond in the penal sum of Two Thousand Dollars ($2000.00) to said City for the use and benefit of the owner or owners of any of such articles so removed, such bond to be executed by said person, firm, partnership or corporation as principal, with a surety or sureties satisfactory to and to be approved by said License Inspector, conditioned that such person will satisfy and pay to the owner or owners thereof all damages to or loss of any property removed by said principal from said City of St. Joseph for cleaning, pressing or renovating purposes.

"Section 25: Before any person, firm, partnership or corporation engaged in said City in the business of operating a dry cleaning establishment, a pressing establishment, in the business of agent for dry cleaning, or who shall in any way take orders for or solicit such business in the City of St. Joseph, shall remove any clothing, wearing apparel, fabrics or towels from the City of St. Joseph for the purpose of cleaning, pressing or renovating any of such articles, such person, firm, partnership or corporation shall file with said License Inspector of said City an itemized list which shall set out each article to be removed from said City for said purposes, together with the name of the owner or owners and the date upon which said articles are to be returned to said owner or owners."

Petitioner does not challenge any other provision of the ordinance, and these only on the grounds hereinafter mentioned. Therefore, we reserve our opinion as to the validity of other sections for the reason that same are nowise in controversy in this proceeding.

The validity of the ordinance is challenged on the grounds that it is "unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, oppressive and unequal in its application." This involves an examination of the provisions of sections 4 and 30 of article 2 of the Constitution of Missouri. Ordinarily questions involving construction of the Constitution are reserved for the Supreme Court alone, but this court is vested with constitutional authority to hear and determine habeas corpus cases, and that authority necessarily carries with it the authority to determine whatever questions may be involved, even though they may involve the Constitution.

Class legislation has been uniformly condemned by our courts as being violative of the above sections of article 2 of our Constitution. State v. Loomis et al., 115 Mo. 307, loc. cit. 309, 22 S.W. 350, 21 L.R.A. 789. "`Due process of law' is denied, when any particular person of a class or of the community is singled out for the imposition of restraints or burdens not imposed upon and to be borne by all of the class, or of the community at large, unless the imposition or restraint be based upon existing distinctions that differentiate the particular individuals of the class to be affected from the body of the community, and this question as to whether the persons thus designated constitute a natural or reasonable class depends upon facts which the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
6 cases
  • Arkansas-Missouri Power Corp. v. City of Kennett
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • September 25, 1941
    ...47 and 48 of the Missouri Constitution. Art. IV, Sec. 53, Pars. 24, 32, Mo. Const.; Art. IV, Secs. 46, 47 and 48, Mo. Const.; Ex parte Beckenstein, 104 S.W.2d 404; Cape Girardeau v. Groves Motor Co., 142 S.W.2d Roberts v. Benson, 142 S.W.2d 1058; Springfield v. Smith, 19 S.W.2d 1, 322 Mo. 1......
  • Turner v. Kansas City
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1945
    ... ... State ex rel ... Musser v. Birch, 85 S.W. 361; Union Cemetery v ... Kansas City, 161 S.W. 261; Ex parte Davision, 13 S.W.2d ... 40; State ex rel. Kennedy v. Remmers, 101 S.W. 2d ... 70. (10) Instances of ordinance held unreasonable. St ... Louis ... Mo. Const., Art. II, Secs. 4, 14 and 30, and is therefore ... void. St. Louis v. Evraiff, 256 S.W. 489; Ex parte ... Beckenstein, 104 S.W.2d 404; Glencoe Lime, etc., Co. v ... St. Louis, 108 S.W.2d 143. (16) Any doubt as to the ... validity of the challenged provisions of ... ...
  • Olan Mills, Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • November 8, 1954
    ...high as to be confiscatory and prohibitive. See also City of St. Louis v. Consolidated Coal Co., 113 Mo. 83, 20 S.W. 699; Ex parte Beckenstein, Mo.App., 104 S.W.2d 404; City of California v. Riback, Mo., 204 S.W. 389. Other municipalities of the State may impose a like tax if the instant li......
  • Linen Service Corporation v. City of Abilene, 2328.
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 19, 1943
    ...Baking Co. v. City of Fernandina, Fla., D.C., 29 F.2d 789; Myers v. City of Defiance, 67 Ohio App. 159, 36 N.E.2d 162; Ex parte Beckenstein, Mo.App., 104 S.W.2d 404. The rule of presumed validity of an ordinance, in our opinion, has no application to an ordinance which upon its face disclos......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT